

MATILDE

Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions

10 STATISTICAL BRIEFINGS ON IMMIGRATION'S SOCIAL IMPACTS

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Deliverable 3.2 – 10 Statistical Briefings on Social Impacts to Provide an In-Depth Quantitative Assessment of the 4 Dimensions Determining the Social Impact of Migration at Multiple Scales

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CONTENTS

AUSTRIA

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1. INTRODUCTION

This statistical briefing note intends to provide background information on the relevance of migration flows towards Austrian regions, and through detailed presentation of key features to contribute to a deepened understanding of the spatial contexts for TCNs integration processes and social impacts. As the country policy report for Austria has outlined (Machold et al. 2021), immigration aspects are increasingly dealt with in a restrictive political framework that nurtures hostile positions among wide groups of society in the country. Dismantling innovative schemes that had previously been available and raising obstacles for approving asylum seekers applications, achieving "integration" success and "bestowing" citizenship under highly restrictive conditions testifies the more difficult situation of recent years. Nevertheless, in contrast to those challenges, a number of local and regional innovative pilot schemes is struggling to retain some of the positive spirit and attitudes among parts of the population to harness new entrants' social and economic potential and contribute to an improved culture of coexistence.

This dichotomy is sensible in many discussions and shows up in many indicators on migration development, the extent of the phenomenon, spatial extension of new migrants towards less densely populated areas and gradual increase of TCNs "weight" in local and regional demography. These indicators are presented for main social issues, contrasting the respective indicators' development for Austrian citizens against TCNs (and sometimes addressing specific sub-groups). As detailed spatial information is limited for several of these indicators, the bulk of information presents a national view and sub-national comparable data, mainly at NUTS 2 level (i.e. Länder level, focusing on Carinthia and Vorarlberg), and in some cases even NUTS 1 information for larger parts of Austria (West Austria including the area of Vorarlberg, and South Austria including the area of Carinthia). The information provided covers themes like income inequality and poverty risk, the affectedness by housing challenges, differences in educational attainment, broken down for different age groups, as well as data on persons not in work, highlighting unemployment levels and the share of young people neither employed, nor in education and training. Finally, an indication of the difference in citizenship acquisition between people originating from TCNs and EU Member States reveals the difference between the two groups of migrants. The data used is based on statistics from Eurostat and the Austrian Institute of Statistics.

These general indicators confirm the perception that TCNs are coping with specific obstacles in their integration efforts, expressed through the short overview of key information for the social dimension within our study areas. Even if these regions represent areas with enhanced economic performance, as it is the case for Vorarlberg, TCNs face considerable challenges that will have to be explored more in detail through qualitative analysis in the case study.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Austria by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+).
Source: Eurostat.



Figure 1 shows the at-risk-of-poverty rate in Austria for nationals and citizens from non-EU28 countries aged 18+ years. All persons with an equivalised disposable income after social transfer below a defined threshold are considered to be at risk of poverty. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers. This indicator puts income of all residents in a country in comparison to each other, but it is not an indicator of measurement for actual wealth or poverty.

While the risk of poverty rate has remained at a stable level throughout the period 2004 to 2019 in Austria at about 10.8% on average, the share of non-EU-citizens facing risk of poverty fluctuated over the period 2009 to 2019 and attained on a much higher level of about 33% on average. Over this period, the lowest rate occurred in 2012 and the highest rate in 2016 and 2017, which can be explained by the high number of refugees who sought protection in Austria in 2015/2016 and were dependent on basic care and minimum income for the time being.

In 2019, 1,161,000 people in Austria are at risk of poverty (after social transfer), which is about 13.3% of all inhabitants. This number also includes 233,000 children under the age of 18 years (15% of all children) at risk of poverty, which leads to the conclusion, that families with a higher number of children are hence more affected by the risk of poverty. A share of 64.4% of these people at risk are Austrian nationals, of which 6.4% are naturalized citizens, and 35.6% are non-Austrian citizens, of which 55% are TCNs at risk of poverty. Looking at the total number of TCNs in Austria, this refers to the fact that one third of all TCNs have less than 60% of the median income and are at risk of poverty. According to EU-SILC 2019, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in Austria is at €15,437 per year for a single-person household, which amounts to €1,286 per month. For a family with two children the threshold lies around €32,419.

In Vorarlberg, the share of population at risk of poverty is considerably higher with 17.5% in 2019, compared to the other provinces of Austria. In Carinthia however, the share is with 13% lower, but very similar to the Austrian average (Statistik Austria, EU-SILC 2019).

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Austria by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The median equivalised net income is defined as the disposable income after tax, that is available for spending or saving. While the median equivalised net income increases slightly but continuously for Austrian citizens over the years, an irregular development can be observed with regard to TCNs. For example, in 2016 the average personal income of TNCs was €1.196 lower than for the previous year 2015, indicating for these significant fluctuations. While the median equivalised net income of Austrian citizens reaches a total of €27,749 per year in 2019, TCNs only get €19,090 per year, which is about a third less (Figure 2).

Looking at national data (Statistik Austria 2020a), foreign citizens are disproportionately represented in the low-wage sector. In total, 13% of all employed persons receive an hourly wage of less than two-thirds of the median hourly wage in 2018. Such low wage levels are observed for 22% of foreign citizens. There is a considerable difference between the various groups of foreign nationals, employees born in EU and EFTA countries are much less affected (16%) compared to TCNs who have a share of low wage incomes of 28%. In comparison, the share of Austrian citizens employed in the low-wage sector is 11%. While the Austrian share is at a stable level from 2012 to 2018, the share of employees in low-wage sectors among immigrants fell in the same time from 27% to 22%. Particularly the share for TCNs declined from 32% in 2012 to 28% in 2018 (Statistik Austria 2020a).

The median equivalised net income of employed persons in Austria was €25,928 per year in 2018. While Austrian citizens earn €26,975, which is almost 4% above the median, all foreign citizens earn on average €21,588, which is 16.7% below median income. Divided into the most relevant TCN groups working in Austria, the median income of citizens of Turkey and former Yugoslavia (outside EU) is about the same and reaches 82% of the median net income of Austrians. Citizens from other non-EU countries earn even less than 75% of the Austrian median net income (€19,538) (Statistik Austria 2020a).

The median annual net income in Carinthia is around €26,000 in 2018. While Austrian citizens earn about €26,500, foreign citizens only made about €21,500. Foreign citizens thus reach only 81.1% of the income of Austrians at their disposal in Carinthia. The net income of persons from Turkey is particularly low at about €19,900 per year. In Vorarlberg, the median annual net income in 2018 is about €27,300 and therefore the highest in Austria. Since 2015, it increased by almost €2,500. In Vorarlberg Austrian citizens earn an average of almost €28,000, while the net annual income of foreign citizens is about €25,000, they have almost 90% of the income of Austrian citizens at their disposal. Persons from countries of the former Yugoslavia (outside the EU) earn about €25,100 and persons from Turkey about €25,700 per year (ÖIF 2021).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Austria by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Figure 3 shows the overcrowding rate in Austria, comparing Austrian citizens and non-EU citizens (TCNs) over the age of 18 years. The overcrowding rate refers to the percentage of population living in an "overcrowded" household, meaning if the number of rooms is not appropriate to the number of people living in the household. This is defined as follows: for a family of two adults and two children, a minimum of two rooms, one for the parents and one for the children (under 12 years or between 12 and 17 years of same gender) is necessary. Each person aged 18 or more needs an extra room (Eurostat 2014). While in average 8% of Austrian citizens live in overcrowded households, this share is much higher for non-EU citizens and varies between 34.6% in 2011 and 45% in 2016. This share increased again in 2019 up to 43.8% after it had dropped in 2017 and 2018. By contrast, the share of Austrian citizens is 7.5% in 2019.

Based on EU-SILC data, in 2019 about 173,000 of the 3.94 million main residential dwellings in Austria are classified as overcrowded. This corresponds to 4% of all households and 7% of the resident population affected by overcrowded housing conditions. More than a half of this share are foreign citizens (52.2%) and among them, 25% EU/EFTA citizens and 75% TCNs. People with a low household income are three times more likely to live in overcrowded housing than the population average as well as multi-person households with three or more children (Statistik Austria 2019a).

Table 1 shows that the largest share of overcrowding occurs in households living in social (14.9%) or rental housing (8.3%). Looking at the data at the provincial level, it can be seen that Vorarlberg and Carinthia are below the Austrian average. However, Carinthia only has an overcrowding rate of 1.6%, while in Vorarlberg 3.1% households are overcrowded.

Characteristics	Accommodation as main residence in total in 1.000	average household size	overcrowding rate
		∅	in %
Total	**3 949,9**	**2,2**	**4,1**
Legal status			
House Ownership	1 477,2	2,7	0,4
Flat Ownership	436,6	2,0	2,4
Social Housing	275,4	2,1	14,9
Cooperative Housing	655,5	2,0	5,5
Other Rental Housing	728,8	2,0	8,3
Others	376,3	1,7	(1,6)
Province			
Burgenland	126,1	2,3	(1,1)
Carinthia	254,3	2,2	1,6
Lower Austria	730,5	2,3	1,8
Upper Austria	638,2	2,3	2,7
Salzburg	242,0	2,3	4,3
Styria	549,8	2,2	2,5
Tirol	328,3	2,3	2,7
Vorarlberg	168,6	2,3	3,1
Vienna	912,1	2,0	9,4

Table 1: Average household size and overcrowding according to housing-specific characteristics (Statistik Austria 2019b)

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

In educational attainment, significant differences can be observed between TCNs and native individuals. This is valid for Austria as a whole as well as its single regions. The relevance of educational attainment, however, does not only root in individual factors of the quality of life or societal factors, but also in the correlation between the level of education and unemployment: well-educated individuals are significantly less likely to be unemployed than people without a vocational qualification. Thus, the facts and figures related to education have to be taken into consideration when interpreting findings related to the labor market and unemployment. Moreover, not only the individual risks of low education have to be taken into account, but also its social costs as unemployed people are usually net recipients of the fiscal system.

Overall, individuals with a migration background are disproportionately represented in the highest and lowest educational groups, while the population without migrant background has completed the intermediate level of education (apprenticeship and vocational school training, an Austrian specificity) more often than average. These differences in the educational structure are reflected in the data covering the last decade also, although in recent years there has been a significant increase in both the Austrian and the foreign population educational level (Statistik Austria/Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres 2019), also referred to as educational expansion. The following chapters give a detailed overview of the educational level of national and foreign citizens.

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4a. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Austria and Carinthia. Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 4a, overall the percentage of population with low education degrees, defined as less than primary, primary or lower secondary education, in Carinthia is decreasing over time. This applies to both groups, TCNs and the reference group of individuals born in Austria. Nonetheless, significant differences remain between TCNs and the reference group, as the percentage of TCNs with the respective low educational levels is on average approximately 20 percentage points higher, even if there is some convergence over time.

For both groups, it can be seen that the educational level in Carinthia is slightly higher compared to the Austrian average, where a higher share of people has the described low educational level. But for Carinthia, also a higher volatility of TCNs regarding educational attainment can be observed – the percentage of individuals with less than primary, primary or lower secondary education alternates more within this group, despite a slightly decreasing trend can also be observed in this group.

Figure 4b. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Austria and Vorarlberg. Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 4b, overall, the percentage of population with low education degrees in Vorarlberg is decreasing over time but is somewhat higher than the Austrian average. Nonetheless, significant differences remain between TCNs and the reference group, as the percentage of TCNs with the respective low educational levels is on average 40% higher, even if there is some convergence over time. Compared to Carinthia, in Vorarlberg the volatility of the group of TCNs is not as high.

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Figure 5a. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Austria and Carinthia. Source: Eurostat.



As indicated for in figure 5a, the share of population with upper secondary and post-secondary, but non-tertiary education is decreasing over time. This finding is valid for Austria in general, and Carinthia in particular, with the numbers in Carinthia being higher than for the Austrian average. As for TCNs, the share individuals with upper secondary and post-secondary, but non-tertiary education is significantly higher than for the reference group. The data discontinuity in 2014 can be laid back to the new ISCED classification 2011, counting schools with vocational education at higher levels as tertiary education.

As indicated for in figure 5b, the share of population with upper secondary and post-secondary, but non-tertiary education is also decreasing over time in Vorarlberg. But overall, the situation in Vorarlberg is somewhat different from the Austrian average – the share of TCNs with upper secondary and post-secondary, but non-tertiary education is significantly lower in Vorarlberg compared to the Austrian average.

Figure 5b. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Austria and Vorarlberg. Source: Eurostat.



5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6a. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education in Austria and Carinthia. Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 6a, the share of population with tertiary education increased over time. This is valid for natives as well as for TCNs, and applies to Austria as a whole, while the effect for TCNs in Carinthia cannot clearly be observed due to a lack of data. Compared to the reference group of natives, TCNs are less likely to attain higher education, with a significant gap of about 5 to 10 percentage points and more. Nonetheless, while for natives there is a relative stable trend, mixed up only by a sudden jump in 2013 due to the earlier mentioned data discontinuity, the numbers for TCNs alternate, in particular in Carinthia there is a high level of volatility.

As there are two higher education institutions in Carinthia – the Alpen Adria University Klagenfurt and the Carinthia University of Applied Sciences –, and several other universities in a driving range of about 2 hours, the relatively lower attainment in tertiary education in Carinthia cannot be grounded mainly in this fact. Thus, other explanatory factors as the absorption in the labor market without tertiary education (which could be motivated by the demographic change and missing employees, see Klinglmair/Aigner-Walder 2013), but also a mismatch of offered study programs with the real demands could be taken into consideration as potential explanatory factors. More than 70% of Carinthians who leave the country to study in other regions of Austria, state that the study program was not available in Carinthia (Aigner-Walder/Klinglmair 2015).

As for TCNs, language issues may be relevant when it comes to their relatively low participation rate in tertiary education – in particular, migrants with lower levels of German skills may be interested particularly in English study programs which number is still restricted in Carinthia.

Figure 6b. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education in Austria and Vorarlberg. Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 6b, the share of population with tertiary education increased over time in Vorarlberg, too. In particular the new ISCED classification in 2013 leads to a strong increase in people with tertiary education. While this is valid for natives as well as for TCNs at the Austrian level, this sharp increase cannot clearly be observed due to a lack of data for the regional effect in Vorarlberg. Nonetheless, compared to the reference group of natives, TCNs are less likely to attain higher education, with a significant gap of about 5% to 10% and more.

Once it comes to tertiary education attainment, it has to be considered that there is no university in Vorarlberg (Kramer 2016). The share of people with tertiary education is below the national average and also well below the MATILDE regions average – this may at least partly be explained by this fact, the closest institutions (in terms of driving difference/time) are in Germany (e.g. Friedrichshafen or Kempten) or Switzerland.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Austria by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



As shown in figure 7, the share of young people neither in employment nor in education or training is significantly higher for the group with a migrant background, compared to the reference group: While for TCNs a share of about 22% to 15% in the NEET-group can be observed, the reference group displays an average of slightly above 5%. Nonetheless, both groups display a slightly positive development as the share of individuals in the NEET-group is decreasing over time. This trend is more obvious for TNC – this group, beyond a higher volatility, displays a relatively strong decrease of NEET from about 22% in 2009 (in the global economic and financial crisis) to about 15% in 2019.

This positive trend may be explained by several factors – developments in the educational system that empower in particular TCNs as well as labor market developments. Nonetheless, the remaining gap of about 10 percentage points between the domestic-born population and TCNs is still significant and could be a matter of further specific policy response.

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8a. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Carinthia by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



Despite some missing data, the share of young people neither in employment nor in education or training in Carinthia decreased marginally over time but remains on a relatively high level of about 7.5%, there is no significant decrease (Figure 8a). While current data on individuals with a TNC background is missing in the Eurostat data, qualitative information suggests that the likelihood to belong to the NEET-group is significantly higher for TCNs, compared to the reference group.

Figure 8b. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Western Austria by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



As obvious from figure 8b (despite of some missing data), in Western Austria (including Vorarlberg) the share of young people neither in employment nor in education or training is significantly higher for the group with a migrant background, compared to the reference group. Nonetheless, both groups display a slightly positive development as the share of individuals in the “NEET-group” is decreasing over time, even if the decrease remains incremental.

Moreover, the regional comparison between Carinthia and Western Austria shows, that the share of NEETs is higher in Carinthia, and more steadily decreasing in Western Austria.

7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

The high relevance of education for employment and income can be validated for Austria and its regions. A significant correlation between the level of education and unemployment exists, according to which the well-educated are significantly less likely to be unemployed than people with a higher educational qualification. Those with primary education are most affected by unemployment, while people with tertiary education have the lowest unemployment rate.

Furthermore, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic strongly affects the labor market in Austria. Even if the concrete effects on the reference group of citizens and the group of TCNs are not foreseeable by now, it is plausible to assume that some positive trends (trends towards lower unemployment numbers/rate) may be stopped by the effects of the pandemic. While this may apply to all groups generally, TCNs – depending on their educational level and sectoral employment – may be more affected than nationals.

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Austria by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 10, the unemployment rate in Austria is significantly higher for TCNs, ranging from about 10% to 15%, compared to the reference group which unemployment rate alternates only between 4% and 5%. In addition, the volatility is higher in the group of TCNs, and a general trend of decreasing unemployment cannot be observed in this group, even if the numbers decreased in the last years. Moreover, the effects of economic shocks – in detail, the economic and financial crisis in 2009 – is stronger for TCNs. This fact can be explained by the sectoral distribution of TCNs vs. natives – obviously, TCNs work in sectors that are more vulnerable to this type of shocks.

Analyzing economic activities by citizenship shows that almost 4 of 5 blue- and white-collar workers of the secondary (78,4 %) and tertiary sector (77.7 %) are Austrians, followed by people from

EU-27 & EFTA (12.9 % and 14.0 %) and TCNs (8.7 % and 8.3 %). Almost the same ratio applies to the ICT sector (83.5 %/10.6 %/6.9 %, BMAFJ 2021).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

As can be drawn from figure 10a (despite of some missing data), the unemployment rate in South Austria (Carinthia being a part of it) is significantly higher for TCNs, compared to the reference group. Although the overall unemployment in Carinthia (and in the three NUTS3 regions) was at a low level, below the EU27-level and the MATILDE regions average throughout the period under review, compared to the Austrian countries the unemployment rate in Carinthia is the highest after Vienna (AMS 2021).

Figure 10a. Unemployment rate in South Austria by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Not only the unemployment rate, but also the volatility of unemployment is higher in the group of TCNs – this group seems to be more affected by incidents that influence the labor market than the reference group of citizens in Austria. This significant difference of about 5% to 10% points may be explained by the sectoral distribution of TCNs in the labor market – this finding is valid not only for Carinthia, but for Austria in general. Nonetheless, over the last years there seems to be a slightly positive trend, indicated by a decreasing unemployment rate for TCNs.

As for Carinthia, TCNs preferably work in "Administrative and support service activities", "Accommodation and food service activities", "Activities of households as employers, undifferentiated goods- and services", "Transportation and Storage", "Construction", "Real estate activities" and "Water supply, sewage, waste management". From a sectoral point of view, TCNs have almost the same relevance in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sector (BMFAJ 2021). However, the most important sector with 153,942 employees in 2019 in Carinthia is the tertiary sector (service sector). The most important branches are public administration, trade & repair, business services as well as accommodation and gastronomy (Kärntner Wirtschaftsförderungs Fonds – KWF 2020). The public administration is especially important for the NUTS3-region Klagenfurt-Villach as there the office of the Carinthian provincial government and the two large municipal administrations of the provincial capital of Klagenfurt and Villach are located.

Figure 10b. Unemployment rate in West Austria by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64).
Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 10b, in West Austria (including Vorarlberg) the overall unemployment rate for the reference group (citizens in the reporting region) is slightly decreasing over time with little volatility, ranging between about 4% and 2%. Overall, the unemployment rates of the total population of Vorarlberg (as well as of Austria as a whole) remain stable at a low level. Nevertheless, over the last five years, Vorarlberg was performing better than the Austrian average, even if this development is not reflected by the unemployment numbers of TCNs. The unemployment rate for TCNs is significantly higher, ranging from about 12% to 7%, with a strong volatility.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Austria as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



As can be drawn from figure 11, the share of resident non-citizens that acquired citizenship in Austria is significantly higher for TCNs than for the reference group of citizens from EU28 countries. This can easily be explained by the higher pressure for former TCN-citizens to acquire the Austrian citizenship for specific purposes, as they do not fall under the exceptions made for EU citizens.

Interestingly, the numbers are decreasing over time for TCNs, while the numbers for the reference group (citizens from EU countries) are slightly increasing. While this development could be interpreted as some kind of convergence, it is not necessarily positive, as it implies that the number of TCNs that acquire citizenship is decreasing. With a view on the fact that some parts of the labor market (e.g. the public sector) are hard to access without the Austrian citizenship, this issue may affect also labor market inclusion of TNCs.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since the 1990s, Austria has been affected by significant migration inflows that took place within a broader international context, resulting in considerable effects on Austria's population structure and the socio-economic situation of both, the native population and the migrants themselves. In particular, from the 2000s on, almost all regions of Austria have benefited in demographic development from labor migration, particularly from new EU-Member States and, more recently, from Third Countries (Faustmann & Skrivanek 2019).

For the two last decades the positive international migration balance has contributed to a balanced and in parts even increasing population number in Austria, also in the majority of its rural regions. Overall, the median Austrian population development is zero, but the internal population movement of Austrian citizens is relocating to cities and metropolitan areas. Despite the preference of immigrants for larger cities, particularly Vienna, almost all rural and mountainous areas witness an immigration surplus (from international migration) which, in most regions, is sufficient to compensate for local population losses due to negative natural population development and losses in internal migration balance (Machold & Dax 2019).

These developments bear significant economic effects for the respective regions, but also imply strong implications for societal change, as social diversity of people of different origins, languages and cultural backgrounds affect also the host society (Machold & Dax 2017). While some of these effects, like increasing cultural mixture and societal diversity, are starting to be considered positively by local population as well, it is obvious that migrants, in particular TNCs, are still somewhat marginalized with respect to many key indicators. Without dispute, in the long term there is some convergence between migrants and the native population in Austria as a whole and the two Matilde-regions Carinthia and Vorarlberg. This applies e.g. to the share of young people neither in employment nor in education or training. Nonetheless, apparent differences remain concerning (un)employment. Overall – beyond some regional differences – the share of unemployed individuals, individuals with lower education degrees, and the share of young people neither in employment nor in education or training is significantly higher amongst TCNs.

From a regional point of view, the data shows minor differences concerning the situation of TCNs within the two considered Austrian regions Carinthia and Vorarlberg. This is of interest as both countries register main differences from a demographic and economic point of view. While Carinthia faces a slightly negative population development, a median income below the Austria average, one of the highest unemployment rates and structural problems, Vorarlberg has a very positive population development (with even a still positive natural population growth), one of the highest income levels in Austria, an unemployment rate below the Austrian average and faces a prosperous economic development (Aigner-Walder 2018). Nevertheless, TCNs seem to face comparable challenges.

As there is a relatively close correlation (and a causal link as well) between education and employment, people with lower education levels experience a significantly higher likelihood to become unemployed. This effect can also be observed for Austrian citizens – an issue putting the link between educational policy and labor market policy center stage, raising the need for enhanced public policies. Furthermore, the educational attainment level has a positive impact on the income level, i.e. in a simplified relationship, the higher the educational level, the higher the income. Thus, the gaps between TCNs and the reference group considering the educational level lead to implications in the poverty rate, the equivalised income and the overcrowding rate in immigrant households, revealing important target fields for policy tasks.

The difficulties experienced and exposed through the indicators underline the importance to go beyond "traditional" migration policy which often tackles very specific areas of "integration" of migrants, not considering adequately the links between social and economic dimensions as delineated above. The goal of social inclusion for integration processes is therefore severely endangered due to the social "gap" as expressed by these indicators. This contributes to polarization processes, even in regional contexts with quite favorable economic performance. Such developments jeopardize social cohesion efforts, as expressed through manifold local action (see reports of both case studies and good practice examples).

Finally, capacity for active participation is limited for many TCNs due to their reduced income and education levels and perspectives, and personal efforts are concentrated on achieving affordable personal conditions to access basic services. Furthermore, the question of citizenship is of relevance in this context, as specific employment opportunities, e.g. in the public sector, are not open to non-nationals, and political participation is severely restricted. As outlined in the policy report, demands for fulfilling “basic” life aspects have risen in recent years so that deeper integration approaches have retreated to some extent. Looking beyond the average picture will be an important aspect in the case study to validate this, and to assess the meaning for different groups and the variability among TCNs within the case study regions, as well as to identify and develop innovative action to overcome these challenges.

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BULGARIA

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1. INTRODUCTION

With regard to statistical data on migration phenomena in Bulgaria, there is a lack of access to reliable and up-to-date information (Krasteva 2014). According to the Open Society Institute Sofia, "*Bulgaria is the only EU country that does not have comparable annual statistics on migration*". Ten years after this statement the situation is much better. However, although even that several local institutions provide data on different aspects of migration situations, there is no accessible and centralized system for collecting data on migration flows (Staikova 2013, Krasteva 2014). Generally, the information on the migration phenomena is predominantly qualitative.

This statistical briefing for Bulgaria on social impact of TCNs in MATILDE regions allows the evaluation of a migrant integration in comparative and broader perspective on one hand between European, national and regional level, and on the other between the majority and minorities into the country.

In some aspects this report builds on and details the results produced under WP2 and additional desk research and fieldwork gathered information thanks to its comprehensive approach based on many indicators for social polarizations and social cohesion.

The report uses Eurostat as main data source, but also information from National Statistical institute, as well some other results from particular researches of UNICEF or The Institute for Market Economics.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Bulgaria by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



There are extremely negative characteristics of the situation in the country when we talk for poverty. These are: the high levels of poverty and social exclusion, strong differentiation and fragmentation of society, poor quality of jobs, very high poverty rates among children and the elderly, strengthening the so-called K-shaped development ("K" recovery with one group up and the other further down) already dominating for decades with inequalities' ever increasing (Maria Jeliazkova and Douhomir Minev 2020).

The situation with the foreign population is mixed and complicated. The statistics shows that in 2020 the risk of poverty or social exclusion recorded for non-EU citizens in Bulgaria was lower than rate of the national citizens, but higher than the previous year – 24,6 %. Furthermore, there is a big difference among the migrant's groups. The refugees, the victims of human trafficking, the minors and the women are much more vulnerable than the others. There is no recent research on the topic, but one from 2014 says that in Bulgaria, 51% of immigrants from outside the EU live in material deprivation (Петкова 2014). It could be assumed that the situation become more complicated after the COVID-19 pandemic.

The fieldwork shows evidence that the refugees are the most vulnerable group, especially in a situation of unemployment due to the pandemic.

Furthermore, the lack of policy that address the specific needs of the vulnerable migrants in the country greatly reduces the chances of resolving the problem.

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Bulgaria by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



As in most post-socialist economies, the market transition in Bulgaria has been accompanied by an increase in income inequality, which currently is one of the highest in the European Union (EU). Compared to other EU members, Bulgaria has one of the lowest shares of social protection expenditures in GDP, which is the reason why some authors put the country in the category of a "minimal welfare state model" (Svilena Mihaylova and Silviya Bratoeva-Manoleva 2016). Even it seems that the social transfers mitigate income inequality, Bulgaria more or less follows the already turned into typical higher vulnerability of specific groups of the population. The long-established ethnic selectivity of the main socio-economic processes in the country is reaffirmed again. In 2019, the highest relative share of the poor is among the people who self- identify themselves as Roma - 64.8%. There are also significant differences linked to the economic activity according to the different ethnic groups. Among the poor people from the Bulgarian ethnic group, retirees predominate (55.2%), while among the poor people from the Roma ethnic group the relative share of the unemployed is the highest (36.6%). The relative share of the working poor is 27.5 among the poor people from the Roma ethnic group; 24.0% among these from the Turkish ethnic group and 22.0% among the poor people from the Bulgarian ethnic group (Maria Jeliazkova and Douhomir Minev 2020).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Bulgaria by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The overcrowding rate is often closely linked to other social exclusion and deprivation indicators, in particular those related to income. The EUROSTAT data for the overcrowding rate in immigrants household for 2019 show that more than half of the foreign citizens in Bulgaria (59.3 %; low reliability) live in an overcrowded household (Eurostat 2021). These data could be explained by different factors – the high risk of poverty, the income inequalities, as well as with some cultural specificities, such as bigger families than the local nuclear family.

In 2020 Bulgaria is the negative leader for overcrowding rate (60%) among the MS. When we analyse the data for the record in overcrowding for non-EU citizens, we have to take into account that the rate for nationals is also very high (44%).

Among EU countries, Bulgaria marks the largest difference in percentage points between the overcrowding rate for the 15-29 year age group and the population as a whole - almost 20 percentage points higher for young people or 62%.

It is important to note that the overcrowding rate in Bulgaria in both urban and rural areas is very high compared to the EU-27 average.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

The number and proportion of foreign-born school-age children in Bulgaria for 2018 are 18,593 or 2%. It is important to note that refugee and migrant children are recorded in national education statistics only if they are asylum-seekers or beneficiaries of international protection. As of the end of December 2018, school enrolment for refugee and migrant children was five times higher compared to the 2016-2017 school year due to increased outreach and support provided by the government and humanitarian agencies. 50% or 81 out of 161 school-age refugee and migrant children accommodated in government reception centres in December 2018 were enrolled in primary and secondary public schools, while a total of 121 asylum-seeking and refugee children were registered overall in the formal education system in the beginning of the 2018-2019 school year. Positive sign is that Bulgaria is one of only seven EU MS that has explicitly recognized undocumented migrant children`s entitlement to basic formal education (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) (UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM September 2019)

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Bulgaria and Yuzhen tsentralen. Source: Eurostat.



In Bulgaria, the primary education is compulsory between ages 5 to 16 and free in state owned schools. Pre-school (pre-primary) education in Bulgaria comprises children from the age of 3 to age of 6 or 7. Two years of pre-primary education are compulsory. School education in Bulgaria begins at the age of 7. Six year old may also be enrolled in school, if their physical and mental development allows for it and after their parents'/guardians' explicit consent.

School education is divided into primary and secondary, general or vocational, public and private.

In 2016, an amendment to the Law for School and Pre-school education created a provision for education, i.e. "individual" form of education. This allows families to educate their children at home under the condition that they follow government educational policies and the curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education and Science (European Commission 2019).

During the last 10 years there is a huge decrease in the enrollment of pupils.

The total number of dropouts for the 2018/2019 school year is 21,127 (out of 718,186 enrolled). The data show that in Bulgaria thousands of students drop out mainly after they complete the primary education. This composes the largest group of dropping out or not enrolled students in the country. Those who drop out / do not continue in high/secondary school are not evenly distributed among schools and regions, but there is concentration and even over-concentration in certain municipalities and schools. For the MATILDE region, NUTS2-region Yuzhen tsentralen, over 3000 students dropped out in the last two school years (3577 for 2016/2017 and 3223 for 2018/2019).

Although there has been a reduction in dropout not only regionally but also nationally, it should be noted that the reduction seems too modest on the background of the government's mega-action to return students to class. It started in the 2017/18 school year and continues up today, with more than 1,000 teams of employees from a number of institutions - schools, regional education departments, police, social services, municipalities, district administrations. The data of the Ministry of Education and Science showed that in 2017/18 - 24 000 children were returned to school. In 2018/19 - 19,077 students entered the class. In the second year of the mentioned mechanism, the focus was put not so much at returning but at keeping the students in class. However up to now, there is still no official data to show the results of the efforts (NSI 2020).

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Bulgaria and Yuzhen tsentralen. Source: Eurostat.



The comparison of the education level of the total population in Bulgaria and the total population of NUTS2-region Yuzhen tsentralen shows that the level of secondary or upper secondary education is similar (53.5% versus 53.6%) (Spenger, David 2020).

The last MIPEX issues describes, the school system in Bulgaria is slightly unfavourable. This could give explanation for the lower per cent of pupils with a migrant background in secondary education level in Bulgaria. The education system still creates barriers to the access of certain categories of immigrant pupils and largely ignores the specific needs and benefits they bring to the classroom. Immigrants and their children now face no impediments in their access to compulsory education and receive language support at school (Solano, Giacomo and Huddleston, Thomas 2020).

In terms of inclusion in the education system of beneficiaries of international protection of school age have the same rights as Bulgarian nationals laid down in the Pre-school and School Education Act. The persons of school age are provided free education in state and municipal schools of the Republic of Bulgaria under the terms and conditions of the Bulgarian citizens (Bulgarian Council on Refugees and Migrants н.д.).

However, in reality even this facilitations of the integration in the educational system, a lot of those who obtained refugee status didn't become part of the educational system.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6. Share of population with tertiary education in Bulgaria and Yuzhen tsentralen. Source: Eurostat.



In 2019/2020 academic year, 220.2 thousand persons were enrolled in the different tertiary education levels.

In the academic year 2019/2020, students - Bulgarian citizens were 195.7 thousand or 92.3% of all students in universities and specialized higher schools and in comparison to the previous year their number decreased by 3.7 thousand or by 1.9%. Foreign students were 16.3 thousand, which is 5.5% more than in the previous year and 43.0% more than in the academic year 2015/2016 (NSI 2020)

All foreigners have a right to study in higher education institutions of the Republic of Bulgaria, if they hold a document of completed secondary education of the country where the secondary education has been acquired, or a document of higher education or higher education degree (Study in Bulgaria 2019). The number and share of foreign students in Bulgaria increased during the observed period. Foreign students come from over 100 countries to study higher education in Bulgaria.

The largest share of foreign students came from Greece (23.7%), followed by the United Kingdom (16.1%), Germany (8.8%), Ukraine (6.3%) and Turkey - 6.0% of the total number of foreign students (NSI 2020). The largest numbers of foreign PhD students are from Greece (19.2 %), the Republic of North Macedonia (9.5 %) and Albania (9 %) (The Sofia Globe 2020).

For the TCNs the level of tertiary education is almost identical than the national average (20.4 versus 24.8%) (Spenger, David 2020)

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

In 2014, UNICEF conducted in Bulgaria a nationally representative survey on NEETs. which covers people between the ages of 15 and 24 and describes the socio-demographic profile of these young people. The first peak in joining the group is in the age between 15-19 and it is a result of early school leaving, and the second one is just after graduation. 64% of the NEETs live in small settlements - villages and small towns (other than district centers). Young people with status NEETs, living in rural areas are three times more than these who live in the capital - respectively 36%: 12% (Gender Project for Bulgaria 2019).

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Bulgaria by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



* Due to lack of data no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.

Education is the socio-demographic characteristic that determines to the greatest extent the inclusion or non-inclusion among NEETs. A significant share is occupied by early school leavers (47%).

The structure of NEETs by ethnicity is dominated by the Roma and Turkish ethnic groups (51%), 46% are Bulgarians. Ethnicity can be defined as a second risk factor for falling into the group of NEETs. The Roma are 4 times and the Turks - 2 times more at risk of getting into a situation of NEETs compared to ethnic Bulgarians (УНИЦЕФ 2015).

For minority ethnic groups, the proportion of women with NEETs status is 3.5 times higher than the others. The proportion of men from minority ethnic groups who are part of NEETs group is 2.3 times higher than the other (Gender Project for Bulgaria 2019).

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Yuzhen tsentralen by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



* Due to lack of data no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.

The European Survey on Social Inclusion and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) shows that the NUTS2-region Yuzhen tsentralen of the country as having the highest NEET rate of 31.8% for the 15-34 age group. It is largely reassuring that there are not many inactive youths in the school-aged group, between 15 and 19, with the exception of the Southern Central and Southeastern regions of the country. This, again, seems to be correlated with the larger presence of Roma in those regions. Breaking down the share of NEETs by education shows that the apparent “breaking point” is the completion of high school (the 12th grade), which significantly decreases the probability of having NEET status.

One survey from 2019 of IME provides evidence of the need for special emphasis on some groups in particular, such as NEETs living in South Central region, as well as NEETs in the 30-34 age group, and women from ethnic minorities (IME 2019).

7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

Unemployment has declined significantly but regional variations and long-term and youth unemployment remain high. Inactivity among certain groups of the population persists and many citizens – including the elderly, people living in rural areas, and the Roma - are excluded from economic opportunities (The World Bank 2017).

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Bulgaria by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



** Due to lack of data no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.*

Bulgaria's economy started to recover after a steep downturn and is expected to continue expanding. After an initial surge, unemployment had stabilized and decrease in the resent years.

However, even with this positive trend, some groups of the society continue to struggle more with some economic difficulties. For example, those from Roma population. Unfortunately, a clear focus on this group as well as measures tailored to the needs of migrants are absent from some of the main policies and programmes. For Roma, challenges remain in terms of discrimination, negative stereotypes, and socio-economic and cultural factors, which contribute to their marginalisation, which in some extend is also valid for migrants. Another gap is the ineffectiveness of current measures in dealing with long-term unemployment among people of various ages, groups, and societal background living in extreme poverty and/or social exclusion. Positive step is the articulation in the Action Plan Entrepreneurship 2020 for Bulgaria of migrants, along with other groups, as key target groups which are under-represented or disadvantaged in the labour market (OECD/European Union 2017).

Immigrants in Bulgaria do not figure in the general statistical data on employment rates. One of the publicly accessible sources for labour migration is the data provided by the Employment Agency on the number of work permits issued per year.

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 10. Unemployment rate in Yuzhen tsentralen by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



** Due to lack of data no specific characterization for TCNs can be provided.*

The economic and labor market panorama of the region could be summarized in two opposite characteristics – low GDP per capita, but also low unemployment. The regional GDP per capita (8,200) is way lower than the national one (14,900), and also below the EU average (29,800), and MATILDE regions average (29,624). On the positive side, the regional unemployment (3.1%) is way lower than the national one (6.2%), the EU average (8.1%), and MATILDE regions average (8.4%).

The most negative indicator is the very high percentage of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion – 43.8%, almost double than the EU average (22.5%), more than double than the MATILDE regions average (18.7%) and also higher than the national average (38.9%).

With only small fluctuations, the unemployment rate of the region follows the national trend, i.e. the pre-crisis, financial and economic crisis and post-crisis. The following graph presents the development of the unemployment rate at both the national level and in the region. The development of the unemployment rates was highly dynamic in the period under consideration (Spenger, David 2020).

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

In general, the Bulgarian citizenship can be acquired by origin, place of birth and naturalization. In Bulgarian case, the standard naturalization procedure assumes that the applicant has spent at least 10 years in Bulgaria before applying for citizenship. In addition, they must demonstrate financial independence and stability, as well as knowledge of the Bulgarian language. The commitment to Bulgaria is confirmed by the requirement for foreigners by general naturalization to renounce their previous citizenship. The acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by naturalisation is carried out by the President of the Republic of Bulgaria through a special decree. The decree enters into force on the day of its issuance.

There are two “short cuts” to Bulgarian citizenship. The first one is the claim for Bulgarian origin. The Bulgarian origin is proved with a certificate issued by the State Agency for Bulgarian Citizens Abroad. To obtain such a certificate, the Agency needs evidence for the Bulgarian origin (birth certificate, passport or other private/public document) of the applicant. The certificate is issued after an examination period, which lasts around 2 months.

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Bulgaria as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



The second one is the so called “investment citizenship”. Foreign entrepreneurs who are able to make a minimum investment in Bulgaria can obtain permanent residence permits and, in time, acquire citizenship. According to the latest amendments of the Bulgarian Citizenship Act voted on 16th of February 2021 the investors can now invest in priority government projects (projects in tourism, industry, and local development are available), Bulgarian ETFs, AIFs, REITs, or stocks of Bulgarian companies traded on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange. Investors in ETFs, AIFs or REITs have to invest 512,000 EUR for the ordinary procedure or 1,024,000 EUR for the fast-track.

According to statistics the top five countries of origin for those who acquired Bulgarian citizenship remain the same during the last few years: the Republic of North Macedonia, Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova and Albania (European commission 2021). The interest of the Turks toward Bulgarian citizenship is also stable during the years. There is a kind of trend of restoration of Bulgarian Citizenship of Turkish citizens who have lost their Bulgarian citizenship in the migration processes in late 20th century (Restoration of Bulgarian Citizenship n.d.). As a result of the so-called European migrant crisis, there is also a significant increase in the number of Iraqi and Syrian citizens who have received a Bulgarian passport. Other third countries which have seen an increase in nationals being granted citizenship in Bulgaria are Vietnam and Armenia (European commission 2021).

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This statistical briefing for Bulgaria on social impact of TCNs in MATILDE regions confirms the lack of specific data for TCNs. The official information offices do not provide a lot of information for migrants related to different socio-economic indicators. Even in those aspects where there are official data the information is evaluated as not fully reliable. This is the reason why some of the conclusions in this report are made on the bases of European tendences, national specifies, concreate case studies and the MATILDE fieldwork.

Even the overall conclusion of the core migration researches in the country, that the Immigrants in the Bulgaria are well integrated, we should keep in mind that and this integration is the result not so much of government integration policies but rather of their own integration projects and practices (Krasteva 2019, 23), as well as it is more valid for the migrants who comes from other EU countries, rather for those from third countries. This is the reason why Bulgaria's approach to integration is classified by the last MIPEX 2020 issue as "equality on paper". A lot of documents were produced, some of them with a very good quality remain without any practical consequents "on ground".

The research interprets that migrants in the country enjoy basic rights and security but not equal opportunities. Major obstacles emerge in nearly all areas of life.

For example, as it was outlined in the text, but for 2014 in Bulgaria, 51% of immigrants from outside the EU live in material deprivation (Petkova 2014).

Spatial differences between urban-rural were also reconfirmed in some aspects where the vulnerability based on ethnic origin or gender play the main role.

Discrimination, negative stereotypes, and socio-economic and cultural factors, which contribute to the marginalization of some groups of the society, are also valid in some extend for migrants.

The thin role of the regional and local authorities in the migrant integration was once again reconfirmed, even because of the lack of such data. There is no national, nor regional or local assumption that the assessment of the migrant accession into the daily life could have crucial role for the social cohesion of the society. Moreover, some of the conclusions made in this statistical brief shows that there is a potential for negative trends: the social-economic indicators such as risk-of-poverty, overcrowded household, unemployment rate, early drop-outs, which in the Bulgaria are closely linked to ethnical background shows potential to be linked also with some vulnerable migrants groups present in the country.

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FINLAND

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1. INTRODUCTION

The social impact of TCNs in Finland are studied in two case study areas (the regions of North Karelia and Ostrobothia). This statistical research report also includes the overview of the country in total. The two Finnish case study areas of North Karelia and Ostrobothnia differ from each other quite significantly geographically, culturally, and economically. North Karelia locates in Eastern Finland and it has long border against Russia while Ostrobothnia locates on the west coast short ferry ride away from Sweden.

Ostrobothnia is the only region in mainland Finland that has Swedish speaking majority (51 per cent) while 96 per cent of North Karelia's population are Finnish speakers. In whole country Finnish is first language for 87 per cent and Swedish for 6 per cent of population. Population size of these two regions is nearly the same (North Karelia 164,000 and Ostrobothnia 176,000 inhabitants) but their community structures are quite different. Population density is three times higher in Ostrobothnia and its population is concentrated in river valleys while in North Karelia population is much more scattered.[1] (see MATILDE Classification on spatial specificities and TCNs distribution).

According to Statistics Finland, 423,500 persons with foreign background lived in Finland at the end of 2019 which means that 7.7 per cent of the population had a foreign background. 76 per cent of foreign population were third country nationals. Largest background groups living in Finland were Russia and former Soviet Union (21 per cent of foreign population), Estonia (12 per cent), Iraq (5.5 per cent), Somalia (5 per cent), Former Yugoslavia (4 per cent), and China (3 per cent). Share of people from Middle East and North Africa has increased significantly, especially since 2015. The shares of the other Asians and Africans have also risen rapidly. (Statistics Finland 2021)

Non-EU and EEA citizens must apply for a residence permit if they intend to stay in Finland, for non-tourist purposes, for more than 90 days. If EU and EEA citizen's stay in Finland lasts more than three months, the right of residence must be registered. According to residence permit applications and EU citizens' registrations in 2015-2020 the main reason for immigration to Finland was family related (36 per cent) while 26 per cent per centcame to work, 16 per cent per cent to study, and six per cent per cent sought asylum. Often reasons for immigration are combination of these. Shares of third country national's reasons for immigration follow the shares immigrants' average while EU citizens came mostly to work (50 per cent). (Finnish Immigration Service 2021a.)

Foreign-born population is highly concentrated in urban areas, especially in the Greater Helsinki area. Almost 85 per cent per cent of immigrants live in urban areas while 70 per cent per cent of the

[1] For an overview and classification of Ostrobothnia and North Karelia as well as for an overview of Finland, see Kordel et al. (2020.

total population lived in the urban areas. During the last 10 years, more foreigners have also come to rural areas. However, many asylum seekers who were accommodated around Finland have moved or are about to move to larger urban areas and especially to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. At the end of 2019 half of the population with foreign/born lived in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area while the region accounted for about one-fifth of Finland's total population. Especially Somalis (79 per cent) and Indians (70 per cent) were concentrated in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Also, over half of Chinese, Filipinos, Estonians, and Iraqis lives there. In Helsinki the share of people with a foreign background was 16.5 per cent, while it was only 6.4 per cent elsewhere in Finland. Although Helsinki has a high share of people with a foreign background compared to the rest of Finland, their number is relatively small compared to other major Nordic cities. (Juopperi 2019, Statistics Finland 2021, City of Helsinki 2021.)

In North Karelia the share of foreigner/born in the population was 4.0 per cent in 2019, while in Ostrobothnia the share was 7.5 per cent per cent (Statistics Finland 2021). The enterprises in Ostrobothnia import labour from non-EU-28 countries on a regular basis to mitigate a labour shortage, mainly in industry but also in agriculture (Mattila & Björklund 2013, Närpiön kaupunki 2020, Statistics Finland 2021.).

In Finland, as in Norway and Sweden, the NUTS2 level is an artificial administrative scale without any practical relevance. The data used by national practitioners and stakeholders is at NUTS3 level. The NUTS2 region Eastern and Northern Finland covers 226,628.44 km^2, which makes it slightly smaller than the UK (244,820 km^2), but with only about a million inhabitants. The case study area North Karelia is on one the seven NUTS3 regions in this huge NUTS2 region. Ostrobothnia is one of five NUTS3 regions in the NUTS2 region Western Finland. Although this NUTS2 region is not as sparsely populated as Eastern and Northern Finland, it is still a sparsely populated region. One of Finland’s three largest cities, Tampere, is located in Western Finland, which means that the statistical picture for TCN’s and the social impact they pose on the NUTS region may bias the picture for other parts of the NUTS2 region (i.e. for the NUTS3 region Ostrobothnia). In some cases, the bias can be expected to provide a more positive development, sometimes a more negative.

Before the refugee crisis in 2015 several studies on immigrants in Finland were conducted. A large survey on work and well-being among persons of foreign origin (UTH-survey) was carried out in 2014 by Statistics Finland and the National Institute for Health and Welfare (Nieminen et.al. 2015). Since then, refugee crisis emerged and immigration has increased also in other groups as well, which may have affected results covered here. It should also be noted that the employment rate of people with a foreign background differs in register- and interview-based statistics (Pasila & Sutela 2019).

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Finland by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Over the last 15 years, the share of Finnish nationals at risk of poverty has fluctuated between 10 and 15 percent. The at risk of poverty rate for TCNs however display a significant variation over time. There are several reasons for this: migrant's access to labour markets, and language skills (Yijälä & Luoma 2018). Immigrants from non-EU28 or other foreign countries face higher at risk of poverty rates than other groups. Also, the self-employed are more exposed than employees, and low work intensity households (single mothers, in particular) have higher risks (Kangas & Kalliomaa-Puha, 2019). The weak position of immigrants is in part because they tend to be independent professionals or employed in low-wage sectors where risk of poverty is greatest (EAPN, 2020). Immigrants, and especially youngsters with an immigrant background, are exposed to low income, serious material deprivation, low employment, and discrimination. Many of them are students. "The risk of poverty for immigrants is 6 times higher, when compared to the mainstream population" (Caritas Finland, 2017, p. 6). This is not clearly displayed in Figure 1, as Caritas Finland (2017) refers to all immigrants, not only to TCNs as in Figure 1.

The geographical distribution of being at risk of poverty displays an increased risk of poverty rate in rural and peripheral areas in Finland (ESPON 2013). Since 2010, rural areas and large university cities (Jyväskylä, Kuopio, Oulu, Tampere and Turku) display the highest rates for being at risk of poverty; in rural municipalities the share of population at risk of poverty was 20.3 per cent in 2019 and the corresponding share in large university cities was 21.6 (Statistics Finland, 2021).

Contrary to many other countries, the TCNs in Finland did not increase their share of persons at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the wake of the refugee crisis 2015. Instead, the share of TCNs has decreased. Although the Finnish government allowed more refugees after the refugee crisis 2015, it kept its restrictive policy on refugee immigration (Laine & Rauhut, 2018).

Finland has a well-developed social security system providing support for persons in need. Still, many people have needs that cannot be met by the regular social security institutions in case of poverty. Without voluntary work from NGOs these people would face hardship. After the financial crisis 2008-

2009, many religious charity organisations started to play a role in poverty alleviation in Finland (Hiilamo, 2012).

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Finland by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The median net income of TCN's is lower than Finnish citizens median income and the gap between citizens and TCN's income has been stable being about 7,000 euros per year. However, TCN's are more vulnerable to the changes is labour markets than citizens and hence also display higher unemployment rates. The lower income level of TCNs can, generally, be explained by the occupational structure; jobs in low-productive and labour-intensive sectors generate lower incomes. People with Estonian or Western European background have the highest median income while Russian, Middle Eastern and Somalian immigrants' median income is lowest. Median income increases the longer the person has lived in the country (Busk et al. 2016).

Immigrants are more often employed on a fixed-term or part-time basis compared to Finns. Foreign employees also work more often atypical and flexible working hours than Finnish employees (Sutela 2015). Foreigners work less frequently in expert professions, white collar jobs and customer service work than Finns. In contrast, "other employees" occupations are clearly more common for people with a foreign background than for those with a Finnish background. Relatively more foreigners also work as service and sales employees (Sutela 2015). In 2017 the highest proportions of employees with a foreign background were cleaners and domestic workers (27 per cent of all foreigner employees), kitchen and food assistants (22 per cent) construction workers (13 per cent), and tertiary education (13 per cent). In addition, 14 per cent of foreign employees work under temporary employment agencies (Statistics Finland 2021).

Significant variation in annual income of households exist between regions. While the household's median disposable ncome in Ostrobothnia was third highest in 2019 (34,900 euros), approximately 5 per cent higher than national median income (33,100 euros), North Karelia had the lowest median income (28,400 euros), which was only 86 per cent of the national median (Statistics Finland 2021). These geographical differences in income structure can partly be explained by Finland's economic geography. As jobs are concentrated in growth centres in south and west, the earned income form larger portion of total income and lift income level in those areas. In sparsely populated areas, where fewer jobs exist and pensioners and other in-active population form much greater proportion of total population, the income levels are lower. Consequently, in the east and north current transfers form larger and earned income smaller portion of total income than near growth centres (Statistics Finland 2017).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Finland by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Studies on housing overcrowding rate for immigrants in Finland display several characteristics: 1) they analyse either Finland or just Helsinki; 2) they analyse situation for immigrants as a group; and 3) there is a focus on the housing situation for children (e.g. Tunström & Wang, 2019; Obucina & Ilmakunnas, 2020; Skifter Andersen et al., 2013). There is a significant research gap for future research to fill regarding the housing overcrowding rate for immigrants in rural Finland.

A special means-tested social housing is used in Finland (Tunström & Wang, 2019). Eligibility depends on the social and financial circumstances of the applicant in terms of household income, assets, and the urgency of the need for housing (Andersson et al., 2010). Finnish social-housing rents are below the level of rents in the private sector and not linked to the income of the residents. The non-profit principle guarantees that the state subsidy covering the production of social housing ends up with the residents. Most municipalities have a maintenance plan ensuring that the dwellings remain in a relatively good condition (Vaattovaara et al., 2010).

Asylum seekers who have received residence permits are allocated to certain municipalities to create an equal distribution rather than a concentration in certain cities, municipalities, or districts. The central government exerts a significant control to avoid such clustering of refugees (Tunström & Wang, 2019). Residential segregation of immigrants in Finland is viewed mainly as a spatial problem. By just viewing the housing situation as a spatial issue, factors that may restrain the immigrants' capability to improve their own housing situation is overlooked or ignored (Dhalmann & Vilkama 2008). A weak attachment to the labour market, low incomes and recurrent spells of unemployment poses a significant influence on the housing situation for, especially, refugees (Andersson et al., 2010). This results in a higher overcrowding rate. The interviews made in WP3 and WP4 explicitly uncovered that this is the case also in the two rural regions North Karelia and Ostrobothnia (for more, please see MATILDE reports D3.3 and D4.3). The increasing refugee immigration and its weak attachment to the labour market may explain the increasing overcrowding rate displayed in Figure 3.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Education is one of the cornerstones of the Finnish welfare society. Education from pre-primary to higher education is free of charge in Finland and the teachers are highly educated. Early childhood education and care is provided for children before the compulsory education begins. Pre-primary education is provided for children in the year preceding the beginning of compulsory education. Nine-year compulsory basic education (comprehensive school). Upper secondary education is either general upper secondary education or vocational education and training. Education up to secondary education is provided by municipalities or municipal federations. Higher education is provided by universities and universities of applied sciences. Furthermore, free adult education is available at all levels (Ministry of Education and Culture 2021).

The educational level of TCN's in Finland in total is lower than the average of those born in Finland. Comparing those with primary education or less it can be seen that in both groups the educational level has been increasing since 2004. Especially with native Finns this can be explained with the retirement of the generations with less education. Today there are less viable jobs for those who have no degrees at all. At national level the share of those who completed no higher than primary education decreased slightly with the time spent in the country. This may indicate that low-educated people with a foreign background have been able to complete vocational degrees in Finland through integration (Sutela & Larja 2015).

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

The regional comparison indicates that while Ostrobothnia follows the national average quite smoothly in North Karelia the TCN's educational level is better than in Ostrobothnia and it is almost in same level than the average of whole population. There can be several explanations for this, one of which is that in North Karelia there are less industrial and primary sector jobs than in Ostrobothnia and for this reason the TCN's who are moving to North Karelia have better educational level. The other explanation has to do with the former home countries of TCN's. In Ostrobothnia there are more migrants with asylum seeker and refugee background, while in North Karelia most of the migrants are from former Soviet Union, with a higher level of education.

Figure 4a. Share of population with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Finland and North Karelia. Source: Eurostat.



People with a background in Russia or the Soviet Union (63 per cent of TCNs in North Karelia) were the most educated among those aged 25–54 in 2014. Only seven per centof them were without post-primary education. People from the Middle East and North Africa (38 per cent), the rest of Africa (29 per cent), and Asia (23 per cent) groups had the highest proportion of those without post-primary education. In Finland 17 per cent of all foreign population aged 25–54 was without post-primary education in 2014 (Sutela & Larja 2015).

Figure 4b. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Finland and Ostrobothnia. Source: Eurostat.



5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Figure 5a. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Finland and North Karelia. Source: Eurostat.



Contemporarily the level of those with secondary education is very similar with the different groups. TCN's and residents born in Finland are almost equal in North Karelia, but in Ostrobothnia the gap is a little larger. According to the evaluated statistics one can see that in the national level, TCN's have caught up the gap to those born in Finland. The qualitative data collected in the Matilde-project explains this by the fact that vocational schools in the regions have been active in providing education for non-Finnish speaking population. For example, according to our stakeholder interviews and focus groups, the Riveria vocational school in North Karelia is developing its strategy and education-paths for non-Finnish speakers and is also active in recruiting TCN students from abroad (for more, please see MATILDE reports D3.3 and D4.3). Riveria has campuses in different locations in North Karelia, and during recent years the number of Russian students has risen especially in the municipalities of Lieksa and Kitee According to interviews, vocational schools pay special attention on TCN students and their success in education (Statistics Finland 2021).

Figure 5b. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Finland and Ostrobothnia. Source: Eurostat.



The statistics also indicate that in North Karelia and in Ostrobothnia there are more secondary educated people than on the national level. Almost half of the working-aged people have studied only until the secondary level. This is likely explained by the smaller need for highly educated people in the labour market in these regions compared to the more urban regions in the south.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

In terms of tertiary education, the main observation is that in national level the share has been increasing remarkably from about 30 per cent of population having higher education degree in 2004 to almost 50 per cent in 2019. This trend does not translate as well in the studied regions or TCNs in general.

Figure 6a. Share of population with tertiary education in Finland and North Karelia. Source: Eurostat.



In the other groups, the share of population with tertiary education has been more stable, with the number fluctuating between 25 and 35 per cent of population having higher education. There has been an increase in the share of tertiary education among Finnish-born residents of Ostrobothnia but it is still much lower than the national level. The lower education levels in both provinces can be explained with the labour market having less pull for those with tertiary education. In North Karelia the economy is based mostly on the service industry, while Ostrobothnia is dominated by export industries. While there are institutions of higher education in both regional centres, Joensuu and Vaasa, many of the people studying there move elsewhere after graduating to get a job matching their qualifications and competence.

Figure 6b. Share of population 25-64 with tertiary education in Finland and Ostrobothnia. Source: Eurostat.



When education structure is examined according to the length of residence in country it can be noticed that in 2014 there was a high share of higher education graduates (48 per cent) among those who have lived in Finland for less than five years. After 5 years of stay in Finland the share of higher education graduates dropped to 39 per cent (Sutela & Larja 2015). This decrease of foreigners with higher education is most likely related to an increase of an inflow of foreigners with a low education.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Finland by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



The share of population aged 15–29 living permanently in Finland that are not in employment, education or training has varied between nine and 12 per cent in 2008-20. The share of NEET youths with a Finnish background was 11 per cent in 2014 while 15per cent of youths with a foreign background were outside work and education. The NEET rate was highest among people from the Middle East and North Africa (23per cent) and the rest of Africa (20per cent) and lowest among people from Asia (9per cent). Language skills were also linked to young people's likelihood of being NEET. Of the young people with a foreign background who had low proficiency in Finnish or Swedish, the NEET degree was 22 per cent, while in the mother tongue level Finnish or Swedish speakers' group outside work and education were 11 per cent (Larja et.al. 2015, Statistics Finland 2021).

No major gender differences existed in NEET degrees among young people with a Finnish background (men 12per cent, women 10per cent) in 2014. For young men, there was no difference in the NEET degree between those with a foreign and a Finnish background, but for young women with a foreign background, the NEET degree was 19per cent. The higher NEET degree of young people with a foreign background is due to the earlier family formation of young women with a foreign background. Of young women with a Finnish background outside work and education, 31 per cent per cent were caring for their own children in 2014. The corresponding proportion for women with a foreign background was 51 per cent (Larja et al. 2015).

Relatively more young people with a Finnish background outside work and education (19per cent) considered themselves incapable of work or long-term illness than those with a foreign background (7per cent). Most young men out of work and education considered themselves as unemployed for both people with a Finnish background (72per cent) and with a foreign background (78per cent). In 2014, NEET status was most common among young people with a foreign background who had moved to Finland between the ages of 20 and 29 (21per cent) and least common among those who were born in Finland or had moved under the age of seven (7per cent) (Larja et al. 2015).

Parents' educational background was related to the NEET degree of young people both with a Finnish background and with a foreign background. Of the young people whose parents had at least one university degree, significantly fewer (7per cent of Finns, 11per cent of foreigners) were NEET than young people whose parents had no more than a primary education (20per cent of Finns, 21per cent of foreigners). The educational background of parents is thus a significant background factor in the educational differences and NEET rates of young people with a Finnish and foreign background. When compared the young people whose parents have the same level of education, most of the differences between young people with foreign background and with Finnish background disappear (Larja et al. 2015).

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

No statistically significant differences existed between regions in terms of early school leaving in 2014. In terms of NEET rate, regional differences exist only for young people with a Finnish background (Larja et al. 2015). Unfortunately, the statistics does not include any information on country of birth for the NEETs at the regional level. However, there are indications that the NEET rate for TCNs may be higher to significantly higher than for natives depending on what region is analysed. The problems for TCNs, and especially those with a refugee background, to enter the labour market and their lower educational levels, would most likely lead to higher inactivity rates such as NEET. This is a task for future research to analyse.

Figure 8a. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Northern and Eastern Finland by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 8b. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Western Finland by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

The two case study regions, North Karelia and Ostrobothnia, underwent a dramatic structural economic change during the first half of the 1990, which made unemployment rates rocket (Pekkala & Kangasharju, 2002; Hynninen et al., 2009). In North Karelia, a slower branch structure in the region than at the national level makes the branch structure obsolete. This results in a slower economic growth than in the national economy. Ostrobothnia has experienced a faster branch changes in the region than at the national level. The expanding branches are relatively labour intensive and low productive. However, the positive branch effect is not large enough to neutralize the negative structural effect, which results in an overall slower economic growth in the region compared to the national level (Eðvarðsson et al. 2007). The problems of de-industrialisation prevail (Valkonen & Vihriälä, 2014).

In both case study regions, population aging is a problem. In a Nordic context, to mobilise marginal groups and immigrants at the labour market would be enough to meet the demand for labour (Dall Schmidt el al. 2014), but ageing labour markets and sectors suffering from an ageing labour force pushes away, or even close, the labour market entry for younger labour and immigrants (Mitze et al. 2018). To adjust to a post-industrial reality is not always simple. The policies today aim at keeping the elderly labour force active as long as possible, but this may be counterproductive as it reduces the access to the labour market for entrants, i.e. youngsters and immigrants (Rauhut & Eðvarðsson, 2009). The issues raised here have paradoxically a negative impact on the unemployment rates for immigrants.

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

In Finland, the foreign-born population has about twice as high unemployment rate as Finnish population and their employment rate is ten percentage points lower. The difference in employment rate between Finns and immigrants is related especially to the low employment of foreign women. The employment rate of foreign women is more than 17 percentage points lower than Finnish women while foreign men are employed almost as well as Finnish men. For the women with a foreign background, the employment rate begins to lag Finnish women after the age of 24. The difference in the employment rates of 25–29-year-old women is more than 20 percentage points. The difference is largely related to the early family formation of young women with a foreign background (Larja & Sutela 2015).

The employment rate of persons of Finnish background was 74 per cent in 2014. Foreigners who had moved to Finland to work (86 per cent) or study (78 per cent) had a better employment rate than Finns while refugees had significantly lower (39 per cent). Also, Estonians (76 per cent) and citizens of EU, EFTA and North American countries (75 per cent) had a higher employment rate than Finns. In total, third country nationals' employment rate was 54 per cent. Asians' employment rate was 68 per cent and Russians' 61 per cent. People from Middle East and North Africa (46 per cent) and the rest of Africa (48 per cent) had the lowest employment rates (Larja & Sutela 2015).

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Finland by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Immigrants who spoke Finnish at least advanced level had higher employment rate than Finns or other foreigners in 2014. However, there did not seem to be a significant difference in employment between primary and intermediate language skills. The development of language skills from primary to intermediate level will only improve employment for those who have completed primary education at most. For those with a tertiary or secondary degree, intermediate language skills do little to help them find employment (Larja & Sutela 2015).

The employment rate increases the longer the person has lived in the country. In 2014, the employment rate for those who lived in Finland for less than five years was only 56 per cent, while for those who lived for more than 10 years it was 69 per cent. The effect of residence time on the employment rate is almost exclusively due to the improvement in the employment rate for women. The employment rate for women who lived in the country for less than five years was 40 per cent, but for those who lived for more than 10 years it was already 67 per cent (Larja & Sutela 2015).

The educational background has a significant effect on (un)employment for both Finns and foreigners. Higher education graduates were the best employed and those with lower primary education were the least employed in 2014. When compared similarly educated men, the difference in the employment rate between foreigners and Finns is very small. However, education does not even out differences for women, and the employment rate of foreign women was lower than Finnish women at all levels of education (Larja & Sutela 2015).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 10a. Unemployment rate in Northern and Eastern Finland by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Unemployment rate varies significantly between Finnish regions. In 2019 Ostrobothnia had fifth lowest un-employment rate (4.7 per cent) while North Karelia had the highest (10.4 per cent). National unemployment rate was 6.7 per cent. In general, unemployment rate is lower in Southern and Western Finland than in north and east (Statistics Finland 2021). In figure 9 above, it was clearly illuminated that the unemployment rate for TCNs is significantly than for Finnish nationals at a national level. For most years, the unemployment rate among TCNs was about twice as high as for Finnish nationals. In Figure 10a, the data is missing for unemployment by TCNs at the artificial statistical NUTS2 scale.

By looking at the employment rates, we can make assumptions about the unemployment rates for TCNs. The employment rate of foreigners in 2014 was highest in the Helsinki metropolitan area (about 70 per cent) and worst in Northern and Eastern Finland (51 per cent). In Southern Finland foreigners' employment rate was 59 per cent and in Western Finland 63 per cent. The employment situation of foreign people was the most difficult in Northern and Eastern Finland also in relative terms: the employment rate of foreign people was more than a quarter lower than Finns' employment rate. The weaker employment situation of foreigners in Northern and Eastern Finland is not related to the age structure, as the age structure of the region does not differ much from the average of foreigners in Finland. There are also no statistically significant differences between the regions in terms of length of residence. However, there are fewer people who have moved due to work in Northern and Eastern Finland than in the Helsinki metropolitan area (Larja & Sutela 2015).

Figure 10b. Unemployment rate in Western Finland by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



In the available national statistics, non-EU28 citizens are not listed separately; the statistics only separates between Finnish nationals and foreign citizens. The unemployment rate of Finnish citizens varied between 8–13.5 % in years 2004-19 (at the end of the year). The unemployment rate of foreign citizens was 19–28 % in same period. In North Karelia unemployment situation has been significantly worse than in Finland in average. Finns' unemployment rate was 13.5–18 % and foreigners' 30–43 %. In Ostrobothnia unemployment rates are significantly lower than in Finland in average. Finns' unemployment rate was 5–9 % and foreigners' 12.5–24 % (Statistics Finland 2021).

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Finland as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



The current Nationality Act regulating citizenship was issued in 2003 abolishing the older 1968 act. The new act modernized the legislation and took in to account the diversified reasons and situations of the people applying for citizenship. It also lengthened the time of residence needed in certain cases, which in turn caused a two-year slump in the citizenships granted in 2005 and 2006. The legislation was laxed and simplified in 2011 by shortening the time of residence it takes to be able to apply for citizenship in most cases. This can be seen as following the EU trend as this amendment almost doubled citizenship grants from 2011 to 2012.

Finnish citizenship can be granted through an application or a declaration procedure. A child of a Finnish citizen receives Finnish citizenship automatically through his/her parents. Applicant must fulfil the requirements for naturalisation such as established identity, sufficient language skills, and sufficient period of residence. A citizen of a foreign country may receive Finnish citizenship after five years of residence in Finland (a Nordic citizen after two years). A foreign citizen who has been married to a Finnish citizen and lived in Finland for three years may be granted Finnish citizenship. Beneficiaries of international protection may receive Finnish citizenship after four years of residence. Finland accepts multiple citizenship (since 2003). Acquisition of Finnish citizenship requires that the applicant's identity has been reliably ascertained. Persons without proper identifying documentation must appear for at least ten years with an identity revealed by the population information system before his/her identity is considered as reliably ascertained (The Nationality Act, Finnish Immigration Service 2019).

During 2009-2019 of all granted Finnish citizenships 86 per cent were granted to third country nationals. Largest group that acquired Finnish citizenship was Russians who acquired quarter of all citizenships. 8 per cent of citizenships were granted to Somalis and 5.5 per cent to both Estonians and Iraqis. Other top 10 nationalities were Afghans, Iranians, Turkish, Swedes, Ukrainians, and Vietnamese, each with two to four per cent share. Two percent of the citizenships were granted to people living in North Karelia and four percent people living in Ostrobothnia (Statistics Finland 2021).

The increase in the number of applicants in 2012 is mainly due to the amendments to the Nationality Act that came into force on 1 September 2011. With the amendments, the period of residence required for acquiring Finnish citizenship was shortened from six to five years. After amendments, former Finnish citizens are now able to regain their citizenship by declaration irrespective of their place of residence (Ministry of Interior 2013).

In 2020 Iraqi citizens submitted the largest number of citizenship applications in Finland. For years, the largest group applying for Finnish citizenship has been Russian citizens. Especially asylum seekers who arrived in Finland in the autumn of 2015 and have been granted international protection are now applying for Finnish citizenship. A person who has been granted international protection must live in Finland for four years before he or she can be granted Finnish citizenship (Finnish Immigration Service 2021b).

The statistics show a slight increase in applications by citizens of the United Kingdom after a referendum on leaving the EU (Finnish Immigration Service 2018). The Nationality Act allowing dual nationality came into force in June 2003. The Act made it possible for former Finnish citizens (people who had lost Finnish citizenship e.g. when acquiring the citizenship of another country) have their citizenship restored by declaration between June 2003 and May 2008 without any need to move to Finland. Nearly 22,000 people took advantage of this opportunity. Declarations were received e.g. from Sweden, the United States, Canada, and Australia (Ministry of Interior 2011).

In 1990-2016 Finland had a special return migration program for Ingrian Finns, i.e. people living in the territory of the former Soviet Union who were considered to have Finnish roots. Most of the returnees were Ingrian Finns, but there were also Finns who had moved to the area at other times and their descendants. The return migration of Ingrian Finns was distinguished from other immigration by the fact that it was regulated separately in the Finnish Aliens Act. The return migration program was abandoned as it was considered that most of those who identified themselves as Finns and wanted to move to Finland had already done so. The exact number of returnees is not known, but it is estimated that 30–35,000 Ingrian Finn returnees and their family members moved to Finland during the return migration program. The estimated number of Ingrian returnees makes them the largest group of immigrants in Finland. However, they are not distinguished in immigration statistics as a separate group. Most of the returnees came to Finland from the territory of present-day Russia, but also from other parts of the former Soviet Union, especially Estonia. Ingrian Finns make up a significant part of Finland's Russian-speaking population (Salonsaari 2012, Mähönen & Yijälä 2016).

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This statistical report presents the social impact of TCNs in Finland as well as, when possible, in the two Finnish regions North Karelia and Ostrobothnia. The indicators used are grouped in four dimensions according to the MATILDE Social Dimensions (MSDs): social polarisation, social cohesion, access to and quality of services as well as active participation and citizenship rights (see Laine & Rauhut 2020).

With regard to the MSD **social protection**, the available statistical data for risk of poverty displays a marked downwards trend starting after 2012, from 40 per cent to below 25 per cent. The period after 2012 can hence be described as a process of decreased social polarisation when it comes to the at risk of poverty rate. When it comes to incomes, the median equivalised net income for TCNs has increased more than for natives after 2014, which also suggests an ongoing process of decreased social polarisation.

For the MSDs monitoring **social cohesion**, the indicators "unemployment" and "educational attainment" are used. The indicator for educational attainment displays a troublesome development. A significantly higher share of TCNs have maximum primary educational as the highest educational level relative the natives. The share of TCNs with secondary education as a highest educational level is slightly lower than for the natives, and for tertiary education, the share of TCNs is significantly lower than for the natives. The trend displays an increasing divergence between natives and TCNs. As the Finnish labour market is relatively knowledge-based, the relatively low educational levels of TCNs make it more difficult for them to enter the Finnish labour market. That the TCNs have a significantly higher unemployment rate is a logical outcome of the lower educational levels. Unfortunately, this leads to a decreased social cohesion in society.

The MSD **access to and quality of services** consists of one indicator alone "overcrowding rate". Since 2010 the overcrowding rate for TCNs has increased significantly, which indicates a decreasing access to services. Overcrowding in housing for TCNs is related to lower incomes and a marginal position at the labour market.

Regarding the MSD **active participation and citizenship rights**, the indicator "share of young people neither in employment, nor in education and training" displays a downward trend for TCNs, which indicates increased possibilities for young TCN adults to enjoy an active participation in society. The second indicator in this dimension, i.e. residents who acquired citizenship, display a marked increase between 2011 and 2012, and has been fluctuating on an apparently irregular basis since then. In 2011, the legislation for obtaining a Finnish citizenship shortened the needed time of residence in Finland from six to five years, and this caused the increasing number of naturalised persons. While many other countries increase the requirements for TCNs to become naturalised citizens, the change in the citizenship law in Finland indicates the opposite.

The findings in this statistical briefing suggest that the MSDs for social protection as well as active participation and social rights display a positive development, i.e. a convergence between TCNs and natives. However, the MSDs for social cohesion and access to and quality of services display a negative development, i.e. an increased divergence between TCNs and natives. The divergence trend in the social cohesion dimension is the most troublesome one as low education will increase the risk of experiencing unemployment. Being unemployed will have an impact on the housing situation and the income situation. The social security system in Finland appears to ensure that many TCNs experience a relatively low risk of poverty compared to many other countries.

Some remarks are needed to understand these findings. TCNs do not constitute a homogeneous group of migrants. On the contrary, the share of labour migrants and students is very high among the TCNs and so are the share of immigrants who have come to Finland for family unification reasons or as tied movers. Seen from this perspective, it is not very surprising to find the MSDs for social protection and as well as active participation and social rights display a positive development. To attract labour migrants and international students, such aspects are very important for attracting them. At the same time, labour migrants have a job waiting for them, an income they can make a living on, and their educational level is accepted by the employer (otherwise they would not get the job offer). The same goes with tied movers and international students. A closer look at the MSDs for social cohesion and access to and quality of services would reveal that for labour migrants, students and tied movers to the aforementioned groups as well as to Finnish nationals would display a relatively high social cohesion and access to and quality of services.

If these groups show a positive development when it comes to the MSDs, many refugees and tied movers to them display a completely different development. Although the MSDs for social protection and as well as active participation and social rights indicate that they do well, one's position is the social hierarchy is very relative indeed. Rather, the findings regarding the MSDs for social cohesion and access to and quality of services indicate that this group of TCNs do not experience the same kind of inclusion in the Finnish society.

While labour migrants do relatively well, there is room for improvement when it comes to refugees. This must be kept in mind when analysing the performance for TCNs in Finland.

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GERMANY

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1. INTRODUCTION

The statistical briefing of social impact of TCNs for Germany reflects the relevance of various immigration processes, identified in MATILDE D2.1. (Kordel, Spenger & Weidinger 2020), namely labour migration, forced migration, student and family migration as well as amenity/lifestyle migration. According to the classification of MATILDE regions and TCNs distribution, the share of TCNs and its composition changed over time, while asylum seekers' main countries of origin gained more relevance. However, this composition differs within the MATILDE region Bavaria and regional and local specificities have to be considered. Besides main countries of origin, the classification of MATILDE regions also revealed socio-demographic characteristics of TCNs: while quantitative data on age structure could not be provided, the gender balance slightly changed from 2015 (in the rural district of Regen dramatically) subsequent to the arrival of asylum seekers, who were predominantly male in the very beginning. The report also displayed educational and economic features, including developments of the labour market. While the educational level of TCNs continues to differ remarkably from the total population, the share of TCNs with lower education decreased within one decade in the MATILDE region Bavaria. Regarding the employment situation, in all rural districts under study in the MATILDE region, employment in the tertiary sector predominates, while structural change in rural economies still continues, which is reflected, for instance, in a decrease of employment in primary sector in BGL and GAP (Kordel, Spenger & Weidinger 2020, 271). Unemployment rates in the rural districts are significantly lower than the national, the MATILDE regions and the EU27 average, while seasonality is observable in the three Alpine districts. For TCNs, the MATILDE classification report indicates slightly increasing employment rates.

Based on the observations sketched above, this report intends to provide a nuanced picture of social impact of TCNs by means of selected indicators. Quantitative data mostly rely on EUROSTAT data and cover both the national, i.e. federal level (NUTS-0), and the Federal State level, i.e. the *Länder* level (Bavaria, NUTS-1). Since the latter, however, also covers metropolitan areas, the peculiarities of rural and mountain areas cannot be described in-depth. Where available, additional data on NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 level are provided, yet the internal differentiation of rural districts also diminishes the explanatory power. Moreover, for interpretation of statistical data, (empirical) studies are provided, encompassing ones from:

- the Federal Statistical Institute (DESTATIS),
- the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF),
- the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Research Institute of the Federal Employment Agency (BA),
- the German Economic Institute (iW), or

- the political Friedrich-Ebert-foundation (FES).

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Germany by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Figure 1 displays the shares of population at risk of poverty in Germany between 2005 and 2019, comparing German citizens and TCNs. Results show higher rates for TCNs compared to Germans. While the rate for Germans remained constant over time, the one for TCNs was more dynamic and decreased recently.

Giesecke et al. (2017) identified factors for a higher risk of poverty based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and the micro census (*Mikrozensus*) 2017 and refers to the differentiation between individuals without and with a migration background[2], which is commonly used in German panel studies. They found that individuals with a migration background have a higher risk of poverty, if they entered the country above the age of 40 (ibid., 36) and had a low duration of stay in Germany, as both limit their possibility to acquire German language skills and qualifications (ibid.). The same is true for individuals who did not have a completed vocational training (ibid., 39; cf. Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2019, 25) and did not live in a household with someone without a migration background (Giesecke et al. 2017, 40). Those who immigrated from former "Guest worker" countries, i.e. Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and former Yugoslavia, as well as those originating from other Third Countries, also had a higher risk of poverty compared to individuals from other EU countries (ibid., 38). Drawing on the micro census

[2] An individual has a migration background, if he or she, or at least one parent, was not born with German citizenship. This definition specifically includes immigrant and non-immigrant foreigners, immigrant and non-immigrant naturalized citizens as well as (late) repatriates and their descendants born as Germans (Statistisches Bundesamt 2021). For a critical discussion of this term, e.g. due to its focus on inherited citizenship and ancestry, see Will (2019) or Fachkommission Integrationsfähigkeit (2021).

2019, a recent publication of the Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2020) reported the highest shares of population at risk of poverty for individuals, who themselves or whose parents immigrated from Syria (74.5%), Iraq (66.5%), Afghanistan (63.8%) or Pakistan (54.3%), while the ones of individuals of US and Russian descent were considerably low, i.e. 14.9% and 25%. This argumentation may explain the increase of the at–risk-of-poverty rate for TCNs subsequent to the year 2015.

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2 displays the median equivalized net incomes in Germany from 2005 to 2019, comparing German citizens and TCNs. Results show constantly lower net incomes for TCNs compared to Germans. However, both increased over time, except for TCNs in the 2015-2017 period, when Germany incorporated many forced migrants into the labour market.

Based on SOEP data from 2016, Schacht and Metzing (2018) confirmed this development and showed that individuals aged between 17 and 64 with a migration background had a monthly net income, which was 180€ lower than the one of individuals without a migration background (1,680€). Individuals who themselves or whose parents immigrated from Turkey had a notably low net income (1,200€), in particular women (710€). The authors argue that the particular situation of this group is related to their employment in lower qualified positions in general as well as women's lower rates of full time employment in particular. For the specific group of refugees aged 17-64, the same authors (Metzing & Schacht 2018) found that only one third of refugees aged 17-64, who arrived before 2013, were employed full-time. For those, who arrived between 2013 and 2016, this was true only for 3% as many of them still attended language and integration courses, did internships or an apprenticeships at the time of inquiry. Accordingly, median net incomes were comparably low, i.e. 1,250€ respectively 480€. Differentiating by nationality, it was 800€ for Iranian and Pakistani citizens, 500€ for Afghan citizens, 480€ for Iraqi citizens and 440€ for Syrian citizens.

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Germany by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Drawing on panel data from SOEP and the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS, *Nationaler Bildungspanel*), as well as from the PIAAC (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies) study, Geis-Thöne (2019) found that immigrants who had similar language competencies than Germans earned approximately the same. Based on a household survey, i.e. the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample, Brücker et al. (2021) reported a positive effect of the recognition of foreign credentials on employment and salary differentials of migrants. Compared to migrants without recognised credentials, the authors found an 8% increase in daily earnings after one year and a 20% increase after three years (ibid., 6). The delayed effect may be related to the fact that the recognition immediately eases access to employment, while higher salaries arose from it only in the long run (ibid., 6).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

The overcrowding rates in Germany between 2005 and 2019, comparing individuals born in Germany and those born in third countries, suggest that the rates for the latter group were constantly tripled as against the rates for individuals born in Germany (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Germany by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The information about the average available living space in m² per person in tenant households, which was gained from the micro census 2014, confirms that individuals with a migration background had lower available living spaces compared to individuals without a migration background, i.e. 36.7 m² versus 47.6 m² (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019, 122). Those who themselves or whose parents immigrated from third countries to Germany had particularly low space per person, e.g. individuals from Kosovo (26.6m²), Syria (29.0 m²), Iraq (29.1 m²), Afghanistan (30.4 m²) and Turkey (31.0 m²). Those from Northern America (44.0 m²), Oceania and the rest of the world (41.0 m²), however, were closer to the average of individuals without a migration background (ibid.). The average available living space in m² per person was found to be the higher, the longer immigrants already stayed in Germany. Those living in Germany for more than 25 years, had 40.9 available m² by average, while the ones living in Germany for less than five years, only had 33.5 available m² by average (ibid.).

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

A recent study by Seibert and Wapler (2020) revealed that immigration to Germany between 2004 and 2017 was polarized in terms of level of qualification, which can also be detected from the figures in the subchapters 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 following below. Throughout the period of investigation, the authors found a high share of academics, which was contrasted by a high share of individuals without a completed vocational training. The share of academics declined since 2010s in spite of a general increase in immigration, but is still higher compared to the population without a migration background. The temporary decrease in the level of qualification might be a consequence of an influx of forced migrants to Germany in 2015 and 2016 (ibid.).

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Germany and Bavaria. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 4 displays the share of population aged 25 to 64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of the ISCED classification) in Germany and Bavaria between 2004 and 2019, comparing individuals born in Germany with individuals born in third countries. Results show that the shares of individuals born in Germany were on a similar level for Germany and Bavaria and even decreased over time. The shares of individuals born in third countries, in contrast, were much higher in both Germany and Bavaria, i.e. at least four-fold. Due to lacking availability of data, no trend can be deduced for this group. For different parts of Bavaria, i.e. Lower Bavaria, Middle Franconia, Swabia and Upper Bavaria, however, Kordel, Spenger and Weidinger (2020) found that the share of people with lower education among TCNs decreased between 2008 and 2018.

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Germany and Bavaria. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 5 displays the share of population aged 25 to 64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4 of the ISCED classification) in Germany and Bavaria between 2004 and 2019, comparing individuals born in Germany with individuals born in third countries. Results show that the shares of individuals born in Germany were on a similar level for Germany and Bavaria and were constant over time, respectively regressing on a low level. The shares of individuals born in third countries, in contrast, were much lower in both Germany and Bavaria, i.e. two thirds. Due to lacking availability of data, no trend can be deduced for this group. However, Kordel, Spenger and Weidinger (2020) found that the share of people with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education among TCNs between 2008 and 2018 decreased in Upper Bavaria, remained at least stable in Lower Bavaria and Middle Franconia, and increased in Swabia.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 6 displays the share of population aged 25 to 64 years with tertiary education (levels 5-8 of the ISCED classification) in Germany and Bavaria between 2004 and 2019, comparing individuals born in Germany with individuals born in third countries. Results show that the shares of individuals born in Germany were on a similar level for Germany and Bavaria and increased over time. The shares of individuals born in third countries, in contrast, were lower in both Germany and Bavaria. Due to lacking availability of data, no trend can be deduced for this group. However, Kordel, Spenger and Weidinger (2020) found that the share of people with tertiary education among TCNs between 2008 and 2018 increased by half in Upper Bavaria and Swabia and in a slight way, also in Middle Franconia, in accordance with the general trend.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Germany by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurstat.



When discussing the share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) in Germany between 2004 and 2019, the shares of individuals born in Germany were on a much lower level than the ones of individuals born in third countries and even halved over time (Figure 7). The shares of individuals born in third countries decreased, too, but due to lacking availability of data, no general trend can be deduced.

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8 displays the share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) in Bavaria between 2004 and 2019, comparing individuals born in Germany with individuals born in third countries. Similar to the national trend in Figure 7, results show that the shares of individuals born in Germany were on a much lower level than the ones of individuals born in third countries and even halved over time. The shares of individuals born in third countries decreased, too, but due to lacking availability of data, no general trend can be deduced. However, Kordel, Spenger and Weidinger (2020) found that the share of young TCNs neither in employment nor in education and training in Swabia and Upper Bavaria remained rather stable between 2008 and 2018. In Middle Franconia, instead, it displayed a marked increase between 2017 and 2018.

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Bavaria by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9 displays the unemployment rates in Germany between 2004 and 2019, comparing Germans with TCNs. Results show that the both rates decreased after the economic crisis (with TCNs starting from a much higher level) and, over time, converged slightly. The unemployment rate of TCNs rose only in the year 2016 following the admission of a high number forced migrants (cf. Tangermann & Grote 2018). Individuals with a migration background often had a lower qualification level and were thus more frequently employed in the secondary sector, which is especially affected by the structural change, potentially resulting in a higher probability of unemployment (Brinkmann et al. 2006, cit. after Heckmann & Göler 2017). A recent study also found that unemployment rates were lower among those immigrants, who completed vocational training or hold a university degree (Seibert & Wapler 2020).

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Germany by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 10. Unemployment rate in Bavaria by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Figure 10 displays the unemployment rates in Bavaria between 2004 and 2019, comparing Germans with TCNs. Results follow the national trend, but on a way lower level, confirming the strength of the Bavarian labour market. Both rates decreased after the economic crisis (with TCNs starting from a much higher level), and resulted close to full employment. Over time, in addition, the rates converged slightly. The unemployment rate of TCNs rose only in the year 2016 and 2018 following the admission of a high number of forced migrants. Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a negative impact on unemployment rates and led to a 29.8%-increase compared to 2019 (BR24 2021a).

To differentiate further, a study by Rossen and Böhme (2018) found regional variations in terms of unemployment rates. While in Southern Bavaria they were rather low, in Northern and Northeastern Bavaria, instead, they reached double the average of the Federal State (ibid., 9), confirming a North-South divide of the labour market (ibid., 14). Besides, there is also a seasonal variation in terms of unemployment with a peak in the winter months, not least due to high number of employees e.g. in construction and the hospitality industry (e.g. BR24 2021b).

In the last couple of years, overall, the number of foreign employees rose more strongly than the number of German employees (Eigenhüller & Böhme 2019, 7). This is an inverted development relative Figure 10. Moreover, Eigenhüller & Böhme (2019, 16-17, 19) conclude that the foreign labour was especially employed in the hospitality industry, temporary employment, building cleaning and security services, while a strong increase was reported for temporary employment and the sectors traffic and logistics, construction, security services, health and IT.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Germany as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 11 displays the share of residents who acquired citizenship in Germany of resident non-citizens by former citizenship between 2009 and 2018, comparing EU-citizens and TCNs. Results show that the share of EU-citizens nearly doubled over time, however, on a low level, which may be partly related to the Brexit. The share of TCNs was more dynamic on a higher level and decreased in light of the admission of a high number of forced migrants since 2015. Based on the data from the micro census 2017, the highest number of naturalizations relative to the number of foreigners with a stay in Germany of more than eight years was found among Syrian citizens, Afghan citizens and Iraqi citizens (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019).

Already back in 2008, Thränhardt reported a relatively low numbers of naturalizations in Germany compared to other countries, which was related to the general aim of the Federal Government to prevent multiple citizenship[3]. In addition, practices in the 16 Federal States differ, which led and still lead to varying naturalization rates between the *Länder* (Thränhardt 2008). Experiences from two studies in the Federal States of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate show that many individuals were motivated to acquire the German citizenship due to their main place of residence in Germany, their attachment to the country and the opportunity to take part in elections (Ministerium für Integration Baden-Württemberg 2012; similar to findings for the national level, cf. Weinmann et al. 2011). Similar results were found in Rhineland-Palatinate, where it was very important for respondents that Germany is respected as a social and democratic state under the rule of law, that one wants to belong to Germany with all rights and duties as well as to be able to vote. Half of the respondents, who opted against naturalization, reported their unwillingness to renounce their citizenship, while 40% quoted the unnecessity due to a secure residence status (Ministerium für Familie, Frauen, Jugend, Integration und Verbraucherschutz Rheinland-Pfalz 2020; similar to findings for the national level, cf. Weinmann et al. 2011). Drawing on the MATILDE region Bavaria, the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior, for Sport and Integration (Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, für Sport und Integration 2020) recently reported a rising number of naturalizations in 2019 compared to the previous year. The individuals mostly stemmed from Turkey, former Yugoslav countries, Iraq, Ukraine, India, Vietnam and Afghanistan (ibid.).

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The statistical briefing presented the social impact of TCNs in Germany according to TCNs long-term convergence towards national averages/German citizens across a range of eight common social indicators. According to the MATILDE Matrix (Kordel & Membretti 2020), these indicators can be grouped in four dimensions, the so-called MATILDE Social Dimensions (MSDs): social polarisation, social cohesion, active participation and citizenship rights as well as access to and quality of services (Laine & Rauhut 2020).

For the MSD **social polarisation**, data about risk of poverty and income inequality suggest that especially the arrival of forced migrants in the mid-2010s led to a temporary increase in social polarisation, whereas, more recently, a convergence could be detected. For the MSD **social cohesion**, data with regard to the risk of poverty and income inequality let us conclude that the arrival of forced migrants in the mid-2010s resulted in a temporary decrease and, more recently, in a convergence. Immigration of TCNs, especially of but not limited to forced migrants, translated into a polarisation in terms of levels of qualification of TCNs (educational attainment) and a temporary small increase in unemployment rates. Overall, however, both educational attainment and unemployment rates of TCNs developed positively and resulted in a convergence, too. Regarding the MSD **active participation and**

[3] Multiple citizenship is foreseen only for EU-citizens, individuals with parents of different nationalities and citizens of nation states, where renouncing one's citizenship is not permitted.

citizenship rights, the indicators "share of young people neither in employment, nor in education and training" and "unemployment rate" were on a constantly higher level compared to the overall population and rose temporarily following the arrival of forced migrants. Both indicators showed a positive development and a slightly converging trend. The third indicator in this dimension, i.e. residents who acquired citizenship, decreased after the arrival of forced migrants in the mid-2010s due to lacking minimum requirements, and, similar to the share for EU immigrants, remained on a low level over time. Nonetheless, TCNs may also be very active in civic life and participate in society without acquiring German citizenship (see also discussions in Laine & Rauhut 2020, 29). The last MSD, i.e. **access to and quality of services**, solely consists of the indicator "overcrowding rate", which was very volatile during the time of investigation, not allowing for a clear conclusion in terms of convergence or divergence.

To sum up, ambivalent results can be drawn from this statistical briefing. Besides, the quantitative data presented here do not cover the time after the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore only have a limited explanatory power about the social impact of TCNs, during and post-COVID. The fieldwork in the course of work package 5 (WP5) will hopefully allow us to explore the impacts of migration at the local level more in-depth, taking into account also the implications of the current pandemic on TCNs living in rural and mountain areas.

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ITALY

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1. INTRODUCTION

Immigration processes result in various transformations at rural and mountainous places, based on manifold interactions between TCNs and local structures. In Italy, as discussed in the "Classification on spatial specificities and TCNs distribution in MATILDE regions", the topic of immigration has been underrepresented in public debates and policies for a long time (Weidinger & Bergamasco 2020). Characterized mainly by emigration and internal migration until the late 20th century and by national political polarization during the turning point of migration in the 80s, despite being highly affected by immigrant flows since more than 30 years, Italy still lacks coherent immigration, asylum and integration policies (Schierup et al. 2006, cit. after Fullin & Reyneri 2011). Immigration to rural and mountain regions was paid little attention to until the recent years when its potential to counter depopulation (Osti & Ventura 2012, cit. after Bock et al. 2016, 76; Membretti et al. 2017; Dematteis et al. 2018) and contribute to the development and regeneration of inner areas (Corrado & D'Agostino 2018) became prominent.

The aim of the MATILDE project is to contribute to the shared knowledge and awareness of good practices for co-constructing a Europe that leverages the tremendously underutilized heritage of rural and mountain regions, contributing to the overall development of Europe (Membretti 2020). Immigration can play a major role in the development, demographic stability and functioning of local economy of these regions under the government of appropriate national and local policies. Through the quantitative assessment of social indicators comparing the national and case study level data of the 4 Matilde Social Dimensions, we aim to re-conceptualise and re-represent the active role of Third Country Nationals in these contexts (ibid.). The quantitative assessment of social indicators applies the MATILDE matrix – data collection framework – to provide an in-depth study at multiple scales. The quantitative assessment plays a key role in *contextualizing the position of TCNs* in the MATILDE regions of Italy and its transformation during the past 10-15 years. It is a crucial prerequisite for understanding the interaction between newcomers and the local conditions. Combining migration specific indicators with indicators on employment and educational participation comparing the native-born and TCN population on the case study and national level, it serves as the backbone of social impact assessment.

The 4 Matilde Social Dimensions (MSDs) target the broader social impact of the immigration of TCNs, exploring its interconnectedness with the social structure of mountain and rural regions in Europe. Analysing the 4 MSDs (Social polarization; Social cohesion; Active participation and citizenship rights and Access to and quality of services) allows us to target the broader social impact of immigration on the contextualized social realm and everyday life. As part of Work Package 3, this briefing provides a statistical contextualization to the quantitative assessment of the social impact of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in the MATILDE regions of Italy: South Tyrol and The Metropolitan City of Turin, Piedmont. The national and case study level value of the MSDs' social indicators will be presented, in order to quantify the implications of the arrival and settlement of TCNs respective the host societies.

The social indicators are illustrated by means of statistical data from EUROSTAT and ISTAT – for Figure 8b, young non-EU28 persons neither in employment nor in education and training in South Tyrol (National Statistical Office South Tyrol). The project considers "Third Country Nationals" (TCNs) as non-EU citizens, who reside legally in the European Union and who are the target of EU integration policies (see EU Integration Action Plan of Third-Country Nationals, June 2016). The indicators are compiled for NUTS-0, NUTS-1, NUTS-2, NUTS-3 scale. NUTS-0 for data collection on national level, Italy. NUTS-2 for data collection of Piedmont. South Tyrol –NUTS-3. NUTS-1 scale is been used for Figure 8b, out of necessity of data availability.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Italy by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



"Third Country Nationals" (TCNs) are non-EU citizens, who reside legally in the European Union and who are the target of EU integration policies (see EU Integration Action Plan of Third-Country Nationals, June 2016). The share of population at risk of poverty on the national level remained largely unchanged for Italian citizens and fluctuated between 16%-18% in the period of 2004-2019. As it can be seen, the variation for TCNs was much higher in the 10 years period of 2009-2019. For citizens from non-EU28 countries the risk of poverty rate has been significantly higher, with a fluctuation between 31%-42%. The economic crisis of 2007-2008 peaking in 2012 has had a significant negative impact on the TCNs at risk of poverty, raising their ratio by 5% at its direct aftermath, reaching the highest level of 41.6% in 2017. As it can be seen, this number has been picking up slowly and has not restored its pre-crisis level since. The high risk of poverty level of TCNs in Italy can be explain partially by their predominant employment characteristics, following Ambrosini (2005), the "5 P's employment": occasional (precari), heavy (pesante), dangerous (pericoloso), poorly paid (poco pagati) and socially penalized (penalizzati socialmente) and often in close contact with the informal economy. Due the uncertainly of these types of employment, these jobs often fail to provide security of a stable and sufficient income and living. Interesting to observe the rate of how differently the Italian-born and TCN population were affected by the financial crisis that began in 2007-2008. Although the native population has been largely affected regarding employment rate, we can see that it has but slightly increased their share of at risk of poverty. As opposed to the significant increase of the TCN population in the corresponding years, it further indicates the TCNs high dependency on employment and vulnerability to global economic trends.

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Italy by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



International migration flows might have a key role in the future of income inequality of Europe (Guerin, 2013). As it can be seen on Figure 1, Third country nationals tend to be at a higher risk of poverty partially due to the unsteady features of their labour models, as discussed previously. Figure 2 illustrates the income inequality between Italian citizens and TCNs on the national level in the period between 2004-2019. As observable from the available data on both socioeconomic groups, between 2009-2019, persistent inequality of income lingers. A steady, albeit low level growth of income of Italian citizens can be seen with an altogether almost €4,000 estimated average growth (from €14,145 to €18,098) by the end of 2019. As opposed to this, the estimated growth of income of TCNs in Italy has not exceeded €1,000 (€11,700 to €12,363). The economic crisis in 2012 had a greater impact on the TCNs than on the Italian citizens and following the crisis, the income inequality slightly grew, reaching its climax in 2016 with approximately €6,500 difference between the two socioeconomic groups. Thereafter, the gap has stagnated and began to narrow by 2019 (€5,735). Inequality in income distribution is mostly driven by inequal distribution of wages, nevertheless, other indicators, democratic variables should also be considered. To mention few: the uneven distribution of national and third country national citizens into different sectors, age structure and educational levels.

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Italy by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The rate of overcrowding (the number of rooms appropriate to the size of the household [Eurostat 2021a]) is one of the most fundamental social indicators. One's living condition has an effect on his/her health conditions, social integration and the overall well-being of individuals. The overcrowding rate often influences other negative social indicators such as social inclusion and deprivation indicators (Eurostat 2021b). The overcrowding rate in immigrant households has been significantly higher than of the national population on the national level in the given period of 2009-2019 (Figure 3). Between 2004-2009, there was a steady reduction in the overcrowding rate for national citizens living in Italy, reaching its lowest level of 19.8% at 2009. With slight fluctuation, the share of overcrowding among Italian citizens remained largely constant until 2019, not exceeding 22.8%. Having started at a much higher level than of the national citizens, the fluctuation of the rate of overcrowded TCN population has not displayed any significant steady reduction since 2009. There was a sudden growth of the share of TCNs living in overcrowded households between 2011 and 2014 (from 41.9% to 50.2%) which can be explained by the lingering negative impacts of the economic crisis from 2007-2008 on the labour and broader economic indicators of TCNs and waves of newly incoming TCNs. Between 2014 and 2017, a steady decrease of the share of TCNs can be observed, falling from 50.2% in 2014 to 47.7% in 2017. However, in the consequent years it increased again, reaching a high value of 52.9% by 2019. This indicates a significant difference between the Italian-born and TCN population in terms of rate of overcrowding being almost 30% higher than of the national population in the same year (52.9% as opposed to 22.7% for Italian citizens).

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

The access to education in Italy is guaranteed to foreign minors regardless their legal status. In 2014, the Ministry of Education has adopted guidelines to enhance the inclusion of foreign pupils at schools, providing up-to-date instructions on school guidance, evaluation, education and training of young people and adults[4]. At University level, the Ministry of the Interior provides a limited number of scholarships (100 yearly) to beneficiaries of international protection.

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4a. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Italy and Piedmont. Source: Eurostat.



The ratio of people between 25-64 years with less than primary education, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2) differs significantly between the Italian-born and extra EU28 born population. The education level of TCNs is remarkably lower than of the Italian population both on the national level and with regard to the region of Piedmont. The analysis of Figure 4a shows that in the period of 2006 and 2019, just over half of the non-EU28 born population has completed at most a lower secondary education in Italy. At its lowest rate in 2012, the TCN population with a maximum lower secondary education was 48%, and at its highest in 2018, 56.8%. By contrast, the share of native-born individuals residing in Italy who had no more than a lower secondary level of education was 42.7% in 2012 and 34.7% in 2018. As it can be followed, the share of population with maximum lower secondary education highly separated Italian citizens from Third Country Nationals. There is little difference in the general development of this trend between the national level and the level of Piedmont. The ratio fluctuates around 35% by 2019 for Italian citizens both on the national level and in Piedmont, whereas it reaches more than 55% for TCNs at the same year both on the national and regional level. The overall convergence between the share of TCNs on both national and regional level and the Italian population that could be seen until 2014, stopped sharply. Since 2014, divergence is the overall tendency of share between the two socio-economic groups.

[4] MIUR, Linee guida per l'accoglienza e l'integrazione degli alunni stranieri, 2014. Available at: https://www.istruzione.it/allegati/2014/linee_guida_integrazione_alunni_stranieri.pdf

Figure 4b. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Italy and South Tirol. Source: Eurostat.



Relatively similar tendency can be observed regarding the ratio of people between 25-64 years with less than primary education, primary and lower secondary education of the Italian citizens and non-EU28 born population in South Tyrol than in Piedmont, albeit less accentuated. The percentage of people with maximum lower secondary level of education in South Tyrol is in general minimum 5% higher among the non-EU28 born population than of the national citizens. In 2012, the share of TCNs was 46.2% and of the national citizens, 40.6% and in 2018 45.7% (TCN) and 29.9% (Italian citizens) accordingly. What can be observed is the difference between the share of Italian citizens by 2019 in the two MATILDE regions. In both of the regions, there was a slight decrease in the period of 2014-2019. However, in the region of South Tyrol, by 2019 the share of Italian citizens having attained less than primary education, primary and lower secondary education fell to 29.9%, more than four percentage points lower than in Piedmont (34%).

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Figure 5a. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Italy and Piedmont. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 5a displays the ratio of people between 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 and 4) according to citizenship on the national and regional level of one of the MATILDE regions, Piedmont. As it can be seen, a much greater share of the national population attained upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education on both the national and the regional level than of Third Country Nationals. The highest share of Italian citizens in Piedmont was 45.4 % in 2019, more than 15 percentage points higher than of TCNs in the region with 29.5% in 2019. However, it is notable to mention that the difference has only become such significant in the second part of the 2020s. In the period of 2006 and 2014, the share of both the Italian national and TCN population on the national and regional level seemed to converge. In Piedmont, by 2010-2012, the difference did not exceed 2 percentage points (41.8% for those born in Italy and 39.4% for TCN in 2012) and greater divergence can be seen on both regional and national level from 2014. This can be partially explained by the lingering negative effects of the economic crisis in 2012 and the changing composition of TCN groups. In the consecutive years of 2014, the share of TCN population obtained secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education has been decreasing steadily and sharp. In one year it dropped by nearly 4 percentage points (from 38.5% in 2014 to 34.8% in 2015) and by 2019 it went below the pre-crisis level with only 29.5%.

Figure 5b. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Italy and South Tirol. Source: Eurostat.



The ratio of people between 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in South Tyrol shows a significantly different trend than of that in Piedmont. As it can be seen, the share of native-born population exceeds of those born in non-EU28 countries both on the national and on the regional level. To this extent, it is similar to the situation observed in Piedmont. However, between 2014-2019, a much greater level of convergence can be seen between the ratio of TCNs with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in South Tyrol and of the native born population both on the national and on the regional level than in the case of Piedmont. Meanwhile it went significantly below native-born citizens by 2019 in Piedmont (with more than 15 percentage points), falling behind the share of TCNs on the national level, this ratio in South Tyrol has far exceeded the share of TCN population on the national level, drawing near to the national level of Italian citizens. However, the negative effect of the 2007-2008 economic crisis can be observed as well. In the direct aftermath of the second climax of the crisis in 2012, the share of TCN population with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in South Tyrol dropped with more than 6 percentage points (from 43.4% in 2012 to 37.2% in 2014). Besides the negative effects on economic, educational and social participation of the economic crisis (which given the group's considerably more unstable labour and social status had a larger impact on TCNs than of the native-born population), the ratio of TCN population with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in South Tyrol has been possibly affected by the socio-economic group's changing demography and age distribution of newly arriving TCNs, resulting in a highly fluctuating course between 2006-2019 (with a high variation between the years). However, the overall tendency in the region of South Tyrol is convergence between the native-born and TCN population and increase with breaks for the TCN population only.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6a. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education in Italy and Piedmont. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 6a displays the ratio of the Italian-born population and Third Country Nationals between 25-64 years with tertiary education on the national level and in Piedmont between 2005-2019. Tertiary education (level 5-8), as can be seen comparing the figure with figures 5a and 5b, has been attained by a much lower share of both native-born and TCN population than upper secondary and post-secondary levels of education (levels 3-4). The national average of Italian citizens with tertiary education has been growing steadily, as well as in Piedmont, both reaching their highest share by 2019 of around 20%. (This is considerably lower than the corresponding share of population with levels 3-4, between 40-45% by 2019.) The equivalent share among persons born outside of EU28 countries shows a similar tendency both on the national and regional level. A slight and considerably steady growth can be observed between 2005-2019, with an approximate growth of 3 percentage growth in Piedmont (10.9% in 2006, 13.8% in 2019). As it can be seen, the fluctuation of the ratio of TCNs in Piedmont has been slightly more discontinuous than on the national level with a significant growth between 2007 and 2008 (2.9%) and a more constant period between 2013 and 2016 (3.8% growth of share). The overall tendency is convergence between the two socio-economic groups and slight increase for TCNs only.

Figure 6b. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education in Italy and South Tirol. Source: Eurostat.



The trend of the share of Italian-born population and Third Country Nationals between 25-64 years with tertiary education in South Tyrol slightly differs from that of Piedmont's between 2005-2019. Comparing to the national level tendency of the TCN population, a steady and considerably rapid growth can be traced in South Tyrol, starting from single digit share in 2010 (8.5%) and reaching to 16.6 % by 2016, almost doubling in the period of 6 years. (For a comparison, in the same period of time the corresponding growth of share in Piedmont was 4.1%.) However, the steady growth of TCNs did not continue following the tendency of the native-born population. After 2016, a sharp decline can be seen in the share of TCN population attained tertiary education in South Tyrol. Between 2016 and 2019, their share dropped more than 5 percentage points (from 16.6% in 2016 to 11.5% in 2019), reaching a level below the national level of the share of TCN population. It can be seen that the share of TCNs with tertiary education in South Tyrol started from below the national average for the corresponding population, however, increased with a considerably greater speed until 2016. A similar increasing tendency can be seen of the Italian population in South Tyrol, however, compared to the national level of Italian citizens with tertiary education, the share of Italian-born citizens with tertiary education in South Tyrol has remained constantly below with an average 5 percentage points.

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Italy by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



The indicator for young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) corresponds to the percentage of the population of a given age group (in this case aged 15-24 years) who are not employed and not involved in further education or training. The share of NEET on the national level has largely remained stable with a peak of growth on the turn of the 2010s in terms of Italian-born nationals, however, has shown significant fluctuation for Third Country Nationals. Nevertheless, as it can be seen, both groups of population were affected by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which resulted in a more accentuated negative impact on the non-Italian born population, with a raise of NEETs of more than 8 percentage points in the direct aftermath of the crisis between 2007 and 2010 (from 21.4% to 30.1% in 2010). The share of NEET of TCNs on the national level peeked in 2010 with 30.1 %, however, has not shown any significant decrease until after 2015. Their ratio has dropped to 27.8% and 27.4% in 2016 and 2017, then raised by two percentage points by next year, falling closer to the pre-crisis level again by 2019 with 26%. As it can be observed, it has been picking up slowly and has still not reached its pre-crisis level by 2019. The share of NEET among Italian-born population was considerably below of that of TCNs throughout the whole studied period of time, not exceeding 21.2% even in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis. However, it was affected by it as well, peaking in 2013-2014 with 21.1% (still 10 percentage points lower than the share of TCNs correspondingly) and has been picking up slowly.

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8a. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Piedmont by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 8a displays the share of Italian-born and non-EU28 born young citizens (15-24 years) in Piedmont who are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET). Considering native-born population, the share of NEETs in Piedmont is below the national average. It has been fluctuating between 9.3% and 17.4%, with a relative tendency to grow until 2014 and with a steady decrease following. Although with relatively lower share, the development follows the national tendency, largely affected by the 2007-2008 economic crisis (with more than 8 percentage points growth between 2008 and 2013) and a steady, albeit slight decrease in the following years (14.2% in 2019). NEET rates are considerably higher among the TCN population in Piedmont than nationally and significantly higher than of the Italian-born citizen in the region. Compared to the Italian-born population in Piedmont, the share of NEET amongst TCNs has been fluctuating to a greater extent. A sharp decrease can be seen between 2006 and 2008 with a fall of 8.2 percentage points. The share then increased following the economic crisis of 2007-2008 with periods of decrease and increase, peaking in 2016 with 35%. Between 2016 and 2019 the share decreased, reaching 26.7% by 2019.

Figure 8b. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in South Tirol by broad category of country of birth



Figure 8b displays the share of Italian-born young people (aged 15 to 24) neither in education, nor employment or training (NEETS) in South Tyrol and the share of non-Italian born young people (aged 15 to 24) neither in education, nor employment or training in the NUTS-1 region of North-East Italy. Given the necessity to adjust to available data, the difference in the two given geographical dimensions must be taken into consideration. Considering the education participation and attainment of the of the Italian population in South Tyrol, the share of young people not in education, employment or training (NEETS) is significantly below the national average. As it can be seen, it largely remains one-digit in the observed period, its highest value 11% in 2017. On average, it remains almost constantly a ten percentage points below the national level. The share of young NEETs amongst the foreign population in North-East Italy is notably higher than the Italian-born population in South Tyrol. The share of young NEETs amongst the foreign population in North-East Italy fluctuates between 21.1% and 32.3% in the given period of 2004-2019. Their ratio decreased between 2004 and 2008 (from 28.5% to 25.5%), increased in the next two years and peaked in 2010 with 32.3%, followed a breaking but overall decreasing tendency in the following years, reaching a low share of 21.1% by 2019.

7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Italy by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



The rate of unemployment in the NUTS-0 area of Italy between 2004 and 2019 was on average between 5.5 % and 12% for Italian citizens and between 9% and 18% for TCNs. Regarding the typology of labour market inclusion, compared to the total population, the share of TCNs, who are employed part-time or temporary is much higher, whilst self-employed TCNs are less frequent. In rural areas, temporary employment is applying to nearly one third of the TCNs (MATILDE Deliverable 2.1, Table 6.5, p. 314). As far as the main trends are concerned, the negative effect of the economic crisis of 2007-2008 on employment is noticeable with both socio-economic groups. The unemployment rate was stagnating for the TCN population (8.7% in 2006 and 2007) and falling for Italian citizens (from 7.7% in 2005 to 6% in 2007) in the consecutive years following the crisis. The differences between unemployment rates for the native-born and non-EU28 born populations were relatively small at the onset of the crisis but these gaps widened in consecutive years. The share of unemployment among the TCN population experienced a sudden and sharp increase from 2008 to 2009, increasing with more than 2.5 percentage points in a single year (8.8% in 2008 and 11.4% in 2009). There was a continuous increase on a slower rate in the consecutive years until 2011, reaching 12.3% in 2011. A sharp growth can be seen in the following years, the rate of unemployment reaching its peak in 2013 with 18%. At this year, the difference of ratio between Italian-born and non-EU28 born citizens reached 6.3%. Thereafter, as it can be seen, the differences began to narrow again after 2016 (falling to 4.2 percentage points difference by 2019). The unemployment rates for population born outside the EU has been steadily decreasing since 2013, producing a more convergent development with the native-born population, reaching 13.9% by 2019.

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 10a. Unemployment rate in Piedmont by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



The fluctuation of unemployment in Piedmont, by category of age between 25-64 broadly follows the national trend, with a significant difference between Italian and non-EU28 citizens and a climax level between 2012-2015, in the aftermath of the 2012 economic crisis. The percentage of unemployed Italian citizens in Piedmont, however, shows a more positive picture than on the national level, not exceeding 10.1% even following the crisis (compared to the highest national level at 12.4%). Regarding the employment of TCNs, the picture seems more negative. The level of unemployment of TCNs in Piedmont is markedly higher relative to the Italian citizens in the region, but also to the TCNs on national level (with up to 8% difference to the advantage of the national ratio). It has been extremely affected by the economic crisis in 2012, more than doubling the percentage of unemployed TCNs (from 9.2 % to 26.1%). The labour market has been picking up slowly and the level of both Italian citizens and non-EU28 citizens' employment rate has not yet returned to the pre-crisis level today. Some key influences on the labour market in the region were the strongly shrinking industrial sector compared to the beginning of the century, the key role played by the car manufacturer FIAT and the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, boosting the tourist economy.

Figure 10b. Unemployment rate in South Tirol by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



South Tyrol is a prospering region with the highest regional gross domestic product per capita compared to other MATILDE regions and one of the highest in Italy (Chart 98, MATILDE Deliverable 2.1,

p. 310). The rate of unemployment, however, represents this accordingly only with regard of the Italian citizens. As it can be seen, the labour market integration of citizens in South Tyrol highly exceed the national average, unemployment rate, on average, remaining at 3% comparing to the national average approximate 10% in the given period between 2004 and 2019. Even in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2007-2008, the regional level of unemployment remained continuously below 5% (as opposed to the national share reaching above 12%). The employment rate of TCNs in South Tyrol is periodically noticeably higher than of TCNs on the national level between 2011 and 2019, with periods of decrease. The rate of TCNs in employment especially dropped in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2012 and has only been picking up slowly. This has largely followed the national trend, however, more heavily impacted the TCNs in South Tyrol, the level of unemployment nearly doubling in the course of 2012-2014 of the peak of the 2007-2008 economic crisis (from 12.9% in 2009 to 22.6% in 2014). At this period, the ratio is above the national level of corresponding socio-economic group. Similar to the national pattern, there has been a steady, albeit slow decrease in the share of TCNs not in employment in South Tyrol, falling to 11.8% by 2019. Although the corresponding data does not cover all the period of that of the Italian population in the region, based on the tendency between 2011 and 2019, there is a significant inequality of rate of employment between the native and TCN population, both in terms of average share and vulnerability to global shocks indicated by sudden fluctuation.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Italy as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



Figure 11 indicates the share of residents who acquired citizenship in Italy between 2009 and 2018 citizens in EU28 countries and citizens born outside of the EU. The share of population of citizens in EU28 countries that acquired Italian citizenship in the observed period remained considerably steady, with an overall fluctuation not reaching 1 percentage point. As it can be seen, the share of EU28-born citizens acquiring citizenship in Italy peaked in 2015 with 1.28%. The lowest share was in 2012 with 0.47% acquiring citizenship. The majority of persons acquiring citizenship were non-EU28 born citizens.

The share of third country nationals acquiring citizenship in Italy has been on an average higher with 1.5-3 percentage points than of former EU28 born citizens. The share of TCNs was relatively constant between 2009 and 2012 with 2.17% in 2009, 2.18% in 2010, 1.77% in 2011 and 2.05% in 2012. This was followed by a period of more accentuated increase, with the ratio reaching 5.26% by 2016. This growth tendency has only partially corresponded to the overall trend of the share of EU28 citizens obtaining citizenship, following a similar growth trend only between 2014 and 2017. A sudden decrease in the share of TCNs obtaining Italian citizenship can be seen in the consecutive years of 2016. By 2017 their share fell with 1.39 percentage points (from 5.26% in 2016 to 3.87% in 2017) and by 2018 it fell another 1 percent (to 2.89%). A similar decrease can be seen regarding the share of EU28 citizens obtaining Italian citizenship between 2015 and 2018, albeit on a much lower level. From their highest share of 1.28% in 2015, its ratio fell to more than its half by 2018 with 0.58%. Relatively to each other, the two ratios have been following a similar tendency, albeit on a different extent, showing an overall positive trend until 2016.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mobilizing the underutilized rural and mountainous regions has an immense potential in fostering the co-construction of a more inclusive and more developed Europe. Immigration is one of the fundamental factors to be considered when analysing the potential of these regions (Perlik et al. 2019). The arrival of new inhabitants, under appropriate national and local policies to govern it, is a major contribution to demographic stability, local economies and housing and the reconversion of underused local real estate (Membretti & Lucchini 2018). Understanding how immigration, especially from non-EU countries, affects the overall development of these regions, this statistical brief provides a statistical overview of the national and case study level values of the 4 MDSs in Italy. The examined social indicators were: The Share of TCNs at risk of poverty, Income inequality across socioeconomic groups, Overcrowding rate in immigrant households, Population by educational attainment, Young people neither in employment nor in education and training, Unemployment rate, Residents who acquired citizenship. As part of Work Package 3, this briefing provided a statistical contextualization to the quantitative assessment of the social impact of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in the MATILDE regions of Italy. The quantitative assessment plays a key role in *contextualizing the position of TCNs* in the MATILDE regions of Italy and its transformation during the past 10-15 years; it sheds light on the most important influences, as well as on the general tendencies of TCN and Italian born population with regard to their socio-economic characteristics.

The quantitative assessment of social indicators identified the main tendencies of the development of share of the given groups on the national and regional level (MATILDE case studies) in Italy. The first two indicators, 'The Share of TCNs at risk of poverty' and 'Income inequality across socioeconomic groups' (MSDs Social Polarisation and Social Cohesion) were examined on the national level. Regarding the first indicator, a significant difference could be seen between the share of native-born citizens and

TCNs at risk of poverty. As observed, while the share of the first group remained considerably stable and low (below 20%), the TCN population showed greater vulnerability to global shocks, their share fluctuation greatly in the given period, highly impacted negatively by the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its aftermath. The assessment of national and TCN population in Italy regarding income inequality produced a relatively constant picture in the period observed. Seemingly unaffected by the global crisis, the income of the Italian-born population has steadily grown but of the TCNs stagnated, thus resulting in a slight divergence and a growing inequality of income between the two groups between 2004-2019. The third indicator, 'Overcrowding rate in immigrant households' (MSD Access to and quality of services) was studied on the national level as well. As discussed, the rate of overcrowding is one of the most fundamental social indicators; it affects health conditions, social integration and the overall well-being of individuals. The tendency pointed out by the assessment, therefore, shows an alarming trend in immigrant households. The overcrowding rate among immigrant households is on average 20% higher than of the native population and it shows a slightly growing tendency between 2009 and 2019.

The third indicator examined was 'Population by educational attainment' (MSD Social Cohesion). A noticeably difference was showed between the Italian born and TCN population with less than secondary education both on the national level and in the region of Piedmont. While the former showed a steady negative tendency, the share of TCNs remained relatively increasing throughout the examine period. In South Tyrol, the overall tendency of Italian citizens' share was negative and of TCNs' positive, however, with a much less accentuated trend than in Piedmont. Regarding secondary education a sudden decrease of share of TCN population was observed in 2014 in Piedmont, which was align with the national TCN tendency. This resulted in a growing gap between the two groups of population between 2014 and 2019. The share of TCNs with secondary education in South Tyrol showed a more constant positive tendency in the given period exceeding the national TCN average with more than 5% by 2019. The share of population with tertiary education had an increasing tendency both on the national and on the regional levels (Piedmont and South Tyrol) for both socio-economic groups between 2005 and 2019. In South Tyrol, a sudden decrease can be seen in 2018.

The fourth indicator was the share of young people (15-24) neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) (MSD Active participation and citizenship rights). On the national level, the ratio is considerably constant among Italian-born citizens with a slight increase following the financial crisis. The share of TCNs on the national level has varied more. It increased in 2007 with more than 8 percentage points and has been picking up slowly. On the regional level, both in Piedmont and in South Tyrol, the share of native-born population NEET was below the national average and showed an overall slight increase. In Piedmont, the share of TCNs NEET varied on a greater extent and remained continuously above the share of Italian born. In North-East Italy, the share of foreign born NEET remained above and fluctuated to a greater extent than the Italian population in South Tyrol, but showed an overall decreasing tendency.

The fifth indicator was 'Unemployment rate' (MSD Active participation and citizenship rights and Social Cohesion). On the national level, the unemployment rate of both social groups increased significantly in 2011 and has been picking up slowly. Similar tendencies can be seen in Piedmont and

South Tyrol, although in South Tyrol the Italian born population has not been affected by the negative impact of the economic crisis and their unemployment rate remain relatively low and constant.

The last indicator was 'Residents who acquired citizenship' (MSD Active participation and citizenship rights). As discussed in the assessment, the share of EU born residents who acquired citizenship in Italy remained relatively low and constant, barely exceeding 1%. Among the TCN population, the ratio showed greater fluctuation and increased between 2012-2016 and dropped in the following year. However, its overall tendency remained increasing. The main tendencies of social indicators to given socio-economic groups can be greatly varied. As it could be seen from the quantitative assessment, in the case of the MATILDE regions of Italy, the geography, regional economic differences and vulnerability to global shocks play key roles in the lives of TCNs.

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NORWAY

Author: Per Olav Lund

1. INTRODUCTION

This report is a follow-up on the report *Policy briefing on migration-related social and economic policies.* The policy brief emphasized the close interconnection between social and economic impacts and therefore it is difficult to analyse them separately. In this report, we take a closer look at the relationship between the social and economic dimensions.

For immigrants, learning Norwegian is crucial for their ability to enter into the labour market. At the same time, The Norwegian labour market requires that employees have high competence. The Norwegian Introduction program[5] is therefore aimed at language training, knowledge about Norwegian society, as well as working skills. The immigrants are also expected to themselves make an effort to try to enter the labour market themselves.

The requirements for becoming a Norwegian citizen are less stringent than in many other European countries. Over the years, however, several changes have been made to the requirements for obtaining citizenship. The most recent changes came in 2018 when the requirements for becoming a Norwegian citizen were made stricter. This led to a significant increase in applications for Norwegian citizenship in 2017, the year before the new requirements came into play. This is highlighted in more detail in chapter 8. The fact that it has been relatively easy to become a Norwegian citizen may have impacted the statistics presented in this report, since immigrants who have obtained Norwegian citizenship are not always counted as immigrants.

Immigration to Norway varied in size during the period analysed in this report. A large proportion of TCNs who come to Norway are either family reunification or in need of protection (refugees). These characteristics of the TCNs who arrive in Norway are some of the key underlying factors that may explain both risk of poverty, low-income levels, and high unemployment rates amongst TCNs. Integration is a long process and children born in Norway of parents with immigrant backgrounds also experience challenges both socially and economically, which is something we will also touch upon in this report.

Data included in this report are from both the national and the regional levels. On the first of January 2020, the two counties Hedmark and Oppland, were merged into one and became Innlandet County. The newly formed county covers an area of 52,072 km^2 and is approximately 20 percent larger than Denmark. The county has around 371,000 inhabitants, which is approximately 6 percent of the population of Denmark, and large areas are not inhabited. The number of people with a migrant background living in Innlandet County is low compared to the rest of the country. The reason for this is that many migrants choose to move to bigger cities once they have stayed for the duration of the moving restrictions imposed on newly arrived refugees by the Norwegian government. Many factors explain the desire to move to more urban areas of Norway, and these are described in more detail in

[5] The purpose of the programme is to strengthen the opportunity for newly arrived immigrants to participate in working life and society, and to support their financial independence. For further information, see the Matilde report "The impact of social and economic policies on migrants i Europe" page 236 and 243-245.

report 3.3. In short, the main reasons appear to be better work and educational opportunities and more opportunities for social networks with other migrants from their own country of origin.

Statistics Norway uses a different set of categories for country of origin for migrants than Eurostat. The categories are only occasionally comparable to the EU28 categorization. In the few available statistics where it is possible to separate the EU28 countries, countries that are a member of the EEA are also included (Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein). A more common categorization used by Statistics Norway is to distinguish between continents. The categorization most compatible with EU28 is a categorization that includes the EU/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (EU/EEA, etc.). All other countries and continents are defined as *Africa, Asia, etc.* The results presented in this report are based on the categorization of immigrants from *Africa, Asia, etc.* However, given that the immigrants that can be defined as TCNs living in Innlandet County are mainly refugees coming from Africa and Asia, these categorization issues should not be a major source of error. When referencing documents where this categorization is used, the relevant categories will be mentioned.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Norway by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Compared to other countries, Norway has relatively small differences in income and living conditions within the population, and the economic growth the country has experienced in recent decades has resulted in real wage growth for most people. At the same time, there are increasing differences, and the share of persistently low-income households increased from about 8 percent in the period 2010-2012 to 9.7 percent in 2015-2017. Low-income households include both ethnic Norwegians and immigrants, but the share is higher for the latter group, and it is particularly families with a country background from Africa, Asia, etc. who experience poor living conditions due to low income (Omholt, 2019).

Housing expenses are often the largest expense (Revold, Sandvik and With, (2018), in Statistics Norway, 2019b) in a household's budget. Having burdensome housing expenses is more common for immigrants than the majority population. The share that states that they are unable to pay an unexpected bill of about EUR 1 000 is higher for immigrants than for the majority population (Statistics

Norway, 2019b). Immigrants with a refugee background and a short period of residence also more often have economic difficulties compared to immigrants with longer periods of residence and a higher labour force participation (Vrålstad & Wiggen, (2017), In Statistics Norway, 2019b).

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Norway by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Low income is a common measure of risk of poverty, but many of the individuals who belong to low-income households[6] do not report poverty-related issues. In the living conditions survey EU-SILC (With & Thorsen, 2018), the results showed that approximately half of those who reported lacking basic goods[7] did not belong to a low-income household. This reflects the complexity of poverty as a phenomenon, as the experience of lacking basic goods is not necessarily connected to income level. The survey furthermore showed that those who are both in the low-income group and report a lack of basic goods differ from the rest of the low-income group in that they are younger, live in urban areas, often have an immigrant background, and often fall within the NEET (not in education, employment, or training) category.

The labour market is the most important arena for income distribution and the risk of sustained low income is five times higher for households without any household members with stable employment (Dokken & Langeland, 2016). Increased influx of refugees and deterioration of the labour market both influence the share of immigrants with low income. The increase in net income in the period between 2010 and 2014 is due to improvement in the labour market following the financial crisis that hit Norway in 2009. The massive drop in oil prices that occurred in 2014 increased the unemployment rate in Norway and might explain the reduction in net income we observe in the period 2014-2016, which also coincided with an increase in net immigration.

[6] Average income after tax per consumption unit (EU scale) in a three-year period below 60 per cent of the median average in the same three-year period. (ssb.no)

[7] Definition of basic goods: 1. Own at least two pairs of matching shoes (including a pair of winter shoes). 2. Can replace worn clothes with new ones (clothes from a second-hand shop, flea market or similar should not be included). 3. Can afford to eat meat or fish every other day (possibly vegetarian alternative in the same price range). 4. Can afford to keep the home warm. 5. Can go to the dentist if needed.

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Norway by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



It is a political goal in Norway that everyone should have a place to live, and overcrowded households can be a significant living condition problem. Not everyone who lives overcrowded finds that they have too little space and not everyone with a lot of space experiences having enough space. Most people who live in overcrowded conditions do not experience a lack of space, even though this proportion is somewhat lower than for those who do not live cramped by given standards (Revold et al. (2018), in Statistics Norway, 2020b).

The share of overcrowded households varies widely between different immigrant groups and is highest for those who have family reunification or status as a refugee as the main reason for immigrating to Norway. For these groups of immigrants, the share living in overcrowded conditions is approximately 30 percent. In 2019, immigrants with a country background from Somalia, Syria, and Pakistan, had the highest share of crowded households. Overall, the share of crowded households for people with a country background from Africa, Asia, etc. is 30 percent. Among non-immigrants, by comparison, the share of crowded households is eight percent.

The figure above does not include all age groups, only adults from the age of 18 and upwards. Therefore, we can expect that the proportion is higher than indicated by the numbers. The reason why the share of crowded households is higher when one also includes those who are 0-17 years old is that the share of crowded households increases with the number of family members, thus the likelihood of this factor increases. We also find that there is a difference regarding the immigrant’s length of residence in Norway. The share of crowded households is reduced with increasing length of residence. This is because specific refugee groups, e.g. from Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, are statistically better off compared to newly arrived refugees with a different country background. The risk of living in a crowded household is also linked to life-phases. The risk is highest for younger immigrants and lowest for older immigrants. Income also affects the proportion of people living in crowded conditions and is higher for those with lower income. For immigrants, there is not much difference in the share of crowded households between central and more rural areas in Norway, since statistics show that immigrants live in crowded households also in rural areas. With the exception of immigrants with a refugee background, where crowded households are higher than in central areas, there is a slight decrease in crowded households with increasing rurality. Part of the reason for this may be that refugees living in central areas have had a longer period of residence than those living in rural areas. This can partly be explained by Norwegian settlement policy, and that those who settle in rural areas tend to move to more central areas after a while (Statistics Norway, 2020b).

In surveys on immigrants' secondary migration internally in Norway, results show that only about 20 percent chose to move, whereas 80 percent remain where they first settled. However, there are large differences in secondary migration between counties in Norway, with Innlandet County being close to the average number of secondary migration among immigrants (Ordemann, 2017). Those who complete the immigrant introduction program also seem to have a lower propensity to migrate out of the municipality in which they were first settled (Strøm et al., 2020). Why refugees choose to stay where they were first settled can have many reasons. One reason to stay in more rural municipalities is the access to larger and more affordable homes compared to the cities. The rights and requirements which follow participating in the introduction program for refugees furthermore affect their opportunity to move somewhere else in the country, as secondary relocation can result in refugees losing their right to participate in the introductory program, as well as the associated benefits and financial support. For refugees receiving social benefits, moving to another municipality will result in the need for new agreements with NAV (Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration), and the outcome may result in changed benefits.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lover secondary education in Norway and Hedmark and Oppland. Source: Eurostat.



In Norway, the population’s level of education has been increasing steadily for many years. The share of inhabitants with only primary and lower secondary education has been declining steadily both nationally and within Innlandet County, as the Norwegian society has evolved to become a "knowledge-based society". New generations have chosen to take a longer education than the generation before, which means that fewer people have the lowest level of education. This development must also be seen in the context of developments in the labour market where there are increasing requirements for formal education and there are fewer jobs for unskilled workers.

Education is important for both social and personal development, and the development towards a knowledge-based society where citizens are both motivated to and expected to get an education. Through introduction schemes, immigrants without primary and lower secondary school are given the opportunity to take primary and lower secondary education. An important reason why the share of non-EU immigrants without primary or lower secondary education begun to rise in Innlandet County around 2016 is believed to be due to increased settlement of immigrants coming from countries with low levels of education, including countries surrounding the Horn of Africa.

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Norway and Hedmark and Oppland. Source: Eurostat.



As illustrated by Figure 5, the share of the population with upper secondary education is declining slightly both nationally and in Innlandet County. The main reason for this is that those who exit the labour market have a generally lower level of education than the younger generations who are entering the job market (see also the previous chapter).

People with an immigrant background have a lower completion rate in upper secondary school compared to their ethnically Norwegian peers. But this difference is greater for those with an immigrant background and who were not born in Norway compared to those born in Norway. The latter group completes upper secondary school at almost the same rate as those with ethnically Norwegian parents. One of the possible explanations for this difference is that those who are not born in Norway enter the school system later and therefore have a disadvantage compared to those who are born in the country (IMDI, 15. June 2020; Instebø, 2021). Other important factors that influence whether upper secondary education is completed are socioeconomic factors such as parents' income and education level, which might also partially explain why people with immigrant backgrounds have lower completion rates.

Innlandet County has a somewhat lower level of education than the average for the rest of the country. As we shall see in the next chapter, the proportion of the population in Innlandet County with tertiary education is lower than the average for Norway, which might explain why the proportion of the population with high school as their highest completed level of education is higher here. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is also a higher proportion of people with primary school as their highest education in Innlandet County. The observed fluctuation in the share of inhabitants with non-EU 28 background with upper secondary education as their highest level of education is likely caused by fluctuations in the number of refugees settled in the region during the period. The growth in the share at the end of the period can probably be explained by the increased focus on qualification for vocational education in the refugee introduction program, as this has been a focus area both nationally and at the county level.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



As Figure 6 illustrate, the proportion of the population in Norway with tertiary education has increased relatively steadily in the period between 2004 and 2019. At the national level, for people born in countries outside EU28, the development is more stable between 2011 and 2017, before we see a slight dip from 2017 and onwards. The figure also shows that for Innlandet County, the share of people born outside EU28 with tertiary education has varied greatly over the years.

A study based on people who were born between 1980 and 1990 and immigrated to Norway before the age of 17 shows that this group is underrepresented in tertiary education compared to the remainder of the population (Instebø, 2021). The primary reason for this is that fewer immigrants graduate from high school. If one looks at those who have graduated from high school, the share of immigrants who take tertiary education is about the same as for the rest of the population. However, in terms of degree achievement and completion rates, immigrants fall somewhat behind the rest of the population.

The variations in the proportion of non-EU28 migrants with higher education in Innlandet County can partly be explained by increased immigration from countries with low levels of education (see also chapter 5.1). This may also be related to the notion that immigrants experience more difficulties in the labour market and are thereby more affected by changes in the labour market than their ethnically Norwegian counterparts. Educated people have more opportunities and are likely to move if they lose their job and new job opportunities open elsewhere. People with limited or no education have fewer opportunities and are more likely to stay. The share of overqualified immigrants is also higher than for the rest of the population. A study by Villund (2014) showed that in the period 2007 – 2012, 43 percent of employees with an immigrant background from Africa, Asia, etc. were overqualified for their job, whereas the same number for the majority population was only 11 percent.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Norway by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



Compared to other European countries, the proportion of young people who are not in employment, education, or training (NEET) in Norway is low. However, the proportion is increasing and young people with low education are at risk. More young people are also receiving health-related benefits than previously (Statistics Norway, 2018). In the OECD report "Investing in Youth: Norway", low educational attainment is highlighted as the greatest risk factor for young people not being able to attain employment or education.

In a study that examined what those with status as NEET in 2012 had been doing in the period 2008-2017, it was found that, on average, 49 percent had been in employment, education, or training during the remainder of the years in the period. Meaning that approximately half of the NEETs were only temporarily out of employment, training, or education (Statistics Norway, 2019). The share of NEETs with an immigrant background was smaller compared to the majority population, but this can be explained by the fact that a third of those registered with an immigrant background in 2012 emigrated from Norway within five years. The reduction in NEETs with an immigrant background from 2015 is caused by more people being enrolled in labour market introduction programs or undertaking education. Reduced unemployment and several labour market introduction programs have resulted in a gradual reduction in the share of NEETs until 2019. In 2019, almost one in four immigrants under the age of 30 falls within the NEET category (Statistics Norway, 3 Sept 2020).

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Hedmark and Oppland by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



In the period 2004 to 2019, the development in the share of NEETs at the regional level followed the trend at the national level. The regional unemployment figures however fluctuate considerably more than at the national level. Lack of data at the regional level and lack of relevant reference literature, therefore, make it difficult to comment on this development. However, some of the development in the share of young people falling within the NEET category can probably be explained by the industry structure in Innlandet County, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) efforts to reduce NEETS, as well as the available educational opportunities in the region.

7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Norway by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



One of the aims of The Norwegian Welfare Model is to secure high employment rates, as unemployment has negative consequences both for the individual and for society at large. As shown by Figure 9, the unemployment rate for non-EU28 immigrants living in Norway is much higher than for Norwegian nationals. The unemployment rate among Norwegian citizens has remained within the 2,4 and 4,5 percent interval in the 15 years from 2004 to 2019. For non-EU28 nationals, it has been as high as 17,5 percent, and as low as 8 percent right before the financial crisis in 2009.

The generally high unemployment rates among non-EU28 immigrants are partially connected to the increase in immigration to Norway from the year 2000 and onwards. There are many reasons why non-EU28 nationals experience difficulties in the labour market in Norway, but important reasons include limited language skills and lack of formal skills and competencies that are considered relevant in the Norwegian labour market. In Norway, the difference in salary between employees is relatively small compared to many other countries. This leads to increased demands for productivity and formal competencies, making it unprofitable to employ people with limited qualifications as employers are given limited opportunities to adjust their salary to their skill level (OECD, 2015). Many refugees come from countries with poorly developed education systems and many therefore have limited formal education when they arrive in Norway. Discrimination can also play a role in limiting non-EU28 nationals' employment opportunities. A Norwegian study from 2012 showed that individuals with foreign-sounding names were 25 percent less likely to be called in for job interviews than individuals with identical CVs but with Norwegian-sounding names (Midtbøen & Rogstad, 2012).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 10. Unemployment rate in Hedmark and Oppland by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



The unemployment rates among Norwegian citizens in Innlandet County have varied between 2,2 and 4,2 percent in the period 2004-2017. Most years, the unemployment rates were lower than the national average. This can partially be explained by the specific characteristics of the labour market and industry composition in Innlandet, as well as by the efforts of NAV (The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration) in facilitating employment training opportunities for the unemployed. In the short term, this such initiatives can have a positive impact on unemployment rates, as individuals taking part in such initiatives are no longer counted as unemployed. In the long term, such labour market initiatives can have a positive effect on employment rates as they can contribute to increasing the employability of the participants.

In contrast to the large regional variations in young adults in the NEET category (not in employment, education, or training), employment rates among ethnically Norwegians between the ages of 25 and 64, living in Innlandet County generally follow the national employment rates. Largely following the same fluctuations that can be seen at the national level in the period. Figure 10 shows large differences in unemployment rates between the majority population and non-EU28 immigrants in Innlandet County in the limited period from which data is available (2015-2016). Such a considerable difference can be difficult to explain, but the size of the difference indicates that the difference might be explained by a very limited number of people being included in the statistics or that there might be some reporting error affecting the statistics. It nonetheless gives an indication that there is higher unemployment rated among non-EU28 immigrants than among ethnically Norwegian inhabitants.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Norway as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



Norwegian citizenship can be obtained once a person has lived in Norway for at least seven of the last ten years and intend to stay in the country. Applicants need to clarify their identity, have a residence permit, and they need to meet prescribed requirements for participation in a Norwegian-language course. January 1st 2020, the Norwegian government opened up for dual citizenship for the first time, allowing for the first time individuals to keep their citizenship of another country when obtaining Norwegian citizenship.

The share of foreign country nationals who have become Norwegian citizens has changed year by year (Statistics Norway [1]), but as Figure 11 shows, there is a large in 2017. The most important reason for this increase was that it was announced that year that new and stricter guidelines for obtaining Norwegian citizenship would soon be implemented. The high number of granted applications that year do however also rely on a high number of immigrants having reached the required seven years of residency. It is also important to note that there are differences in application propensity between origin country, and the high level of application also relies on a high number of applicants from these countries.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of task 3.2 is to provide an in-depth quantitative assessment of the 4 Matilde Social Dimensions (MSDs) at multiple scales. Referring to analysis of statistics on two levels: the regional level (Innlandet County) and the National level. Following the guidelines for T.3.2, the purpose of this task is furthermore to 'quantify the implications of the arrival and settlement of TCNs in terms of changes in the endowment of resources in rural and mountain regions'. However, analysing the regional statistics of Innlandet in comparison to statistics at the national level is not likely to give in-depth insights into how the settlement of TCNs affects the endowment of resources in rural and mountainous regions. Because even though Innlandet County covers municipalities set in rural and mountain areas, it also covers municipalities that can be classified as more urban and densely populated. Of Innlandet County's approximately 370,000 inhabitants, 44 percent live in the county's six largest urban municipalities, all of which are located in the southern half of the county. The size of these cities varies from 17 000 to 35 000 inhabitants and they all have a city center surrounded by densely populated areas. Five of the six municipalities are also attractive residential municipalities with train connections to Oslo and a travel time to Oslo of approximately 1-1.5 hours. Another 30 percent of the inhabitants in Innlandet County live in the 12 municipalities that are close to the "Greater Oslo region". The remaining 25 percent live in the 28 municipalities in the county that can be described as rural and/or mountainous. Statistics at the regional level, therefore, do not give a reliable picture of the effect migration has on rural areas in Innlandet County, as this would require municipality-level data. This limitation is important to keep in mind when interpreting the statistics and conclusions presented in this report.

An important indicator for social polarization is "risk of poverty" and as we saw in chapter 2, non-EU28 immigrants in Norway are at a much higher risk of poverty than the majority population. Fløtten et al. (2011) present several explanations for this increased risk of poverty among non-EU28 migrants, pointing to unemployment and low wages as the most important explanations. At a national level, the unemployment rates among immigrants are higher than in the majority population at large. The overview presented in Chapter 7, based on the two years data is available for (2015 and 2016), shows that unemployment rates among migrants are also higher at the regional level in Innlandet. Being outside the labour market leads to lower income, which in turn limits the individual's opportunity to take part in activities in society. This also has consequences for the living conditions of immigrants, as housing costs make up a considerable part of living costs in Norway and the proportion of people living in conditions of overcrowding are higher among immigrants than for the remainder of the population.

In rural areas, the labour market is weaker than in more central areas that tend to offer more employment opportunities for people with limited education and limited formal qualifications. Such opportunities might encourage jobseekers to move towards more central areas. At the same time, however, several factors counteract the pull of employment opportunities in more central areas. Housing costs are for example higher in more suburban/urban areas and can thus represent a barrier for moving to more central areas as financial restraints can make housing suitable for a family inaccessible. Results from Strøm et al. (2020), who studied migrants who settled in Norway between 2007 and 2008, showed that migrants who moved from the municipality where they were assigned to when they first arrived, achieve a lower level of economic welfare over time than the migrants who settled down in the settlement municipality they were assigned. However, as they only studied migrants who settled in Norway within a rather limited space of time, we cannot be sure if this effect is generalizable or if it is connected to certain characteristics of the cohort that settled in Norway in 2007 and 2008, and it is therefore uncertain whether the result can help to substantiate that the effect is smaller in rural areas than central areas with higher living costs.

Many of the municipalities in Innlandet County are struggling with issues related to having an aging population as the younger generations leave in the search of education and employment opportunities elsewhere. To counteract this development, refugees are being settled in these municipalities, and to finance integration, the municipality receives financial support from the state. As we have pointed out in the Norwegian Country Report on social impacts, there is a tendency that the economic schemes for integrating migrants are not applied in a way that sufficiently ensures employment opportunities for migrants in the region. Consequently, the level of secondary migration is higher among job-seeking immigrants than it otherwise could have been, had there been employment opportunities available to them in their settlement municipality. We do not however have sufficient data available to analyse these conditions in more detail.

Reduced labour market participation can also lead to increased expenses for the municipality, as they are required to cover social welfare and other forms of financial support. The migrant thus becomes dependent on the public sector for support but is not given the opportunity to get themselves out of this dependency unless they choose to move, in which case they do not contribute to the desired local development.

Social cohesion within a community is affected both by the extent to which migrants take part in the local community, their social mobility, and whether they can improve their economic situation over time. If you look at migration in a longer time perspective, research shows that second-generation immigrants have a significantly higher degree of social mobility when it comes to employment and partaking in tertiary education than first-generation immigrants. At the same time, we see a polarization within the group of second-generation immigrants, where on the one hand, there is a larger proportion of second-generation immigrants who participate in higher education than the general population. But at the same time, the number of students who do not complete secondary education is higher among immigrants than it is among the majority population (Midtbøen, 2020). In Chapter 6, we also saw that the share of NEETs is higher for people with an immigrant background than for the general population. Fløtten et al. (2011) have also highlighted the generally lower level of education and the fact that a higher proportion of migrants have jobs for which they are overqualified as the second reason why migrants have a higher risk of poverty. Over time, this can lead to increased differences within the Norwegian society between ethnic Norwegians and people with a different country background. Although research shows that Norway, to a higher extent than many other countries, has high income mobility between generations, economic living conditions also tend to be inherited between generations (Nordberg-Schulz & Østhus, 2018).

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SPAIN

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1. INTRODUCTION

The magnitude acquired by the migratory phenomenon since the end of the 20th century in Spain has profoundly transformed the profiles of the Spanish society. On the one hand, it is not only by the weight acquired by the population of foreign origin, which, after having reached its maximum level in 2011 with 5.7 million people, in 2019 exceeded 4.5 million people (around 11% of the total population, according to the Municipal Register of Inhabitants, INE). On the other hand, Spain already has a level of multiculturalism comparable to that of the main host countries in the developed world with the longest host tradition.

In particular, the presence of foreign immigrants in rural areas in Spain is important, although their numbers are bigger in urban areas, according to data from the Municipal Register of Inhabitants for 2019. Of all foreigners, only 3.1% reside in municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants, but 17.2% in municipalities between 1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, while 26.7% in those between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants; another 40% reside in the largest (> 100,000 inhabitants). However, 6.1% of the population in municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants is of foreign nationality, 11.4% of those living in municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, while 12.5% correspond to municipalities with population between 50,001 and 100,000 inhabitants.

The important immigration process that Spain received from the 90s until the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 was characterized by a high level of integration of the foreign population; this contrasts with the experience of other countries where high immigration is perceived as a threat (Portes & Rumbaut, 2010). In Spain, the context of economic boom with growth and job creation was a key aspect to understand the unexpected arrival of a large immigrant population to occupy a job in the labor market (Izquierdo, 1996) between the middle of 1990s and the late 2000s, but particularly during the 2000s. The Spanish case is peculiar because during the years of intense immigration it achieved a remarkable degree of integration of this population, despite the lack of planning and clear political action (Cebolla & González, 2013).

Martínez de Martínez de Lizarrondo (2009), about integration, describes the Spanish case as a 'patchwork' integration model where there are variations of the same system that fit into a singular policy within the EU: heterogeneity of the different Autonomous Communities within a state umbrella -The Spanish state-; in addition, it has features of a Mediterranean welfare regime, and a differentiation between migratory systems of temporary management of labor and sedentary installation. Different studies show that the Spanish migration model is focused on the needs of the labor market and its management (Martín, 2011). This model links the maintenance of the regular situation of immigrants to their contribution to Social Security and makes the recognition of rights subject to a work permit.

In this statistical report, indicators on aspects related to the integration of immigrants will be analyzed. Undoubtedly, the Covid-19 crisis has put a brake on this integration and inclusion, due to the precious socio-economic situation in which many foreigners find themselves after the crises.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

In Spain, most indicators show that vulnerability among foreign immigrants is higher than among the local population, both in the workplace and in health, or other living conditions. Immigrants often work in low-income, precarious occupations, and tend to live in more overcrowded households (CES, 2019). Likewise, many of these groups face linguistic and cultural barriers with respect to their host societies, as well as limited knowledge of the reception context, which means insufficient access to health care, especially to the actions of preventive type. The precarious living conditions suffered in many homes of immigrant origin are manifested in higher rates of morbidity among these groups, a situation that is aggravated by the barriers to access to health services (Nazroo, 2003). Immigrants, especially those who are in an irregular situation or have short-term visas, do not enjoy the same rights of access to public health care as natives, while private health insurance does not usually cover health problems derived from an epidemic (Perna & Moreno, 2021). All this is normally reflected in differences and inequalities in the health status of different population groups.

The sectoral distribution of foreign and native employees is different, and therefore, the Covid-19 crisis has had a stronger impact on some sectors with broad representation of foreign workers. This differential impact is largely explained by the greater vulnerability of the foreign population (greater presence in the informal economy, more weight of temporary contracts, less seniority, etc.) and greater exposure to sectors in crisis. The unemployment rate for foreign workers reached 24.9% in mid-2020, falling back to 2017 levels, which means that one in four foreign workers was unemployed (Mahía, 2021).

The result is that poverty and exclusion rates affect 27.9% of the population in Spain in 2020, -12,989,405 people- (AROPE, 2020). The rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE rate) is an indicator composed of the sum of three sub-indicators: people at risk of poverty, people with severe material deprivation, and people in households with low employment intensity.

The specific vulnerability patterns of immigrants lie at the intersections of class, ethnicity, and legal status (Ingleby, 2012). This poverty rate among foreigners whose country of origin is outside the EU is very high (54.2% in 2020) and is 2.5 times higher than among the Spanish population (Fig. 1). However, although for TCNs this figure has been decreasing in Spain between 2016 and 2020, it is still 8% higher than that of foreigners from a country belonging to the EU -which is 46.3% - (AROPE, 2020). These data quite coincide with the figures taken from EUROSTAT (Fig. 1).

These differences vary greatly between the foreign population according to their origin (whether they come from an EU country or not), thus affecting the administrative regulation of their residence and the ability to access the job market, services and benefits. of citizenship under equal conditions.

By nationality, 'extreme' poverty reached 28.2% of TCN immigrants in 2019, while it was 19.5% among immigrants from EU countries and 6.7% among the native population (ECV, 2020). In summary, the majority of people living in poverty in Spain are not foreigners, but more than four out of every five people are Spanish (81.3% in 2019). That is, in the last year only 18.7% of people have foreign nationality (AROPE, 2020).

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Spain by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



In Aragón, and according to data from the Government of Aragón (2018), the rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion was 20.7% in 2017, far from the figure for Spain of 29.2%; it should be noted the growth of this rate by 64.3% between 2009 and 2014 (for Spain, 18.2%), so that exclusion in Aragón has advanced much faster. However, according to the Living Conditions Survey of the National Institute of Statistics (INE), the poverty rate was 13.3% in 2019, and 21.6% in Spain (ECV, 2020). Therefore, this rate is still lower in Aragón compared to Spain.

In this region, two out of every five immigrants (40%) say they are at risk of poverty, according to the latest report from the Comisiones Obreras Union (CC.OO Aragón, 2020). This figure contrasts with the 20% corresponding to the population born in Aragón. The figures for the immigrant population are also oversized because they are mostly young, who have the lowest salaries.

The current crisis "has paralyzed the recovery process" that had begun after the 2008-2014 crisis, but some estimates indicate that the problem of poverty could rise by around 5% in both groups (natives and foreigners) due to poor working conditions, low wages and high temporality generated by the state of alarm during the Covid-19 crisis (CC.OO Aragón, 2020). In Aragón, the year 2020 finished with 75,500 unemployed, of which around 23,900 correspond to immigrants (31.6% of the total). In particular, the Covid-19 crisis has generated a double gap between foreign women: first, due to their nationality, and second, due to the fact of being a woman.

The situation of vulnerability described in the previous section responds to a large extent to the working conditions of the foreign population, and it generated rise to income inequality across socioeconomic groups. The situation of inequality in which this population group lives is not only produced by a greater exposure to job loss, but also by the consequences derived from that loss. An immediate situation of vulnerability is generated in those citizens of foreign origin, and especially in the extra-community immigrants; they tend to have little or no savings to try to cushion periods of crisis and do not have family support networks (CES, 2019).

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Spain by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



It should be kept in mind that income inequalities between nationals' households and those made up of foreigners are very high. Data from the INE's Living Conditions Survey (ECV) for 2020 (ECV, 2020) indicate that the average net annual income per person and consumption unit in 2019 was almost half in the case of non-EU foreigners (€ 10,254) compared to that of Spaniards (€ 18,167), and also lower than the average income of the foreign population in the EU (€ 12,046). These data are quite consistent with those offered by EUROSTAT and also show the slight increase in family income -both Spanish and TCNs- after the economic crisis between 2008 and 2014 (Fig. 2). It should also be taken into account that these income differences are related to the high risk-of-poverty rate of 50% in households whose members are foreigners (Mahía, 2021), which explains the lower level of income among the foreign population.

The unemployment benefit also offers differential coverage and protection between TCNs and natives. Not only those who do not have an employment contract are excluded, but among those who receive some type of benefit, the amount is lower than that of native workers. The data on average spending on unemployment benefits indicate an average monthly amount per beneficiary of about € 798 for the foreign population, which is 20% lower than the general average of € 999 per beneficiary.

In Aragón, the analysis of the labor market also shows the different working conditions that exist in different groups such as foreigners, but also among younger people and women (CESA, 2020). The socioeconomic crisis situation between 2008 and 2014 especially affected the most vulnerable groups, mainly due to the loss of employment of one or more members of the same family. Thus, families that before that crisis were at an adequate level of social and labor integration, worsened their employment situation, accommodation, social networks, decrease in family income, employment, etc. Their purchasing power decreased due to the loss of employment and the end of social benefits, which increased their situation of social inequality -generating a dual and fractured social model- (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). After a slight economic and employment recovery after 2014 (Fig. 2), the Covid-19 crisis has again come to hit the most fragile and vulnerable sectors, so that the TCNs in 2020 again register the most low employment rates and lower incomes (CESA, 2020a).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Access to housing, or decent accommodation is one of the main concerns of the immigrant population. But as with working conditions, the characteristics of the accommodation are often impregnated with problems that lead to situations of marginalization and residential exclusion, especially in the first periods of stay in the host country. Within the residential behavior of foreign immigrants, problems such as access to housing, the costs of that access, problems of overcrowding, the use of public space and residential mobility stand out (Leal & Alguacil, 2012).

At the beginning of the stay in the host country, renting rooms is the most appropriate option to be able to survive with the low income obtained from a precarious job, which allows them to save money. Among other reasons that lead to renting, and more specifically to renting rooms, is the administrative situation (not having a residence / work permit, or 'papeles'), since being in an irregular situation is even more difficult to access ownership of a home, either owned or rented (Leal & Alguacil, 2012).

For this reason, this form of accommodation becomes a strategy to be able to save, either to return to their countries of origin, to pay for family reunification, or to improve, in the medium term, their residential situation. This strategy is put into practice both with the family (sharing a dwelling with different family nuclei, but with a kinship relationship) and with strangers (contacted through advertisements in telephone booths or bus shelters). Social contacts are also important for this, because sometimes shared housing is accessed through acquaintances or colleagues. Sharing a home does not necessarily imply that it is in poor condition. This situation leads to abuses by the agencies and owners of the apartments for rent that are sometimes in poor condition, which must be corrected by the tenants and the cost of which is not assumed by the owner (Leal & Alguacil, 2012).

However, the residential exclusion of the immigrant population is not only determined by the difficult access to decent housing or by residential segregation, but also by the overcrowding within these shared dwellings, as well as by poor living conditions and problems of coexistence that in these circumstances take place. Especially during the first years of the migratory project, a significant economic, labor and legal vulnerability occurs in this population group; this vulnerability contributes to the need to seek strategies - such as sharing a home - that allow them to cope with this situation, and in the medium term improve their living conditions. The percentage of overcrowding is higher among the TCN population than among the population born in Spain (Fig. 3); Furthermore, the application of overcrowding indices in both the first home and the habitual residence indicate that they are higher among the TCN population than among foreigners from developed countries (Leal & Alguacil, 2012).

Although the National Survey of Immigrants (ENI, 2007) is a quite old source, it was a large survey conducted on foreign immigrants in Spain in 2007. This source demonstrated the high degree of overcrowding in homes of certain nationalities such as Moroccans, Ecuadorians or Romanians. Moroccan households that were overcrowded and in which 5 or more members of the immediate family lived together reached 66.6%; Furthermore, the percentage of households made up of unrelated people was only 6.6%. Moroccan immigrants are the least likely to share a home with people outside their family, and they are more likely to share accommodation with direct relatives.

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate (%) in Spain by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Ecuadorian households also live mostly with immediate family and are the least living in single-person households: 16.4% of Ecuadorian households were made up of 2 to 4 people who are not family and 44.8% of cases are family numerous (Leal & Alguacil, 2012). Despite these indicators, Latin American immigrants show better integration indicators in terms of residential segregation than other immigrants (Domingo, 2018).

Before the start of the 2008-2014 crisis, more than 66% of immigrants from developing countries were in a situation of transfer or rent, in contrast to the scarce 17.4% of Spanish households. However, 84.8% of the population in Spain owned their home in 2007, and only 15.3% rented (Leal & Alguacil, 2012), which shows the great difference between foreign and native population regarding access to the house.

There is a direct relationship between the economic situation and the income level of immigrants and the housing situation. Thus, those who have more income or come from more developed countries, tend to buy more houses, instead of renting. For example, and according to data from the National Immigration Survey (ENI, 2007), 71% of economic immigrants rented housing in Spain and only 29%

bought it. The rental percentages among immigrants from Morocco and Ecuador were 64.5% and 72.5% respectively, but 41.8% among foreigners from developed countries.

During and after the crisis from 2008 to 2014, the economic precariousness of many families led to sub-housing situations, residential exclusion and an increase in eviction situations, and problems such as energy poverty have become increasingly visible in many territories (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). Currently, the Covid-19 crisis has exacerbated that problem.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, TCN immigrants have had a difficult situation, also to face housing conditions. According to a study published in 02/2021 on the impact of the Covid-19 crisis and poverty in Spain, 49% of the population served by the Spanish Red Cross during the crisis was born in a country outside the EU (Cruz Roja Española, 2021); furthermore, 73.7% of foreigners assisted by the Red Cross have had problems both in paying for housing / room and supplies (water, gas, electricity) and only 26.3% state that they have not had any difficulties.

During the Covid-19 crisis, and unlike the native population, it is quite common for foreigners to share rooms in homes and reside in homes that are smaller than the native population. According to this study carried out by the Spanish Red Cross, 19.3% of foreigners served by this institution reside in homes of less than 60m^2, compared to 7% of natives (Cruz Roja Española, 2021). Furthermore, while the average size of the dwelling of foreigners served by the institution is 58.9m^2, the average size of dwellings occupied by natives is 81.8m^2. Furthermore, while 54.4% of the native population served by this institution reside in a home that they own that is fully paid for, that figure is only 4.4% among foreign immigrants. In parallel, 54.9% of foreigners served reside in rented homes, compared to only 13.6% of natives.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

In Spain, the educational level of the foreign population is notably lower than that of the native population. Possibly one reason that explains this is that Spain is a young country in terms of the arrival of immigrants, and many are ‘first generation’, which are those with low educational levels. However, this is changing, especially in the ‘second generation’, since the percentage of foreign students increased from 2% in 2014 to 3% in 2018 (INEE, 2020).

Various studies have also shown differences in the educational performance of immigrant and native students in Spain, since immigrant students perform substantially worse than native students at all levels; around half of this differential can be attributed to differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of the parents, being also relevant the influence of the parents’ educational attainment in the their likelihood of succeeding in education of the students (OECD, 2019). Immigrants also tend to perform relatively worse in areas where segregation is higher, although it seems that foreign students tend to improve performance the longer they have been in Spain (Felgueroso et al., 2009).

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

The educational level of the Spanish adult population (25 to 64 years) continues to improve in Spain. During the 2009-2019 period, the percentage of the adult population that has only compulsory studies (lower than secondary education) has decreased by 9.7%, from 48.4% to 38.7% (INEE, 2020), in line with as shown in Fig. 4. Despite the improvement, the values are still high compared to the average for OECD countries (from 26.2% to 21.9%) and for EU countries23 (from 24.2% to 18.3%).

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Aragón and Spain. Source: Eurostat.



According to Fig. 4, in Spain, the proportion of foreigners with primary education from outside the EU is slightly lower than that of the native population. Since 2012 a change can be observed, since the proportion of foreigners TCNs with primary education is higher than among Spaniards. However, in Aragón, the difference between the two groups is greater, and it seems that it is increasingly tending to diverge (since the economic crisis that began in 2008). In 2019, while only about 34% of the native population has primary education, that figure is 47% among foreigners TCNs; this means a lower level of basic education among these foreigners. According to CESA (2020b), foreigners who come to Aragón have less training than the native population.

In Spain, the percentage of the population with not completed compulsory studies remains low when compared to the EU-28 countries, despite continuing to improve. That figure was 31.2% in 2009 and 21.9% in 2014, while in the EU-28 it was 11.1% (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). Considering nationality, the percentage of abandonment of the population that does not possess Spanish nationality was 41% in 2013, and doubled the corresponding figure for the population with Spanish nationality, 23.5%. In Aragón, although with levels much better than the Spanish average, it also has a very negative index, 18.4%, although it is improving year by year.

Among foreigners, the proportion of lowly social classes is much higher than among the general population, and that generally implies greater importance for work than for studies. In addition to the lack of economic resources, it must be pointed out the difficulties of changing the country, the school system and the language (CC.OO, 2018). Also, areas with more recent immigration tend to have worse results than areas that are already used to this phenomenon; this is because the newcomers have more difficulties than those who have been in school for longer, and the system also learns little by little to work better with these students.

In Spain, also the children of foreigners and immigrants from "southern countries" are exposed to a greater risk of failure than natives: they tend to drop out earlier and often without the mandatory title. The differences can be explained mainly by their social class, but also by the disorientation linked to the migratory process and the cultural relocation that it entails, by the fact of speaking a different language at home, and by the fact that “foreign students bring with them the educational processes of their country of origin” (Fernández, Mena & Rivière, 2010, p. 85). In addition, these authors also point out family stability or instability as a factor in school failure.

There is another very important aspect to explain this failure, indeed, related to the socioeconomic origin of the student and those around him, and another linked to the labor market: when there is a lot of employment for people without qualifications, studies are stopped. The Mediterranean Communities (regions), especially the Balearic Islands, with a lot of tourism, are probably the paradigm of this factor linked to early school leaving. Therefore, this is related to economic crises: with less employment, there is a greater propensity to continue studying instead of staying at home.

As it was referred, in Aragón, the percentage of the native population with primary education is much higher than that of the foreign population from outside the EU, and this difference has become more notable in the decade 2009-2019 (Fig. 4). However, there has been an increase in the TCN population in the region in this period, and also in the number of students enrolled at all educational levels. Thus, in the 2019/20 academic year, 29,820 students of foreign origin were enrolled in Aragón in the general (regulated) regime, which represents an increase of 4.3% compared to the previous year (1,227 more students). This number of foreign students represents 13.1% (year 2018/19) of all those enrolled in non-university education in Spain, when the foreign population residing in Aragón accounted for 2.8% of the total in Spain in 2019 (Padrón, INE). Those 29,820 students represent 13.8% of the total student population in Aragón.

By levels, the group of foreign students represents 13.9% of the students enrolled in early childhood education, with 16.4% in primary education during the 2019/20 academic year (CESA, 2020b). Foreign students increased between 2018 and 2019 in the levels of infant, primary and Higher Grade Cycles of vocational training, while they have decreased in the rest. There has been a notable increase in children (+ 8.6%) and in primary education (+ 8.1%). The greatest decrease in students has occurred in high school -after secondary education and prior to university studies- with a decrease of 7.4%, but also in students of basic vocational training (-5.8%) and in the medium grade (-2.0%).

By geographical regions, 36.8% of foreign students are of European origin, so 63.2% are TCNs; of the total, 34.4% are of African origin (10,258 students out of 29,800 from all over Aragón), and 21.8% (6,509 students) are from America, and only 6.8% and 0.3% they come from Asia and other regions, respectively. By countries of origin, among the TCNs, those coming from Morocco (6,093 students and 20.4% of foreign students enrolled in Aragón), Nicaragua (1,525), China (1,367), Algeria (1,229), and Ecuador and Colombia (1,058 each) stand out (CESA, 2020b).

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Differences by educational levels between the native population and foreigners TCNs is also evident in secondary education both in Spain and in the Aragón region. The educational level achieved continues to be a factor to explain unemployment, and recent data show that, even with nuances, the workforce of immigrant origin has an average level of qualifications lower than that of the native population (CES, 2019).

In Spain, around 20% of adults (25-64 years) have only secondary education, while the figure among foreigners TCNs is 30%, (Fig. 5); these figures have remained fairly constant during the last decade.

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



Something similar, with the same difference, occurs in Aragón, where there is also around 10% difference between both groups: here too, around 30% of foreigners have maximum training in secondary education, while that figure is only one 5-6% lower among natives. In this case, the difference between the two is not as notable as for Spain.

However, the total number of foreigners with secondary education in Aragón has varied greatly in recent years, with two moments in which the proportion of foreigners with secondary education increased greatly: in 2009 and in 2016. The first period coincides with the crisis 2008-2014, and it could be interpreted with the aforementioned, since the foreign population takes advantage to train in times of economic crisis and when there is a lack of employment.

In Aragón, despite the worst educational levels among the foreign population, this group increases in secondary education. As an example, in 2016, Aragón was the third Autonomous Community in Spain with the highest percentage of foreign students (Gobierno de Aragón, 2018). In secondary education, foreign students represented 10.6% in 2019 (11.7% in the compulsory stage (primary education) and 6.9% in the non-compulsory stage). In professional studies (vocational training) they have accounted for 13.5%, and of them, the majority in basic vocational training studies with 25.1%, while in Higher and Middle Grade degrees they have been 9.0% and 14.2% (CESA, 2020b).

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

In Spain, the percentage of the population with university studies is high (38.6%) (Fig. 6) and similar to other OECD countries and Europe (INEE, 2020). However, that figure is around 12% lower among foreign TCNs. Also according to EUROSTAT data, the difference is even greater in Aragón, where this figure is more than 40% among natives and half (20%) among foreign TCNs (Fig. 6).

Other sources in Aragón (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015) also confirm that university education among the foreign population is low. In the 2013/14 academic year, there were 32,163 university students in the region, of which 31,174 (96.9%) were Spanish and only 989 were foreigners. Of these (3.1%), 630 came from EU countries, and only 359 from outside the EU. The highest percentage of foreign students from outside the EU came from Latin America and the Caribbean (13.1%) followed from North Africa (7.3%), the rest of Europe (5.9%), Asia and Oceania (5.9%) and the rest of Africa (4.1%) (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). While foreign university students from EU countries have grown faster in recent years, those from outside the EU have grown less.

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



In addition to what has been added in other sections, it can also be stated that the population from outside the EU has great difficulty in validating their university degrees in Spain. In addition, the great segmentation of the labor market in Spain and the difficulty for foreigners to access qualified jobs, makes it difficult to include these workers in qualified positions; That, and the difficulty of the language, justifies that they do not have many motivations to study university studies.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

The approximation to the unemployment rates by age, nationality and educational level shows that they are influenced by age, education, and immigrant status. The youngest groups (but also the oldest ones) have higher unemployment rates than the central age groups. People with only Spanish nationality show lower unemployment rates than foreign nationals (CES, 2019).

Among the Spanish population, it is observed that as the level of training increases, the percentage of unemployed decreases. The percentages differ with those registered by the immigrant population, but it is observed that the more training, for example in secondary education, the unemployment is lower (CES, 2019).

In Spain, the unemployment rate was 24.4% in 2014, and was 4.3% higher than that of Aragón, but this differs from the unemployment rate of the group of foreigners (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). Among the foreign population outside the EU, that unemployment rate was 29.6% in Spain, but it was 6.7% lower than that found in Aragón.

With regard to the youth, their situation is difficult in Spain, with the highest unemployment rates in Europe. However, despite the higher unemployment of foreign workers compared to natives, the labor participation of foreigners is higher than that of Spaniards (activity rate 14.8% higher in 2018). This especially occurs in young people under 25 years of age and in those over 55 years of age: in the 16 to 24 age group and in the second quarter of 2018, the activity rate of foreigners (and with dual nationality) was 15.3% higher than among the total of Spaniards; however, unlike them, it had grown since 2013 (CES, 2019).

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Spain by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



This does not seem to have much correspondence with what is shown in Fig. 7, which refers to people who neither study nor work. Precisely, the greater labor participation of foreigners compared to natives stands out, which is reflected in higher employment rates, although the distance is less than for activity rates, given the higher incidence of unemployment (CES, 2019).

Immigrants participate more and more constantly in the labor market, but their relationship with employment is worse, as shown by data on unemployment rates, which affects foreign nationality more (in both men and women). In particular, young foreigners are better off in the labor market than at other ages, and also compared to the native population; for example, and although they are very high rates, unemployment among those under 25 years of immigrant origin is 32.7%, compared to 35.2% among their Spanish peers (CES, 2019).

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

In Aragón, the situation is also difficult for the young population in general, and particularly those of foreign origin. Youth in this region was one of the groups that suffered the most from the economic crisis of 2008-2014, and also has the highest unemployment rate during the Covid-19 crisis in 2020. That explains their reduction as an age group, and also emigration outside the region and abroad. There were 179,900 young people between 16 and 29 years old in Aragón in 2020 (13.5% of the total population); this figure had decreased by 19.2% since 2008, when there were 222,800 people (CCOO Aragón, 2020). This decrease has been the result of emigration and poor job expectations, as a general situation in Spain. The consequence is that the activity rate of that group was only 52.6% in 2020. This year, that group of employed young people were only 70,300, while the unemployed were 24,400. This gives an idea of the bad economic situation in which young people find themselves, which is also extensive for the foreign population.

Comparing the situation of young people born in countries outside the EU-28 in Spain (Fig. 7) and those nationals from Aragón (Fig. 8), the worst situation of those residing in this region is striking, since they have had higher percentages among those who are neither studying nor working. However, the improvement produced in Aragón is evident, where this percentage has dropped from 30% in 2012 to 15% in 2019. Possibly the better labor and employment situation in the region has contributed to this.

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Aragón by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



As an example, the number of unemployed foreigners in Aragón in 2014 was 22,479 people, and 8.5% belonged to the group of under 25s (they represented 20.1% of all unemployment inthe region). However, unemployment in this age group (under 25 years of age) has been decreasing, and if in 2008 it was 11% of the total foreign unemployed population, in 2014 it was 8.5% (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015)

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

In relation to unemployment, the foreign population has a worse position than the native population in Spain. The presence of unemployed people of immigrant origin increased from 8.4 in 2002 to 21.9% in 2018, even reaching 40% in 2013 during the hardest time of the economic crisis (Fig. 9). Undoubtedly, their situation worsened during the years of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2014 and with the departure of many immigrants from Spain, but despite the progressive improvement in unemployment since 2014, there are still high rates for both groups. In 2018, this unemployment rate for people with foreign nationality (including those with dual nationality) was 21.9%, compared to 14.1% for people with only Spanish nationality (CES, 2019), in line with EUROSTAT data (Fig. 9).

The weight in the active population of people with foreign nationality and those with dual nationality increased from 6.9% in 2002 to 14.6% in 2007; in 2013 it was 15.2% and in 2018 it was 15.6% (CES, 2019). In this same period (2002-2018), the weight of the population of immigrant origin (that of foreign nationality and dual nationality) on employment went from 6.7 to 14.4%, with a distribution of that weight by age in line with the higher presence of relatively young people among this population.

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Spain by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat



These figures imply the presence, in the entire workforce in Spain in 2018, of 3.6 million people of immigrant origin (733,000 of them with dual nationality). Of these, 2.8 million were employed and the remaining 766,000 were unemployed. In all cases, the distribution by sex is currently more balanced than 10 and 15 years ago -48% of the active workers are women, compared to 44% in 2007- in foreigners, and even more so in those with dual nationality -where 57% of the actives in 2018 are women, compared to 48% in each of the two years mentioned- (CES, 2019). Unemployment among the youngest is even higher in 2018, with figures of 21.2% among men and 22.4% among women under 25 years of age in 2018), associated with the weight already in them of the second generation (CES, 2019).

The Covid-19 crisis has also had a differential impact on the employment situation of foreign immigrants, reflected in job losses and higher unemployment in this group. The cumulative decrease in employment between January and June 2020 was 6.1% for Spaniards, while for foreigners it reached 17.7% (Mahía, 2021). The difference in the unemployment rate between foreigners versus natives, which had fallen to 6.3%, in the third quarter of 2019, reached 11.4% again in mid-2020 - a level that had not been recorded since 2015-. The unemployment rate for foreign workers reached 24.9% in mid-2020, falling back to 2017 levels, which means that one in four foreign workers was unemployed. In year-on-year terms (that is, comparing September 2019 with September 2020), registered unemployment among foreigners would have grown by 44%, almost double the national average at 23%.

For this reason, the collateral effects that the pandemic has produced on foreign citizens stand out; in part, due to the difficulties of immigration management, seriously impacted by the paralysis of the administration during the pandemic, especially in its most acute phase. In this sense, it is the responsibility of public policy to try to alleviate this imbalance. It requires, on the one hand, a regulatory framework that points towards a lower structural vulnerability of the foreign group and, on the other, palliative measures that, in the short term, avoid situations of uprooting connected with the loss of employment, legal residence or regularization opportunities (Mahía, 2021).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

In Aragón, the important contribution of foreigners to demographic growth and their significant contribution to the active population is well known, with a predominance of women nowadays (CESA, 2020a). 8 out of 10 people who joined the activity in 2019, as well as two thirds of the jobs created, were people of other nationalities. Foreign labor is of great importance in the region and these workers have a widely recognized impact. For example, the activity rate of the foreign population (77.6%) is higher than that of the Spanish nationality (56.9%) (CESA, 2020a). In particular, men from other countries have the highest rate (82.8%), while women are at 71.5%. The foreign workforce grew significantly in 2019 compared to 2018 (9.9% more), representing 15.1% of the total in Aragón. Regarding the employed population of foreign origin, it also grew rapidly in 2019 compared to previous years, reaching 13.5% of the employees in Aragón, when that same year they were 11.3% of the total registered in the Autonomous Community (Padrón, INE).

However, unemployment among foreigners has registered little change, and accounted for 33% of the total unemployed in Aragón (as the active population has increased, its unemployment has decreased slightly). While the unemployment rate of the foreign population in Aragón was 19.6% in 2019, among the population with Spanish nationality it was 8.3%. However, the unemployment rate is higher among foreign women (21.8%) than among men (17.4%) (CESA, 2020a). After the 2008-2014 economic crisis, employment expectations in Aragón were good and unemployment fell (Fig. 10), which supposedly attracted a foreign workforce between 2015 until the arrival of the Covid-19 crisis.

By activity sectors, unemployment increased in all productive sectors in Aragón between 2008 and 2014. Among foreigners, the greatest increase occurred in the agricultural sector, followed by the service sector, which added 6,260 more unemployed (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015). The high level of unemployment and precarious employment (temporary jobs, with poor working conditions and wages, and low and irregular contributions to social security in the face of social protection) were factors that increased social inequality. The increase in the number of long-term unemployed leads to certain situations becoming chronic, reducing the level of employability of the worker and worsening the prospects for labor insertion, affecting social relations and the life project of these people.

With the arrival of the Covid-19 crisis, and according to data from the Active Population Survey (EPA, INE) for 2020, the unemployment rate for the total population in Aragón was 11.7%, while for the population Spanish was 9.56%, while for the population with foreign nationality it reached 22.6% (21% for nationalities of EU countries and 24.2% from outside the EU, Fig. 10).

Figure 10. Unemployment rate in Aragón by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



The situation in the labor market is closely related to the educational level. Thus, the highest unemployment rates are found among the population with primary education or less (30.0%), being better as qualification increases (11.6% among those with secondary education) and 6.4% among those with higher education (CESA, 2020a).

The weakening of social policies with progressive cuts in rights (health, education, social benefits) has led for several years to the lack of coverage of basic needs by the State to which, on occasions, they are forced to respond to the social entities.

With this, as mentioned, the rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion in Aragón was 20.7%, far from 29.2% for Spain in 2018 (Gobierno de Aragón, 2018). However, the increase was 64.3% between 2009 and 2014 (for Spain, 18.2%), so that exclusion in Aragón progresses much faster, without there being sufficient means to tackle this situation.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Spain as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



One of the main effects of the growing arrival of the foreign population in Spain in recent decades has been the increase in the volume of Spanish citizens, and therefore the acquisition of Spanish nationality. Only between 2013 and 2017 there were more than 763,400 nationalizations (Fig. 11), with the majority taking this acquisition by residence -as a general rule, a minimum time of legal residence between 1 and 5 years- (around 60% of the total), followed by other reasons such as roots or family reunification (38% of the total) and, more residual, by nature letter [carta de naturaleza]- granted or denied at the discretion of the Government- (CES, 2019). If around 500,000 naturalizations were granted in 2006, the maximum occurred in 2013 with 250,000, dropping later again to 50,000 in 2017.

In total, the volume of concessions of Spanish nationality by residence (the most frequent reason for granting) between 1997 and 2017 exceeded 1.3 million, the majority of which were people from Central and Latin America. In 2017, the five most frequent countries of origin among new Spaniards who were granted this status were Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Among the reasons for access, he highlighted obtaining Spanish nationality by means of accreditation of 2 years of residence.

This evolution has contributed to facilitating citizenship rights and obligations to a large volume of people of foreign origin, but it has also given heterogeneity to the composition of the Spanish population. The significant volume of "new Spanish men and women" may blur the different approaches to the effects of the migratory phenomenon. Certainly, naturalized persons are already fully Spanish and as such, without further specification, they usually appear in a large part of the statistics. However, foreign origin, even among generations already born in Spain, can continue to be associated with differential situations that are difficult to understand, as it is diluted in the statistics and records referring to the whole of autochthonous people.

The evolution and rhythm of granting naturalizations not only expresses the growing desire for integration of many people of foreign origin. It also responds to changes in regulations, as well as to changing circumstances of administrative practice during the last decades.

After twenty years of large entries in the total foreign population in Spain, the appreciable roots of a majority part of immigration is evidenced in a high flow of nationalizations (which, as previously indicated, account for an annual average of 120,000 in the period 2009-2017, with a total of close to one million people). From the labor point of view, this is important because, for most of the population of immigrant origin in Spain, it is no longer a matter of recent arrivals, but they already have a long period of settlement. This implies a labor situation more similar to that of the natives (other conditions being equal, especially the level and scope of the qualifications possessed). In addition, because this measure serves "second generation" immigrants, children of migrants, born in Spain or abroad, but raised in Spain, and who are already entering the job market in significant volumes.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In Spain, during the economic crisis 2008-2014, a certain lethargy could be seen in taking into account issues directly related to immigration, with few initiatives being taken. It is worth mentioning the approval of Law 12/2009, of October 30, regulating the right to asylum and subsidiary protection, as well as several partial reforms of Organic Law 4/2000, of January 11, 2000, on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their social integration, as well as its implementing regulations. On the other hand, the last Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2011-2014 was finalized, without a new general strategy having been developed so far. It is precisely during those years of economic and employment crisis that the vulnerability of households made up of people of foreign origin has become evident.

The migratory reality in Spain has become more complex: the circumstances and origin of immigrants who settle in Spain have varied, and so have the reasons / triggers for migratory processes, among which family reunification has gained importance. With regard to integration, there are second generations, children and young people born or socialized very early in our country, as well as more than 1 million "new Spaniards", as a result of the intensification of the naturalization processes. All of the above forces us to adopt a more comprehensive approach when assessing the effects and opportunities of migratory flows, since no longer all people of foreign origin fit well into the category of "immigrants".

Regarding the acceptance of immigrants, the analysis of migration policies in Spain allows us to affirm that it is a supportive country in terms of access to services and equipment, although there is still a long way to go. However, it is necessary to advance in the still existing disagreement between perceptions and reality. In fact, and according to a European survey, Spain is one of the EU countries where the highest proportion of the population (74%) admits not being well informed about immigration and related issues (compared to 61% of the European average) (CES, 2019). Despite this, it is not a country where there have been xenophobic ideas, although they sometimes spread in times of economic crisis.

There are important differences in income and wages between Spaniards and the rest of the nationalities. The greater relative vulnerability of foreigners in the Spanish labor market is shown both in terms of salaries and in the higher incidence of underemployment and unemployment. This also explains the differences in the material living conditions of immigrants and natives, as well as the greater risk of the former of belonging to the group of the so-called "working poor" and of suffering from situations of poverty and social exclusion, as can be seen of the information offered by the Living Conditions Survey (ECV, 2020).

Housing plays a fundamental role in social integration, precisely because of the multiple functions it performs (protection, socialization, coexistence, etc.). The guidelines of the residential model of immigrants are closely linked to their socioeconomic situation, their activity and work integration. However, there are other factors apart from the housing market that also affect access and quality of accommodation, such as the rapid quantitative increase (in number), their diverse nationality, the different causes that intervene in their migratory project, or the time of residence in Spain.

When the situation of non-EU foreigners and that of the rest of foreigners from EU countries is considered, the former present a worse situation in terms of access to home ownership, home equipment and habitability conditions of their homes. However, greater residential stability is linked to the family project, the constitution of a family and especially the arrival of children, are key factors in the search for a larger residential space and a more conducive residential environment. In general, many indicators show the highest residential exclusion of foreigners, mainly non-EU citizens, and especially in certain nationalities; However, the official sources of information do not allow knowing to what degree these circumstances correspond to initial stages of the migratory processes or to those with worse residential conditions.

Another characteristic analyzed is the difference between the structure by qualifications of the workforce of immigrant origin and that corresponding to the autochthonous population. The educational level attained continues to be a major factor to explain the differences in the incidence of unemployment, and the data show that, even with nuances, the workforce of immigrant origin would have an average level of qualifications lower than that of the native population.

The differences by studies completed between people of foreign nationality according to their origin show that the structure of Europeans is similar to the Spaniars, but the latter is not very far from that of the Latin American workforce (CES, 2019). However, while Europeans have unemployment rates that are more similar to Spaniards, foreigners from outside the EU have significantly higher rates. This shows that, despite being relevant, the educational factor is not the only one that currently conditions a worse employment situation for immigrants in the Spanish labor market.

Besides, the arrival of immigrants has been noticed in the classrooms of schools. The economic development of Spain at the beginning of the 21st century caused a phenomenon of migratory attraction that produced a growing enrollment of foreign students in the educational system in Spain. Currently it is a reality that has enriched diversity, giving greater heterogeneity in classrooms and schools. In recent years the number of foreign students remains high, although it seems that it has stabilized since 2016 (INEE, 2020).

The analysis of the labor situation of foreigners TCNs points to an unfavorable position in the labor market, concentrating on non-qualified occupations; in addition, there are situations of excessive temporary employment and involuntary part-time work, and even underemployment. Now, the reading of these indicators based on some variables, such as the time of residence in Spain and the geographical area of origin (to a large extent a reflection, in turn, of a different average level of qualification and basic competences), shows also that these positions improve over time, which is a positive sign. This implies progressive integration in the labor market and in Spanish society, even in contexts marked by two long and hard economic crises (2008-2014 and Covid-19 crisis).

However, in terms of integration, there is one group that has benefited more than the others: Latin Americans. Normally, immigrants arriving in Spain from Latin American countries show better integration indicators than those from Africa or Asia in terms of employment, but also in other aspects, but it does not mean that they are unaffected by diminished social mobility and over-qualification in general (Domingo, 2018). This also means that Latin American participation in the job market is always higher, and unemployment levels for these workers are always lower than those of Africans (Amuedo-Dorantes & De la Rica, 2007), both before and after the economic crisis between 2008 and 2014 (Aysa-Lastra, 2015). This situation is one of dependency on a feminised niche which has paid the price of over-qualification with an initial decline in social mobility – linked with irregular status in the first years after arrival (Parella, 2015) – although with a relatively faster subsequent rise in legal and social status than that achieved by immigrants of other origins (Vidal-Coso & Vono de Vilhena, 2015).

The arrival of the Latin American population and its rapid assimilation by comparison with other immigrant groups would entail frustration among and exclusion of immigrants from other countries. This applies especially to Moroccans who arrived earlier and who saw the glass ceiling of social mobility being significantly lowered when they were replaced in the niches they had occupied by workers from Latin America.

In sum, it is important to note the divergence between the pan-Hispanic rhetoric wielded by politicians and actual migration policy where, apart from differential access to nationality, personal situations and labour market characteristics are given higher priority than one's origin. Nonetheless, the following points should be kept in mind (Domingo, 2018):

- The social capital represented by knowledge of the language, together with the professed greater openness of the Spanish population towards Latin American immigrants are, in themselves, relative advantages independent of positive discrimination in the law.
- Despite the homogenising discourse of Hispanidad ("spanishness"), in practice, these migrants and their descendants are assimilated at different speeds and might even experience downward mobility depending on the ethnocultural label they are given in Spanish society, mainly as a result of race and class prejudices. This is what, in the United States, Portes and Zhou (1993) have called "segmented assimilation".
- Through its colonial-style Hispanidad discourse, Spanish nationalism tends to lump together immigrants from Latin America in an ideal category of "Spanish", which is both paternalistic and de-meaning.

In contrast to the unfavorable economic and living conditions of people of foreign origin, various indicators show a relatively satisfactory level of social integration in Spain (CES, 2019). Among them, we can refer to the regular and stable administrative situation of the great majority of immigrants; the fluid social relations among the indigenous population; an important appreciation for immigrants from the country's institutions and a degree of intercultural coexistence higher than that of other European countries. Social relations have been running reasonably well even in difficult circumstances -during economic crises-, since Spain has not stood out for the emergence of social conflicts between populations or xenophobic outbreaks. This is important, despite the intensity of its effects on employment and the highest levels of unemployment in the EU at the time. Likewise, according to the special Eurobarometer of May 2018, in Spain the contribution of immigration to society is valued more positively than in the EU-28 average. In particular, it is valued that this collective helps to cover jobs that Spaniards do not want, the contribution of new ideas or a boost to innovation, enriching cultural life, as well as its general and positive impact on the economy (CES, 2019).

However, even considering the positive situation in terms of integration, there are other factors that still hinder the integration of foreigners, favoring inequality. An example is the toughening of the laws regarding the authorization and processing of documents to be able to work in Spain and the difficulties for the renewal of permits that make them immersed in an irregular situation on many occasions. Access to housing and its maintenance is also a problem given its economic instability (CC.OO. Aragón, 2015).

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SWEDEN

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1. INTRODUCTION

This statistical briefing follows on a report on social and economic policies that have an impact on migration. Among other things the policy report concluded a large income gap between native and foreign population as well as difficulties among people in the latter group to establish themselves on the labour market. Moreover, it drew attention to differences in terms of education and the housing situation. The descriptive statistics presented here may shed some light on all of these various matters. However, as the backbone of this report is just descriptive illustrations, strictly speaking, nothing can be known about the mechanisms that produce the observable patterns. Although references to the scientific literature are included, these studies rarely set out from exactly the points of view illustrated by the figures. There, focus of the studies is typically developed out of some specific context, in the forefront of a specific literature and quantitative data used to (approximately) measure something, rather than being used as a starting point.

There are also a few aspects covered in the policy report, but not really considered in this follow up. For example, the tendency of immigrants to relocate from rural counties in Sweden (including Dalarna) to metropolitan areas, problems in the language training programs, or organizational problems in the carrying-through of various political decisions within the field.

All of the data in this report are accounted for on a national level (i.e. Sweden), some of them also on a regional level, i.e. NUTS2. In the case of Dalarna county, this is not ideal as the region North Central Sweden (SE31), to which Dalarna county belong, also includes two neighbouring counties. Together the three counties cover an area about the size of the Czech Republic, but to a large extent the area is uninhabited. The total population of North Central Sweden is only 860 000. Dalarna county (in focus here) make up about a third of the area in terms of both area and population. Fortunately, the three areas have similar problems and prospects in a large number of respects. Thus, it is not too far-fetched to assume that the situation for immigrants are more or less similar.

Thus, some of the figures commented on in this report applies to the regional level. Of course, literature focusing on the issues focused here in combination with Dalarna or North central Sweden in particular is scarce. It is more or less in the nature of the matter that quantitative studies tend to grasp wider geographical areas than that.

All of the data presented here are originating from Eurostat (although the primary data collection is carried out by national statistical bureaus, in this case, Statistics Sweden). Just like any kind of data, the data used here need to be interpreted and possible errors, uncertainties, and other problems need to be considered. As different kinds of datasets, both register data and various surveys, are used, these kinds of reflections have been included in the text.

As far as survey data on a small group in a small region are concerned, there are generally reasons for caution in the interpretation. The number of third country nationals in north central Sweden is rather small. Besides that, it is also a very heterogenous group in many aspects. Thus, when data are based on a sampling procedure, as several of the datasets in focus here are, and the sampling procedure is combined with a drop-out rate higher than 50 percent (which is sometimes the case, certainly in the sub-groups of immigrants), and other problems are added on, caution is advised (although various methods to handle the uncertainties have been applied by the statistical bureaus).

A general issue to have in mind in the interpretation of the data presented here is that the Swedish policies on citizenship is very different from most other EU-countries. The regulations to become a Swedish citizen are rather generous. Neither are there any requirements to be able to understand Swedish (or any other specific language), to have knowledge about Sweden or Swedish culture, or to be able to support oneself economically. Nor are any deterrent costs involved; the application fee is slightly less than equivalent to 150 euro. Basically, what is required to acquire a Swedish citizenship is five years of residency (four years for refugees, but longer time for convicted criminals) within the country.

As a consequence, most of the third country immigrants in Sweden have a Swedish citizenship. Although we are still in the wake-waters of the large wave of immigrants who arrived in 2015, the citizen rate among foreign born (15- years) is 65%. Thus, when discussing third country nationals (i.e. without Swedish citizenship) in the case of Sweden, we are focusing a minority of the people considered to be “immigrants” or “foreigners” in the everyday language and in the general debate, a minority characterized by the fact that they have arrived to Sweden recently.

Altogether, the TCN-group in Sweden consists of about half a million individuals. During the second half of the 2010s about 80 000 people has been added to the group every year by immigration. However, at the same time about 50-60 000 TCNs per year have obtained Swedish citizenship and another 10 000 has emigrated further. Thus, part of the population identified as third country citizens consists a highly unstable group. In other words, it is characterized by a high turnover; about 15 percent of the individuals in the group are replaced every year.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Sweden by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



First of all, at-risk-of-poverty is a difficult measure as it may have different meanings in different contexts. In a society like the Swedish where many necessities in life are subsidized, it is easier to survive on 60% of the mean income than in countries where individuals pay full cost of for example medication or child care. Thus, the measure needs to be interpreted with care.

The at-risk-of-poverty rate among third country nationals in Sweden has fluctuated around 50 percent during the last decade. It is considerably higher than in other EU-countries. However, one obvious explanation for the high rate is the comparably generous Swedish citizenship policy (discussed in the introductory section above). Thus, a disproportionate share of the group displayed in the figure consists of recently arrived third country immigrants. Nonetheless, the average time from arrival to the first job is 4-5 years, a high rate is expected. Recently Swedish economists established that the average time to achieve self-support is 12-13 years from arrival (Eklund and Larsson 2020).

In contrast to the third country nationals, the at-risk-rate among Swedish citizens is lower than the EU-average. Actually, people born in Sweden has an even lower rate (not illustrated in the figure). Thus, a comparison between Swedish citizens and people born in Sweden reveals that the differences accounted for in the figure cannot only be ascribed to the fact that newly arrive immigrants are over-represented. Doubtless, there are also "genuine" differences.

The comparatively severe labour market disadvantages of immigrants are also pointed at in a study of several countries. However, in this study Kesler (2014) also concludes that although the poverty gap between immigrants and natives is larger in Sweden than in other countries, the poverty level is still lower in Sweden than elsewhere.

To explain the fluctuations revealed in the figure would request a more thorough study. Firstly, it would be necessary to clarify to what extent the fluctuations are results of the turnover of individuals in the studied group. Secondly, the two groups displayed in the figure varies in many more ways than citizenship. Therefore, it would be necessary to clarify the effects of the various attributes that constitutes the members of the groups. Then external factors such as the economic bust and booms, effects of political decisions or discrimination could be revealed.

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Sweden by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The median income among third country nationals decreased in the wake waters of the 2008 financial crisis, where after it increased for a few years until 2013. Then it has decreased slightly during the remaining part of the 2010s. Basically the median income of Swedish citizens shows a similar development path, although at a higher level of income and at a ±0 change during the second half of the 2010s.

The similarities of the development paths hints that at least some important explaining factors are common, and the dip after the year of the last financial crisis, 2008, that the economic boom and bust is one of them. However, to develop the arguments longer would require more thorough studies.

Sweden shows larger differences than any other EU-country, between the two groups displayed in the figure. One obvious explanation is the one already mentioned above, that the Swedish group of third country citizens are not really comparable to most other countries due to the deviant citizenship policy. However, differences between the groups remain even if citizenship is replaced with country of birth (not illustrated in the figure). Another obvious line of explanation sets out from the varying levels of employment. As will be clear from the following pages, TCNs have higher unemployment rates than native Swedes. However, even if the analysis is limited to employed individuals, the differences in incomes still remain, although in a decreased state. Moreover, even if various relevant background variables are controlled for, immigrants have smaller incomes than natives, certainly recently arrived immigrants (Hammarstedt 2003). Thus, although the differences seem to be partly related to individual attributes, these results hint that external factors may also be of importance. At the other hand, a comparison with Denmark, a country with a very different context from Sweden in terms of naturalisation regulations, hints at similar problems (Helgertz et al 2014). Of course, more possible explanations of various kinds, from the compilation of the groups in terms of individual attributes to various external reasons, remain to be tested.

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

European data on overcrowding is collected within SILC, i.e they are based on interviews with samples of the population rather than register data. The general drop-out rate has been around 50% during the last years (maybe even larger among foreign born). Thus, caution in interpretation could be recommended, certainly when subgroups are analysed.

For the first part of the period measured, the overcrowding rate among the part of the population born outside EU was stable around 30 percent, until year 2017 when it jumped to 36 percent. There may be many possible reasons for this, from measurement errors to changes in the compilation of the group or external factors.

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Sweden by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Among the Swedish-born population, the overcrowding rate is stable, around 10 percent, throughout the period. The differences between the two groups are large. In a European perspective, the rate among foreign born is higher than the EU-average, whereas it is lower among the Swedish-born. Again, the possible explanations are numerous. It seems reasonable to assume that the poorer economic situation of the first group is of importance, but it is also younger and geographically more concentrated to the larger cities, two factors known as such to increase the probability for someone to reside in overcrowded dwelling.

Lind (2017) does not offer any explanation to the bump in the curve, but has drawn general attention to the problematic combination of low levels of housing construction and population increase, characteristic for Sweden in the beginning of the 21st century. Put simply, housing shortage will result, and low-income outsiders (including various immigrant groups are particularly hard hit by this situation. Another side of this is the up-flushing of an old kind of conflict between municipalities. Whereas metropolitan municipalities are particularly worried about uncontrolled in-move certainly to some well-known residential areas and suburbs, resulting in overcrowding and negative neighbourhood effects, rural municipalities are accusing their richer urban counterparts of "exporting" the poor immigrants. What happens according to the rich urban municipalities, is that after two years of introduction to the Swedish society, when the municipalities are responsible for among other things the housing of immigrants, the responsibility is taken over by the immigrants who often miss the resources necessary to obtain housing in these municipalities, and as a consequence moves (Amcoff 2021).

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Sweden and North-Central Sweden. Source: Eurostat.



The fifth section focus educational attainment. Again, some caution is advised. Firstly, since there are more missing data among foreign-born individuals than among Swedish-born, in the Swedish registers on attained education. Secondly, and more important, the reliability of the data on foreigners has recently been questioned based on a study where Finnish and Swedish educational registers are compared. A majority of the migrants between Finland and Sweden display different educational information in the two registers. The disagreements are worst during the first years after migration, where after they decrease. The researchers behind this study (Saarela and Weber 2017) advise anyone to interpret data on immigrant's education with care. Given that Finland and Sweden are two neighbouring countries with a common history, closely cooperative, and in many respects similar, it is not far-fetched to expect even larger errors in educational information on the individuals in other immigrant groups.

The educational level among the Swedish population has increased for many years. Thus, every new generation who leaves the educational system has a longer education than the previous one. As a consequence, the share of the Swedish-born population with short education is falling in Sweden as a whole as well as in the north-central parts of the country. However, the share of shortly educated is heightened in this area of Sweden. To some extent this is doubtless a consequence of a more elderly population, but it is probably also due to the established economic structure in the area, with a relatively large share of manufacturing industry. A proper study could probably add more factors of importance.

The foreign-born population is younger than average, which usually mean that they have longer education. In spite of this, the share of shortly educated is larger than average in this group, certainly in north-central Sweden.

The share of shortly educated is stable among the foreign-born population in Sweden in general, and increasing in the north-central parts of the country. As nobody can shorten their educational level, the only possible explanation to the increase must be searched in the (internal or international) migration streams within the group. It has been notified that recent immigrants to Sweden tend to be polarized in terms of length of education (SCB 2018). Thus, a probable explanation would mean that poorly educated immigrants have ended up in north-central Sweden to an unproportionable degree.

With all this said, it deserves also to be pointed at huge differences in terms of education within the foreign-born group. For example, whereas 60 percent of the Somali-born population miss an exam from upper secondary school (actually, most of them has less than primary school) and about 10 percent have a university degree, the figures are almost opposite for the Iranian-born (to mention some of the most common immigrant groups). Thus, the Iranian-born part of the population has clearly a higher level of education than the Swedish-born, whereas the opposite situation prevails for the Somali-born, all according to the educational registers of Statistics Sweden.

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

The share of the population with a medium-long education is slightly decreasing in the Swedish-born population in the north-central parts of the country as well as generally, but it is still around 50%. This decreasing tendency is an effect of the fact that every new cohort of people turning 25 and entering into the data, tend to have a larger share of university educated than the previous one, in combination with large shares of secondary educated individuals in the cohorts turning 65 and stepping out of the data.

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



The equivalent figure in the foreign-born group is smaller and decreasing faster. The differences are accentuated in north-central Sweden. There are many conceivable explanations to this situation, from a possible systematic skewness in the missing data to specific compositions (in terms of education or any kind of in-direct attribute such as age or origin – to mention a few obvious ones) of migrants to issues in the Swedish educational system.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



Given that the share of the population born outside EU is younger, a higher share of tertiary educated would be expected. Whereas the differences between the Swedish-born group and the group born outside EU are small generally, the share of tertiary educated is slightly larger in the first group. However, in North Central Sweden the opposite situation prevails. Again, there are various possible explanations but the specific age structure of immigrants and the relatively short average education in Dalarna are among the obvious factors of importance. There are no deviations in the development over time; the increasing share is an effect of an increased disposition for university studies in every new generation.

In summary it seems that the group of people originating outside EU does not distinguish themselves in terms of a deviant share of tertiary educated, but rather that the share of people with short education is large, certainly in the north-central parts of the country.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Sweden by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



One again caution is advised, since the data displayed in the figure are based on the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), i.e. based on interviews. Sweden is among the countries in the EU where participation in this survey is non-compulsory. Collection of LFS-data in Sweden has been adversely affected by both a diminishing willingness to participate and increasing difficulties to reach selected individuals at all. The general drop-out rate has passed 50% (and is considerably higher among immigrants). As a consequence, Swedish LFS has been compared to alternative sources of data (based on various kinds of registers). The differences turn out to be particularly high as far as immigrants are concerned. In the light of these comparisons, the reliability of Swedish LFS data have been discussed and questioned (Häkkinen Shams 2019). Besides all this, the so called LFS-incident need to be mentioned. From year 2014 Statistics Swedes out-sourced parts of their LFS data collection to a call centre company. A few years later severe quality problems were revealed in the data delivered by this company. Thus, 50 percent of the interviews (which in turn had a response rate of 50 percent) where discarded and the out-sourcing was stopped. As an obvious consequence of all this, the uncertainty of the Swedish LFS data increased during the second half of the 2010s (Statistics Sweden 2020).

Although the data give rise to some concern, they indicate that the share of young people neither in employment, nor in education (NEET), is decreasing slowly over time, among Swedish born inhabitants as well as among those born outside the EU. The peak in year 2009 may be due to the financial crisis and the (compared to other countries) decently good situation and the improvements over time may be due to successful policies, although other explanations cannot be ruled out without further investigations. Youth with migrant backgrounds has been shown to be more vulnerable. In a comparative study Manhica et al (2019) found that this also applies to inter country adoptees. At the same time, it is probably needless to remind that also socio-economic background is of importance to explain NEET (cf. OECD 2016).

The comparably good situation in Sweden in terms of NEET problems generally has been noted, and associated to successful policies previously by e.g. Bäckman and Nilsson (2016), who also studied the wider context of the phenomenon.

6.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in North-Central Sweden by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



The north central parts of Sweden is worse off than general, although the development among the Swedish-born youth show the same positive direction of development here as elsewhere in the country. However, the group born outside the EU is worse off during the last years monitored. A possible explanation may be searched for in the 2015 reception-of-immigrants-peak, where after many young people got a permit to stay, but encountered particular difficulties to establish themselves at the labour market in Dalarna county. But of course such an explanation would require some kind of argument on the specific situation in Dalarna, arguments so far missing. Another possible factor of importance may be the reliability issues of the Swedish Labour Force Survey during the last decade, which have been discussed above.

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 9. Unemployment rate in Sweden by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



We are still analyzing Swedish LFS-data, so let's start to remind us that it is associated with various problems (accounted for in section 6). With this recommendation of care in the interpretations of the data, they reveal that among Swedish citizens, the unemployment rate is rather stable between 5 and 10 percent, although a jump can be read off 2008-2009 when the financial crisis hit the economy. It is hardly a daring guess that a connection may exist.

The unemployment rate among non-EU citizens is firstly, much higher than among Swedish citizens. However, to get to the bottom would need more studies, but again the Swedish citizenship policy may be one (of several) explanations (i.e. a large part of the third country citizens are recently arrivals to Sweden). At the same time Åslund et al (2017) who analyse immigrants in general, rather than third country citizens, describes this difference as a remarkable stable. Moreover, their study hint that a combination of many factors is at work behind these differences, and as a consequence of that no single reform could radically change the pattern. When various background variables are controlled for, Bevelander and Pendakur (2014) found that the Swedish patterns are rather similar to the Canadian (used for comparative purposes).

Helgesson et al (2017) found that labour market marginalization due to mental disorder varies between young natives and immigrants in Sweden. Even if they find a job, immigrants are more likely to re-enter unemployment, although the risk varies with economic sector, how established the employer is, and the ethnicity of the manager (Daunfeldt and Fergin–Wennberg 2018).

Secondly, the unemployment rate among non-EU citizens does not take a small jump towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, but a giant leap. For sure, the financial crisis is of some importance here too, but as the leap starts already 2007-2008 and that it goes on until 2011 hints that more factors need to be considered. A report from Statistics Sweden (2014) on the labour market situation of foreign- born inhabitants during this period, hints that this may be an effect of changes in the composition of immigrants.

Sometimes it is suggested that immigrants find employment within ethnical family firms or social networks coupled to such businesses. However, Klinthäll and Urban (2016) show that this pattern is well established in the small business sector generally. People of Swedish origin use their family resources and social networks to the same extent as foreigners.

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

The unemployment rate among Swedish citizens follows the same track in north-central Sweden as is Sweden generally, but it is somewhat higher. According to Mångs (2018) the regional patterns in unemployment in Sweden are stable and due to self-reinforcing mechanisms (unemployment-people move out-less demand-increased unemployment, and so on).

There are about 20 000 third country citizens in the actual ages altogether in north-central Sweden. In absence of proper knowledge it seems reasonable to assume that the 2010-2011 leap has the same background in North Central Sweden as Statistics Sweden suggested nationally, a changed composition of foreign born individuals. As in Sweden generally, their unemployment rate is also higher than among Swedish citizens even in these regions. However, it is also more volatile. One possible reason for this is that the number of people discussed is only about 20 000. Of course, genuine reasons may also occur, but to shed light on them would require more detailed studies.

Figure 10. Unemployment rate in North-Central Sweden by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Vogiazides and Mondani (2020) found that the most advantageous regions to find a first employment in for refugees is the most and the least densely populated, i.e. Stockholm and rural regions. Figure 10 does not fit well with their finding. However, it does not really address the same issue.

In a special report on regional aspects of the labour market, Statistics Sweden (2015) draws attention to a gender gap in Dalarna meaning a higher unemployment rate among men, but any specific commentaries on the labour market situation for the foreign born population or third country nationals, are missing.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

As mentioned earlier, the Swedish citizenship policy is rather distinguishing compared to most other EU-countries. Whereas an average EU-country assign citizenship to about 2 percent of their resident TCNs yearly, the equivalent figure in Sweden is 8-10 percent, and whereas the rate is generally falling in the EU it is increasing in Sweden.

Figure 11. Residents who acquired citizenship in Sweden as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



The fluctuations in the figure could have various explanations, from variations in the number of applications (fulfilling the criteria) to varying efficiency in the processing of them.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The selected data presented here can shed light on some of the themes discussed already in the policy report, whereas other themes cannot be followed up. Generally speaking the statistical indicators are well in line with the conclusions drawn in the policy report. No real contradictions can be observed.

On the other hand, the data presented here are just of descriptive nature and does not necessarily correspond adequately to the issues discussed in the policy report. Thus, as such they can hardly qualify the arguments of the policy report. There may be several various explanations to each of the curves presented here. The group of third country nationals (often compared to citizens in the reporting country; i.e. Sweden) may be special in more aspects than lack of citizenship in Sweden (or have been born there). For example, it is well known that TCNs are younger, show a male surplus, speak Swedish to a lesser extent, and as has been illustrated above, that their educational profiles differ from those of the Swedish population in various aspects. Thus, the figures do not say anything of the extent the deviations between the two groups exist due to their varying age profiles, varying sex profiles, Swedish skills, their wider educational differences or due to their different citizenship.

In the best of worlds, other studies may have filled the gap here. However, few studies set out from a (from point of view of their aim) spuriously chosen piece descriptive data. They are rather part of a literature supplying a context. Thus, although literature have been referred to here, the studies are generally focusing issues slightly besides what is presented in the figures.

One general example of this has to do with citizenship. As have been pointed out (already in the introduction) citizenship has another meaning in Sweden than in most other countries. Due to the Swedish citizenship policy, the group of third country nationals consist, to an unproportionate part, of newly arrived immigrants as their predecessors tend to have been acquired a citizenship.

There are also some general issues with some of the data sets used here. These issues do not mean that the data are unusable, but demands care in the interpretation of them. This may certainly be the case when focus is on a rather small subgroup in a region with a rather small population.

With this said it can be concluded that third country nationals or immigrant population are worse off than the native population in almost every respect illustrated here. They have less income, shorter education, higher unemployment rate, higher NEET rate, and higher overcrowding rate. As far as data are available, the situation is similar in North Central Sweden (including Dalarna county), with the possible exception of tertiary education. Neither are there any signs that the gaps are closing. If anything, the message is rather a tendency towards the opposite.

There are some obvious problems to consider in the interpretation of the descriptive data presented here. Some of them (e.g. the Swedish citizenship issue and the fact that also third country nationals and foreign-born people have more attributes than that) were just mentioned. However, when other studies have considered these issues, the differences between the foreign and native populations generally still remain (let be at a reduced level). Thus, the message is that there are genuine gaps between the two parts of the Swedish population focused here. At the same time as this is pointed out as a general conclusion of this report, we must also humbly admit that it is really not possible to say something very precise about the sizes of these gaps and remind ourselves that a group such as “third country nationals” or “foreign born” is very heterogeneous.

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TURKEY

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1. INTRODUCTION

Although Turkey has always been a country of migration, and that is also the case for the selected MATILDE region-Bursa, neither public policy nor public opinion has been shaped along the lines of social cohesion. Since 2011, with the arrival of Syrians due to the civil war in the country, Turkey for the first time has to adopt its public policies as a migration receiving country.

Syrians, first as accepted as 'guests', are granted the "temporary protection" status in 2014 by Act No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection and Temporary Protection Regulation (AFIP). With this regulation, the right to health, education, access to labour market, social assistance, and interpretation services become possible. Considering the highly centralized governance in Turkey, these are national policies, however, access to these rights in every region/locality requiress scrutiny. Temporary protection status provides the legal foundation, but there are obstacles-language, competition among the poor, and social exclusion- to turn the rights into capabilities.

The population of Turkey is 83 million- 41 million 698 thousand 377 female and 41 million 915 thousand 985 males in 2020 (TUIK, 2021). As of February 24, 2021, the total number of Syrians in Turkey in the status of temporary protection is 3 million 656 thousand 525. 1 million 733 thousand (47.4%) are children between the ages of 0-18. The total number of children and women is 2 million 590 (70.8% of the whole population) (DGMM, 2021). For Bursa, this number is 178.683 which equals 5.7% of the population of the city. Furthermore, according to UNHCR Statistics on Turkey, regarding non-Syrian asylum seekers, the number has also increased to 330 thousand, and therefore despite the informality, the official total numbers exceed the 5 % of Turkey's population (Erdogan, 2019).

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT)'s data based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), in 2019, 1 million 531 thousand foreigners were residing in Turkey. Foreigners in this data are defined "the foreign population by country of citizenship", excluding those Syrians who are under temporary protection status (TUIK, 2019). As only those Syrians who are not under temporary protection but have legal permits to stay are included in this number, Iraqis and Afghans took first and second place respectively. This statistical report compares the situation of the citizens of Turkey with that of citizens of non-EU 28 in that country with the available data of Eurostat on the areas of poverty; inequality; overcrowded household; education; NEET; unemployment and finally residents requiring citizenship. All these variables are crucial for livelihood for TNCs and also the social cohesion of the country.

Eurostat, the general data source that is referred throughout the brief, uses TURKSTAT data "Income and Living Conditions Survey (SILC)". Since 2006 by the panel survey method, TURKSTAT, for compliance with European Union (EU) aims to supply comparable data on income distribution, living conditions, social exclusion, and relative poverty based on income

(TUIK, 2020). Thus, the reliability of the data is questionable not only because it is based on a panel survey, which does not aim to represent the Syrians under temporary protection but also because of the irregular migrants, informal and unregistered economy.

For the cases when there is no data provided for Turkey by Eurostat, other data set released by TURKSTAT and The Directorate General of Migration Management are used. However, there are also few cases for which there are no data available in national statistics for any of the levels, and therefore secondary sources are tried to be applied.

Regarding the territorial dimension of the chosen indicators throughout the brief, the indicators are generally displayed at the NUTS2 level (TR41 including Bursa, Bilecik, and Eskişehir provinces). However, in few cases, due to the lack of data, other scales are used. Also, for some, due to the lack of data on NUTS2 and/or NUTS3 level, no specific characterization regarding the chosen indicators of foreigners or TCNs can be provided.

Last, but not least, since the year 2012, a new administrative system was established which prevents a detailed analysis of the situation of rural (Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci 2020). 30 provinces, population higher than 750000 individuals, have started to be classified as the Metropolitan Areas and due to this change, the rural population of Turkey declined to 8% from 23% (Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci 2020: 14). Although there is an effort to develop a better categorization, the national available statistics by TURKSTAT are based on the previously defined administrative distinction and therefore rural/urban distinction is no longer valid. According to the currently available official statistics, 93% of the population lives in urban places which do not reflect the actual conditions in the country.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

The population at risk of poverty is defined as households having equivalized household disposable income below the specified lines. Although there is a slow decline in the risk of the poverty rate, as the figure demonstrates, poverty and social exclusion have been an important problem in Turkey. The above figure reflects the continuous decline since 2009, the year in which one can observe the effects of the economic crisis. However, it is important to underline that with the existing data, a significant share of the population is still at the risk of poverty in Turkey.

As noted in the introduction the data on citizens in non-EU28 countries is questionable and as the survey sample does not particularly aim at a representation of neither this stated group nor foreigners in general, there is a problem of reliability. The sharp fluctuations are hard to explain and it may be because of the small size of the group.

The increasing share of persons at risk of poverty for the citizens born in non-EU28 countries since 2012 relates to the arrivals of Syrians. Thus, the highest rate is 30 which was in 2016, we know that this is not a correct reflection of the field. According to UNHCR Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in

Response to the Syria Crisis 2020-2021 in Turkey Country Chapter, 42 percent of people who live in temporary or international protection status in Turkey are under the poverty line while 85 percent of these individuals are Syrians under temporary protection (UNHCR, 2020). Various local studies show that Syrians are experiencing extreme poverty, spatial segregation, and social exclusion (Ozkazanc 2021; Gurel et al., 2018).

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in Turkey by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



Inequalities and regional development gaps (Karatay et. al., 2016); poverty; informal economy; child labor and access to qualified education for all have been major problems in Turkey (Uyan-Semerci et. al., 2013, 2014; Uyan-Semerci & Erdogan, 2017). With the arrival of Syrians, these problems are multiplied and the competition among the poor creates further tension in the field, both for accessing the job market, mostly informal, and for accessing social supports and assistance. With the first wave of migration, social assistance directed to Syrians created further tension among the Turkish nationals who needs social assistance. Unfortunately, we neither have census data nor representative sample data for the third-country nationals in Turkey.

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

The median equivalized net income in Turkey in Euros, both for the citizens of Turkey and citizens born in non-EU 28 countries is displayed in Figure 2. As can be observed, all through the years, for the citizens of Turkey the value is between slightly lower than 3000 and 4000 which is comparatively very low among the Eurostat data. The data for the citizens born in non- EU 28 countries is available since 2010 and, as already noted, is also questionable. We observe sharp fluctuations but overall interestingly in the year 2014 which it reached its peak value, it was slightly over 6000, which is significantly higher than the income of Turkish citizens. Then we observe the sharp fall and since the year 2017, the two lines almost have overlapped. This may be explained by the increased number of settled Syrians whose income lower than the average of the income of citizens born in non-EU 28 countries. Unfortunately, due to the reliability problems with the data, a real comparison of the equivalized income for Turkish citizens and third-country nationals in Turkey is not possible.

Thus, income inequality across socioeconomic groups is an important indicator of social cohesion. Gini coefficient is used to measure income inequality and its value varies between 0, which reflects complete equality, and 1, which reflects complete inequality. As stated by Eurostat, a relatively high Gini coefficient was observed in Turkey. Gini coefficient was estimated at 0.395 with a decrease of 0.013 points compared with the previous year in 2019 (TUIK 2020).

Also, according to OECD data, the index of Turkey, which is roughly 0.4, is well above the OECD average of 0.32. Compared to other OECD countries except for Mexico and Chile, Turkey has a less egalitarian income distribution. However, we lack comparative data on the Gini coefficient of the citizens of Turkey and the third-country nationals living in the country.

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in Turkey by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in Turkey by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



The overcrowding rate in households is an indicator of vulnerability. The overcrowding rate for the citizens of Turkey has been in decline since 2007. The figure shows that the percentage dropped below 40% in 2017. Although the decreasing trend continues, it is still higher than 35 %. This is slightly higher than the rate for non-EU citizens living in overcrowded households within the EU and is almost 20 % higher than average the overcrowding rate of citizens of EU countries (Eurostat, 2019).

The figure shows that the overcrowding rate in Turkey for country of birth in non-EU28 countries reached 40 percentage in 2019. The limited data on the third country nationals due to the designing of the sampling strategy of the survey may be the reason for the fluctuations since the year 2009. There was a declining trend after the year 2010 and 2014 onwards, the overcrowding rate has been increasing and this can also be explained with the inclusions of the Syrians' households to the data.

Although various studies underline the fact that Syrians live in overcrowded households and try to elaborate its various effects (Erdoğan, 2020; Babacan et al. 2017; Simsek et al. 2018; Uyan Semerci and Erdoğan 2018)\ we lack national data for third-country nations living in Turkey. Overcrowded household means further vulnerability long before the Covid virus, thus during the pandemic, it creates further and higher risks.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Education level is an important indicator of wellbeing and is crucial for social cohesion. The education levels of immigrants play a crucial role in immigrant children's school participation. The following figures, both regional and country-level are questionable as the educational level of Syrians in the status of temporary protection is below the average in Turkey about half of them were either illiterate or never attended school (Erdoğan, 2019:8)

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education in Turkey and Bursa, Eskisehir and Bilecikby. Source: Eurostat.



The share of the population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary, and lower secondary education in Turkey for the Turkish citizens has gradually decreased but it is still above 60 percent. For the region, the same trend can be observed hence it reaches below 60 percent. Considering the share of third country nationals 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education, the fluctuations portrayed in the illustration above due to the already stated problems. Hence there was an increase of almost 10 percent in the year 2013 which mainly can be explained the process following the arrival of Syrian migrants both to Turkey and to the region (TR41, Bursa, Bilecik, Eskişehir). As the number of Syrians increases, the share of the mentioned population also increases. In general, it is also often stated known that Syrians with higher education backgrounds try to reach Europe and prefer to seek asylum in European countries. Since 2017, there has been a decline but it still is higher than 50 percent which is lower than the percentage for the citizens of Turkey.

Considering the NUTS2 level, the region, especially Bursa, is among the rural areas with high agricultural production. Migrant agricultural workers, particularly Syrians, often the ones who migrated from the rural areas in Syria. Moreover, work in agriculture is characterised by low wages and bad working conditions including long working hours or discrimination at the workplace (Tören 2018; Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; Kaya 2020). All these give a considerable reason to explain, in one sense, the high share of population 25-64 with low levels of education of illiteracy among the agricultural workers and so does the one for NUTS2 level in the graphic above.

Besides, Bursa province has a strong concentration on textile production. Considering this fact, Syrians who are settled in Bursa mostly originate from the Syrian province of Aleppo with earlier expertise in textile production which does not require higher education. This may have an effect on the share of the migrant population with lower education settled within the region. Last, but not, gender plays a role and therefore low level of education is observed among Syrian women.

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

The share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education was 25 percent in the year 2012 for the citizens of Turkey. The change in the data that was observed can be due to 2-Year Compulsory Education System (4 + 4 + 4 education system) that started in 2012-2013, the education system in Turkey. The compulsory education in Turkey for eight years removed 12 years. For those who were born in non-EU28 countries, the data for Turkey has been below 20 percent and slightly upward between the years 2012 to 2019.

The regional data for the citizens of Turkey have been stable around the 20 percent. Thus for those whose country of birth is non-EU28 countries, there have been enormous fluctuations. In the year 2013, the percentage was 50 and fell slightly over 20 percent in 2016 and then increased to 35 percent in 2017, and then a drop to 30 percent. As already noted despite the data problems, the inclusion of more Syrians in the data set may explain the dramatic decline starting in 2013.

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in Turkey and Bursa, Eskisehir and Bilecikby. Source: Eurostat.



5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

For tertiary education, one can observe 5 percentage gradual increase between the years 2012-2019 for the whole Turkish population and almost the same, but a slightly higher trend for the regional data (for the ages 25-64). Thus, fluctuations can be observed for non-EU28 born foreigners in Turkey and the data higher than the Turkish population except the year 2017, both almost had the same value. This is also difficult to explain and demonstrates that the vagueness of the data.

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education in Turkey and Bursa, Eskisehir and Bilecikby. Source: Eurostat.



For the regional data on third- country nationals, one can observe a lower percentage almost all the years except the year 2013 where all three was 15 percentage except the non-EU28 born foreigners in Turkey. In the year 2016, the percentage was as low as 7 and then there has been an upward movement which reaches to slightly over 15 percent.

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Turkey has the highest NEET rate among the OECD countries, as indicated in different studies (Erdogan et al., 2017; Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2020; Susanli, 2016). As the illustration above also shows that there is an acute unemployment problem among the Turkish youth. Continuous political and socio-economic problems in Turkey caused by polarized politics, child labor, gender-related inequalities, Kurdish issue as well as migration have all had multi-layered effects on youth wellbeing (E. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2020). The high rate of youth unemployment is also linked, by the Eleventh Development Plan of the Presidency of Turkey (2019), to the global macroeconomic developments and therefore to the weak outlook for investment, trade, productivity as well as wage increases, high debt ratios, and the increase in income inequality in the global scale. The Youth Working Group in the Ministry of Development (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2018) also draws attention, among NEET, to the high rate of youngsters who do not actively search for a job anymore. Turkey is among the countries with the highest rate in this regard. This could be explained by giving up hope on finding a job. A survey on the well-being of youth in Turkey (Habitat, 2020) shows that 73% of young people believe that finding a job is hard and job opportunities are limited in Turkey. This also brings a growing trend of alienation from education with it, due to the complaint about failing to find a job after graduating from university.

Figure 7. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Turkey by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



The mismatch between young people's skills with the needs of the economy is also portrayed to make a general evaluation of the youth unemployment in Turkey (Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2018). In addition to the limited job opportunities, being employed in the informal economy is a serious reason for the high rate of NEET. It is indicated that more than half of young people in Turkey are employed in the informal economy (Ibid.).

A significant gender gap and the lower levels of female labor force participation have led to an increase in the NEET rate in Turkey (Erdogan et al., 2017; E. Erdoğan & Uyan Semerci, 2020). The main factor affecting female labor force participation is the division of labor within the family. Marriage (Susanli, 2016), household workload and the lack of social services to support mothers to take care of children seem to be significant determinants of the NEET status for women. Low education levels of women, despite improvements, could also be raised as the reason to fall into the NEET category. In addition, the correlation between poverty and having difficulties coping with education expenses and giving priority to the education of boys rather than girls, which assign women as a secondary role as a symptom of the patriarchal culture, makes the NEET rate higher for women (Erdogan et al., 2017).

Regarding migrant youth, the high level of NEET in the illustration above mostly refers to the arrivals of millions of Syrians to Turkey, and not to be well integrated into the job market. According to the interviews conducted for the MATILDE Project, the unregistered employment of Syrians is very high. Moreover, school drop-outs because of the poverty or peer bullying in schools make the Syrian children fall into the NEETs among migrant youth. Cultural reasons such as early marriage for Syrian girls as well as not letting women work in marriage also make a higher likelihood for women to be NEETs. Additionally, unaccompanied minors over age 18 remain outside the protection system provided to unaccompanied children in Turkey. In this sense, unaccompanied migrant youth also fall in a more disadvantaged position for their education, and this creates a challenge for accessing vocational education as well (Beyazova, 2019). This may lead to a likelihood for especially Syrian unaccompanied youth to fall into the NEET category.

Figure 8. Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in Bursa, Eskisehir and Bilecikby broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



The illustration above on the regional level shows a similar trend as the one on the national level. One of the possible interpretations for the sharp increase from 2013 onwards can be linked to the sharp increase in the number of Syrians under TPS between 2013-2017 (please see Temporary Protection, 2021) throughout Turkey as well as the region. Also, although the arrival of Syrians fleeing from the civil war to Turkey began in 2011, most of the Syrians lived both in refugee camps and outside the camps in the bordering provinces of Turkey within 2 years. However, the majority of Syrians in Turkey have turned into "urban refugees" after 2013 (Erdoğan, 2019), so they also moved to the Western regions, including Bursa Sub-region (NUTS-2 level, TR41), covering the provinces of Bursa, Bilecik, Eskisehir.

In addition to the increase in Syrian population in the region, the fluctuations and mostly sharp increase in NEET rate is mostly the result of the facts due to unregistered employment of Syrian youth, school drop-outs, and the language barrier as a serious obstacle to integrating the Syrian refugees into the education and work environment. All these dynamics were emphasized in almost all interviews conducted in the region. In many interviews, the reluctance of female employment as a cultural approach among the Syrian population was also raised as an issue. This could let the migrant population fall in the NEET category in the region as well.

One of the striking reasons to be evaluated under NEET rate among the foreign population is the decrease in schooling rate as the level increases in Bursa region. According to the figures, delivered by one of the interviewees during the field research (Informant 15, Bursa, 11 March 2021), whereas an average of 4000 students is enrolled in each grade at the primary school level, it decreases considerably in the upper levels. As of March 2021, for example, in Bursa, only 475 foreign students[8] (out of which 265 students are Syrians) are enrolled in the schools in the 12th grade. The migrant youngsters then have a very limited chance to go on their education at the university level or to find qualified jobs in the field of employment.

[8] As of 11 March 2021, the number of foreign students enrolled in Bursa province is 36.206, out of which 31.209 are Syrians.

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

Figure 7.1. Unemployment rate in Turkey by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: World Bank data.



An overwhelming proportion of migrant workers are employed in the informal sector. More than 95% of the migrant workforce are employed in the informal sector. As of May 2019, employment in the informal sector makes up 34.3% of the total employment in the Turkish economy (Erdoğan, 2019). Also, for the Syrian population among TCNs, the ESSN aid (Emergency Social Safety Net) seem to have a direct bearing on the scope and extensity of informal migrant labor. Since it is given to each member of the migrant family provided that none has formal employment, many Syrian refugees, who are eligible for ESSN aid from applying to jobs in the formal sector, are believed to prefer to be employed in informal sectors to enjoy its benefits.

The decrease in unemployment rates among the foreign population between 2016 and 2019 can somehow be explained by the regulation in January 2016 when Turkey decides to grant Syrians under TPS increased access to labor markets. According to this regulation, with a quota on temporary protection beneficiaries based on the needs of the sectors and provinces, the number of beneficiaries active in a specific workplace may not exceed 10% of the workforce, unless the employer can prove that there would be no Turkish nationals able to undertake the position. Also, only one temporary protection beneficiary may be recruited in a workplace employing less than 10 people. Although this is an important step in terms of economic activities and the integration of Syrian migrants in Turkey, even so, it cannot be said to show the expected effect in terms of registered migrant employment (Erdoğan, 2019).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

As there is no regional data on the unemployment rate for foreign population at NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the unemployment rates of foreigners or TCNs can be provided. The high rate of unregistered employment must be taken into consideration, not only for Bursa but also for Turkey in general.

Figure 7.2. Total unemployment rate in NUTS2 region Bursa, Eskişehir and Bilecik by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: TUIK Regional Statistics.



8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

Due to the lack of data on any of the levels, no specific characterization for the residents who acquired Turkish citizenship can be provided. Based on the secondary sources, only scattered numbers can briefly be mentioned.

Turkish citizenship is primarily based on the principle of jus sanguinis (by descent). Turkish descendants may be eligible to acquire citizenship regardless of the place of birth. A foreigner or stateless person can acquire Turkish citizenship after birth by the decision of competent authority on the basis of several conditions, e.g. exceptional and marriage. Turkey also started a citizenship program as of 2017 with a regulation (2016/9601) by which investment conditions were determined to acquire Turkish citizenship. Accordingly, there is the news, released based on the data of the Ministry of Interior, in 2017-18 (Daily Sabah, 2019), 70 foreigners applied for Turkish citizenship by investing $1 million each (Hurriyet Daily News, 2020). In September 2018, another amendment eased the minimum requirements for acquiring Turkish citizenship to encourage investment in Turkey. In July 2019, it was announced that 981 foreign investors became Turkish citizens since the 2018 amendment (Daily Sabah, 2019). In November 2020, the figure was updated as 7,312 foreigners who have become Turkish citizens over the past three years (2017-2020) by investing in property in Turkey. Accordingly, following September 2018 amendment, 7,242 foreigners from 93 countries made property investments in the country, each investing $250,000, and acquired Turkish citizenship.

The issue of granting citizenship to Syrian migrants is another issue frequently brought up. There are dispersed and confusing numbers mentioned in different studies, rarely, though. In the study titled "Syrians Barometer 2017" (Erdoğan, 2017), it is stated that 38 thousand Syrians were granted as of November 2017. In March 2018, the Refugee Rights Sub-committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM, 2018) published an immigration and cohesion report and mentioned approximately 30,000 Syrians have acquired citizenship in the last 6 years (2011-2017). About 10,000 Syrians acquired citizenship either because they were from a Turkish mother and/or father or through marriage. Only 1% of Syrians living in Turkey acquired citizenship in that period, despite the stories about a very large number of Syrians in Turkey acquiring citizenship. This figure was briefly mentioned reached up to 60 thousand in 2018 in a news article (Özbey, 2018). As of December 2019, the number of Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship was 110 thousand, according to the declarations made by the officials in their speech (Erdoğan, 2020).

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

"Migrants, refugees are people, not numbers" is an important ethical statement which we need to consider for human/refugee rights. However, both the numbers and the statistics are important to give us a picture of the situation that exists in the field. The existence of data or the lack of data or unreliable data is a problem as it may mislead the design of the policies, and the priorities.

Overall, the general approach towards immigrants, particularly Syrians, also plays a role. The dominant perspective, not be accepted as a permanent part of the current and/or future society in Turkey, has not only an effect on policymaking and policy implementation but also data collection. Hence, to develop short, middle, and long-term strategies for harmonization, the availability of detailed data is crucial. Furthermore, without the knowledge of the "universe", various studies that have been conducted in the field were not representative.

Syrians under Temporary Protection are registered to cities and their access to rights depends on this registration. However, for most in their search for work, they may go to other cities that they are not registered. Thus, some cities, including Bursa, are "closed cities", they do not accept new registry which leads to a problem as this affects the reliability of the data. Syrians with temporary protection identity cards from other cities both have difficulty accessing the rights and also prefer to be unseen as they do not want to be sent back to the city they are registered in.

Furthermore, the informal economy in Turkey also is an obstacle to the collection of reliable data but at the same time, the livelihood of Syrians often depends on this informality. Although the decline in the risk of poverty rate for the citizens of Turkey is observed, poverty and social exclusion have been an important problem in Turkey. The Covid- 19 pandemic creates further risks for this vulnerable population. The wide gap between have and have nots still continues in Turkey, along with regional gaps. We lack comparative data on the Gini coefficient of the citizens of Turkey and the third-country nationals living in the country. Hence almost all research in different parts of Turkey demonstrate competition among the poor with respect to social assistance and informal labor that leads to tension rather than social cohesion.

Thus, informal labor means usually precarious and exploitative working conditions endangering the wellbeing of the Syrians, from child labor to work-related accidents. The vast majority of third-country nationals work without work permits and outside the protections of the law- no social security, low wages. Thus, this informal work is also common for the citizens of Turkey and as noted, competition among the poor lowers the wages that are already below the minimum. Furthermore, even with work permits, requested by prospective employers, Syrians are allowed to work in the province in which they are registered. The application for work permits time consuming and costly and needs renewal every year.

Syrians under TPS residing in Turkey have lower levels of education and especially those working in agriculture are mostly the ones who migrated from the rural areas in Syria. Considering the NUTS2 level, the region, especially Bursa, is among the rural areas with high agricultural production and textile production. This makes the region attractive for both seasonal agricultural workers and textile workers, both are mostly informal, with migrant backgrounds, and with low levels of education.

Unemployment is also a serious issue for a long time in Turkey. Over recent years, the increase in the unemployment rate in terms of the foreign population can generally be explained by the arrival of the Syrian population to Turkey. However, this does not mean that the inflow of Syrian migrants in the labor market has a significant effect on the overall unemployment rate. This is mainly because an overwhelming proportion of the migrant workers are still employed in the informal sector, despite small procedural regulations providing rights to them to access to the Turkish labor market.

Regarding NEET figures, it is the fact Turkey has the highest NEET rate among the OECD countries. Several reasons such as political and socio-economic problems in Turkey caused by polarized politics, child labor, gender-related inequalities, giving up hope on finding jobs as well as migration have multi-layered effects on youth wellbeing in the country. The mismatch between young people's skills with the needs of the economy is also portrayed to explain the highest level of NEETs. More importantly, a considerable gender gap and the lower levels of female labor force participation have to be mentioned among the main reasons which cause an increase in the NEET rate in Turkey. Regarding migrant youth, the high level of NEET mostly refers to the arrivals of millions of Syrians to Turkey, and not to be well integrated into the job market as well as into the education system. The gender gap is also an obvious cause for the Syrian migrant population residing in Turkey.

To make a comprehensive analysis, the lack of data on acquiring citizenship is a very challenging issue. Although after 5 years of residence, immigrants can apply for naturalization, by completing language, economic and other requirements, it has still been criticized with discretionary and complex requirements. The issue of granting citizenship to Syrians under TPS is another issue frequently brought up in Turkey. However, there are only dispersed and confusing numbers mentioned in different studies.

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UNITED KINGDOM

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1. INTRODUCTION

This statistical report aims at exploring social polarisation in the United Kingdom among two groups, third country nationals (TCNs) and UK nationals. It does so by comparing key indicators of poverty, exploring income inequality, housing condition (overcrowding) and education attainments among TCNs and UK nationals or non-EU28 born and UK born, (both categories used to define non-EU migrants). Moreover, it explores social exclusion through unemployment and NEET rates. Finally, it explores social integration through the acquisition of the nationality or naturalisation.

From a demographic point of view, the Scottish MATILDE regions are marked by population decline, result not only of ageing but also of the outflow of the young generation seeking better employment opportunities or further education. Consequently, this decline concerns notably the working age population and it is only very partially mitigated by the inflows of UK and EU migrants whose presence is proportionally small. Furthermore, the islands in particular attract pensioner or (pre)pensioner population as lifestyle migrants: nationals looking for the rural idyll who generate pressure on public services and on housing availability for the locals or for returning populations (notably in their working age).

Regarding their socio-economic context, in both regions, the unemployment[9] was comparable to the Scottish average – in the Highlands and Islands in 2018[10] it was 2.3%, and in the Southern Scotland 3,3%. Relative poverty analysis seems not particularly meaningful – as the local incomes are on average lower than the national one – while material deprivation seems fundamental to analyse living conditions. It emerged from WP3 interviews that food and fuel poverty – such as the impossibility to afford fuel, which is more expensive in the islands due to higher transportation costs– need to be considered in those regions (Interview WP3SCOT06).

Focusing on TCNs, the indicators analysed in this report will allow us to reflect on the impact of migration policies. In particular, the Tiers-point based system that enabled TCNs skilled workers to enter the country while restraining unskilled ones and the Home Office Hostile Environment – a wide, opaque policy, not described by any so called 'white paper' and with no official definition available nor clear aims or objectives (Griffiths and Yeo 2021) that nevertheless is affecting the life of many migrants excluding them from rights, notably healthcare, employment, housing.

The indicators are analysed at NUTS0, NUTS1 and NUTS 2 level, that in our case correspond to the UK, Scotland and the regions of Highlands and Islands and Southern Western Scotland. This latter region exists only until 2013, then, on the Scottish government request, a new NUTS2 division has been created: the Glasgow and the surrounding local authorities (formerly part of the Southern Western Scotland region) became the West Central Scotland, while the remaining part of the former Southern Western region with the South–east of the Scottish borders became "Southern Scotland" (Scottish Government,

[9] Total unemployment rate among the population aged 15 to 64 years.
[10] No data is available for 2019.

2015). This change is very relevant for this report as data are described for Southern Western Scotland until 2012 and then from 2013 for Southern Scotland.

Data at Local Authority level seems not available for most indicators, especially because of disclosure issues or the difficulty of providing reliable estimations on small numbers. This limits considerably the analysis as local trends in the studied areas are likely to differ substantially from the national as well as the regional ones. The data source is EUROSTAT.

2. SHARE OF TCNS AT RISK OF POVERTY

The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median. The equivalised disposable income is the total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, divided by the number of household members converted into equalised adults (EUROSTAT Glossary[11]).

This indicator does measure "relative poverty", such as in our case TCNs, EU and UK nationals' income in comparison to the median of all the residents in the UK, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living and is not sensitive to regional dissimilarities. In this sense, also the trends we will analyse do not necessarily have to be understood as a change in migrants' economic conditions, but they can be understood as a result of their diminished or increased distance from the median incomes of all UK inhabitants – of which TCNs constituted about 10% of the population in 2019 (8% in 2009) and EU about 5% in 2019 (3% in 2009) (Office for National Statistics).

[11] Please find the full description of the indicator at the EUROSTAT glossary page "At-risk-of-poverty rate": https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:At-risk-of-poverty_rate .

Figure 1. At-risk-of-poverty rate in the U.K. by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+).
Source: Eurostat.



Between 2009 and 2018, the TCNs were overall considerably more likely to be at-risk-of-poverty than UK citizens and EU citizens, nevertheless this gap variated significantly during this decade.

In 2009 more than one in every four TCNs were living in a household at-risk-of-poverty. In one sole year, that is in 2010, this proportion increased of 2.6 points to 30%. In the same two years, the share of EU citizens (except UK) at-risk-of-poverty quite halved: from 19% to 12%. The UK citizens at risk of poverty stayed at 16%. It is likely that TCNs' economic conditions in those years significantly worsened. This can be interpreted as an effect of the Great Recession of 2008-2009 which affected different categories of the population in different ways, or it had longer lasting effects on TCNs, many of which have a more limited access to welfare benefits[12] than UK or EU nationals (see also Baglioni, Caputo 2021). The following years show a progressive decrease of the at risk-of-poverty rate, until 2014 when only one in every five TCNs was at-risk-of-poverty. This is mirrored among UK citizens although for them this decrease is less significant (2.6 points). We can understand such a decline of the at risk-of-poverty rate as the ending phase of the recession effects. On the other hand, in the same period the portion of EU citizens at risk-of-poverty increased and in 2014 reached that of the TCNs: one in every five. In this sense, in 2014-2015 there were no major differences between different groups of migrants vis-à-vis of poverty.

Among TCNs a slow increase occurs then until 2015 while a very radical change occurs between 2016 and 2017 when the indicator drops of 5 percentage points. But, since 2017 in only two years, the

[12] Migrants "subject to immigration control" and whose granted leave states that they cannot claim public funds are not eligible to welfare benefits. A "person subject to immigration control" is a person who falls into one of the following categories: someone who need leave to enter or remain in the UK but do not have it (e.g. asylum seekers with temporary admission) or someone who overstayed their leave to enter or remain; someone who have leave to enter or remain in the UK on condition that they have no recourse to public funds; someone who have leave to enter or remain in the UK as a result of someone providing a maintenance undertaking.

TCNs living in a household at-risk-of-poverty increased of 8 points, in 2017 they were 18% (less than one in every five) while in 2019 they were 26%, such as more than one in every four. Here, two main elements are important to understand: first of all, the introduction of the Home Office 'hostile environment' policy implemented with the Immigration Act 2014 and 2016 (Griffiths and Yeo 2021) and the general worsening of the relative poverty, showed here by the share of UK citizens at-risk-of-poverty that was even higher than during the recent recession years (18% in 2019). Concerning EU nationals, the poverty rate remains high in 2017, when it is even higher than that of TCNs, one in every five migrants, while he drops after 2017. This last number can be interpreted as a change of the EU population in the country, with workers in routine or semi-routine works or in non-permanent positions non-returning or leaving the country in the context of the Brexit referendum (Zubairi et al. 2020)

3. INCOME INEQUALITY ACROSS SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS

The median equivalised net (or disposable) income divides the UK population into two groups of equal size: the individuals in one half less than the median income and those in the other half earn more. Equivalised net income represents the economic resources available to a standardised household for spending and saving [13].

The median income of TCNs in the period between 2009 and 2018 was always lower than that of UK and EU nationals. In 2009 UK and EU citizens, had about 2.600 euros available more than TCNs. This gap increased in 2010, when the difference between TNCs and UK nationals' resources was of more than 4.500 euros.

[13] EUROSTAT, Statistics Explained, "Living standard statistics - median equivalised disposable income" https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=250634

Figure 2. Median equivalised net income (€) in the U.K. by broad group of citizenship (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



This gap tended then to reduce and in 2012 the distance between the resources of the two groups was of about 1.150 euros. This first period 2009-2012 needs to be understood in the context of the Great recession – that, as we argued earlier, seemed to have a bigger impact on TCNs than on UK citizens as the two groups did not have necessarily the same level of access to the to the welfare safety net (see section 2). Moreover, this can be also related to the introduction of the Tiers Point-Based System[14] according to which entry in the UK was prioritized for workers with specific skills (see below).

After an increase in 2014 when the net income gap augmented at about 1900 euros, in 2015 the gap reduced to 920 euros and in 2017 to about 510 euros. Such a gap reduction could be understood as post-recession recovery of the labour market and therefore more employment opportunities for TCNs but also to the Tiers Point-Based System aimed at allowing entry primarily to skilled migrants to fill qualified jobs. As a result of this scheme, TCNs workers tended to be proportionally more represented in sectors that employ notably skilled workers and to be underrepresented in sectors that employ mostly routine or semi-routine workers like the manufacturing sector, that were notably reliant on EU workers (Interview WP3SCOT01). This positive income trend changed in 2019 when TCNs had about 2000 euros less than UK nationals available for their spending and saving.

Comparing the two migrant groups, we can appreciate that the gap between TCNs and EU citizens incomes increases progressively over the years and has its peak in 2017 when EU citizens had about 3.700 euros available more than TCNs. EU migrants had overall similar incomes to UK citizens until 2017 when they started to have higher incomes than the local citizens. This can be understood as the effect

[14] The Tier Points-Based system (TPBS) is a visa scheme aimed at workers and students: it regulates the migration to the country for highly skilled workers (Tier 1), skilled workers with job offers (Tier 2) and low-skilled workers to fill specific labour shortages (Tier 3). A Shortage Occupation List defines jobs in short supply in the UK (and Scotland), these jobs can be filled by migrants under the Tier 2 route more easily than others. The Tier 3 was never implemented as all non-UK low-skilled labour requirements has been met by EU workers. The TPBS also allows the stay of Students (Tiers 4) and young people and temporary workers (Tiers 5), such as people whose primary interest to join the UK is not directly connected with the economy.

of the Brexit impact on the type of EU migrants in the country and with the depart of many migrants working in routine and semi-routine occupations (see previous section).

4. OVERCROWDING RATE IN IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

The overcrowding rate represents the share of people living in an overcrowded household[15]. It is sensitive to household type and size as well to the housing tenure, i.e. if people own or pay for their homes. Overall, the non-UK born population is much more likely to live in overcrowded households than UK born. As our data show (fig.3), the gap between the share of UK population on the one side and TCNs and EU28 born on the other side living in overcrowded accommodations remains large and constant for most of the considered time span (2009-2016), to be reduced in 2017, and to increase sharply, again, the following year.

Figure 3. Overcrowding rate in the U.K. by broad groups of country of birth (population aged 18+). Source: Eurostat.



In fact, the overcrowding rate among UK-born people was mostly constant around 4% across the time span considered here (2004-2019), it decreased to 2% in 2017. On the other hand, different migrant groups had similar trends. 18% of non-EU born and 13% of EU born migrants were living in overcrowded households in 2009-2010. This proportion dropped to 15% for TCNs and 12% for Europeans in 2011-2012, we can imagine thanks to improved living condition after the Great recession. But things deteriorated again after 2013 when more than one in every five people born outside the UK (22% TCNS in 2013 and 21% EU28 in 2014) were living in overcrowded households. Then the trend became different

[15] The household is considered overcrowded "if it does not have at its disposal one room for the household, one per couple in the household, one for each single person aged 18 or more; one per pair of single people of the same gender between 12 and 17 years of age; one for each single person between 12 and 17 years of age and not included in the previous category; one per pair of children under 12 years of age". EUROSTAT, Statistics Explained, Overcrowding rate, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Overcrowding_rate

for the two migrant groups until 2016 – with the Europeans being the group more likely to live in overcrowded households.

In 2017, there has been a dramatic fall in the overcrowding rate for all migrants group: only 6% of non-UK born were living in overcrowded households. In the most recent years, the trend restarted to go toward an increase and in 2019 about 1 in every 10 non-UK born (9% EU28 and 11% non-EU28 born) was living in overcrowded households.

Overcrowding is more common in the private and social rented accommodations and has risen in both since the 1990s (Wilson, Barton 2020). Non-UK migrants are less likely to be owners (53% of non-EU born and 39% of EU born while 71% of UK born) and more likely to be in privately rented houses (31% of non-EU born and 45% of EU born while only 14% of UK born)[16]; recent migrants in particular are almost three times as likely to be renters compared to other migrants (Vargas Silva, Fernández-Reino 2019). This context allows us to understand why non-UK born between 2009 and 2019 were in average 4 times more likely to live in overcrowded households.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that remittances are an important element to keep into consideration while discussing about migrants living conditions. The choice to save money to send to their country of origin can also contribute to shape migrants' housing condition. In particular, in the United Kingdom, 14% of EU born migrants and 30% of non-EU born migrants send money to family, friends, community, for saving (like investing in proprieties in the home country) and to repay a loan (Vargas Silva and Klimaviciute 2020) in their country of origin.

5. POPULATION BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

In this section, the report presents data on the educational levels comparing both the British and Scottish level and putting under the lens the differences between the UK born population and migrants. We will scribe those data and link them to the migrants' roles in the UK economy and migration policies.

5.1 PRIMARY EDUCATION

According to the Eurostat Glossary, the "primary education" term defines the programmers designed to provide students with fundamental skills in reading, writing and mathematics and establish a solid foundation for learning and understanding core areas of knowledge. The "lower secondary education" is the following educational program and it lays the foundation for lifelong learning and human development upon which education systems may then expand further educational opportunities (EUROSTAT Glossary [17]).

[16] Those data exclude London, that has very specific housing tenure structure (see Vargas Silva, Fernández-Reino 2019).

[17] International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 - Eurostat

Figure 4. Share of population 25-64 years with less than primary, primary and lower secondary education. Source: Eurostat.



The data are analysed at UK and Scotland level, while a comparison for the area of our case studies will be developed in the next section. In both areas, we aim at comparing education level among residents reporting the UK as "country of birth" are compared with those who were born in EU28 and non-EU28 countries. Firstly, it is interesting to observe at the UK born population show similar trends at UK and Scottish level – about 30% had only a primary education or less in 2004 and in 2019 this proportion became 20%, such as overall the British population became more educated both at country and national level. Furthermore, we found at UK level a similar decreasing trend among TCNs and EU citizens: the proportion of people with lower levels of education decreases across the time – from 23% to 17% among the TCNs and from 19% to 13% among Europeans – reflecting the tertiarised and skilled nature of the UK labour market, which attracts migrants with higher educational level, as well as the large component of students among migrants. At country scale, among the studied groups, Europeans are the least likely to have attained only primary education. At Scottish scale, TCNs and Europeans who attained only primary education are significantly less represented than UK born, nevertheless from 2014-2015 a major change occurred and the share of people with primary education or less among migrants doubled. Consequently, we can think that Scotland became attractive for a European migrant population looking for "low skilled" job in key Scottish sectors like food production or tourism, as well that data reflect also the arrival to Scotland of Syrian refugees as part of the Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme.

Figure 5. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



Both British and Scottish governments have implemented programs to enhance also migrants' educational levels (e.g. ESOL) that seems to affect the figures with a constant decrease at national level for most groups. Additionally, the more restrictive prescriptions of immigration policies have reflected also on education-related entry requirements (Lewis et al., 2012) and this can have reduced the entry of people with lower levels of education. Furthermore, it is important to consider how the population ageing favours the turnover in the workforce; older people with lower educational levels leave, thus, younger and more qualified workers enter in the counting. Additionally, the labour market is under constant change and improvement and it requires higher level of knowledge and skills (OECD, 2020b).

Data at NUTS2 scale are complex to analyse as the as the Southern Western Scotland region series is interrupted and the new region (from 2013) do not include the urban areas of Glasgow and surroundings. Furthermore, for the Highlands and Islands only data for UK citizens are available.

Western Southern Scotland (then Southern Scotland) and the Highlands and Islands present tendencies already described: a significant decrease of people with primary educational level among UK-born inhabitants. Non-EU28 and EU born population do not follow the same trajectory. In Southern Scotland, in particular, it worth mentioning that in 2019 one third of the EU born migrants attained primary education or less, showing a net difference from the country and the national level where only 13% and 14% of the European population have a primary education or less.

5.2 SECONDARY EDUCATION

Eurostat intends the "upper secondary" and "post-secondary non-tertiary education" as programs to provide people with more structured skills that can lay the base for the tertiary education or preparing for labour market entry (EUROSTAT Glossary [18]).

In this case, the trends of UK-born population are similar at country and national level. In the first year represented (2004), the share of UK born people with a secondary education was 40.6% at country scale and 38.8% at Scottish scale. These two values remained similar until 2010 (around 40%), then the UK born Scottish population with a secondary education decrease evidently – in 2019 was around 30% (while at country level it decreased of only two points). Those data need to be read as the indication of a progressively more educated population, as it will be confirmed by the following analysis of the tertiary education.

Figure 6. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



The non-EU28 and EU born population have similar dynamics at country and national level. In 2006, more than four in every 10 non-EU28 people had a secondary education both at country and national level – a slightly higher rate than the UK-born at UK as well as at Scottish level. The non-EU data remained almost in line with the UK-born between 2007 and 2010 but, then in one sole year, in 2011, there is an important drop (12pp at UK level, 15pp at Scotland level) and in 2019 only about one quarter of non-EU born population (28% in UK and 24% in Scotland) had a secondary education. Those data show a neat change in the migrant population arriving to the UK. The variation in the education level has to be understood considering the policy framework that the Scottish government has implemented over the years to enhance the work-based learning system (OECD 2020b) and the changes in the labour market. Job positions that required lower professional skills and education were predominant during the decade 2000 – 2010. During the following decade, there has been a growth of job positions in

[18] International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 – Eurostat.

sectors that require more complex skills and this have caused an improvement in people's education to respond better to market needs (Owen 2012).

Figure 7. Share of population 25-64 years with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



At regional level, we can appreciate how in the Highlands and Islands the indicator overall declines for all the three groups represented, in a coherent way with the national and Scottish level, such as with a more important decline for the migrant groups. At their highest, the share of non–EU born with a secondary education was 61%, of EU born was 67% and UK born 49%. In 2019, the EU born were 42% and the UK born 35%. No data are available for non-EU born population after 2014 when they were 45%.

In the South Western Scotland for UK born population there is a slow decrease and a more important for the migrant population as just seen for the Highlands and Islands. What it relevant is that the change in the description of the region, with the introduction of the Southern Scotland region and the exclusion of the urban areas, bring a radical change only in the curves representing the migrant groups: in 2015 60% of European migrants living in this region attained secondary education (they halve in 2017) and 40% of non-European migrants (in 2019 they were 32%). The lack of data does not allow a clear interpretation, nevertheless if we consider the Scottish and UK trend we would expect lower share of migrants with secondary education in those areas. This can be understood as the for the local labour marked in this rural region there is less need of tertiary skills.

5.3 TERTIARY EDUCATION

Eurostat intends “tertiary education” as the specialization in a specific field through learning programs of higher complexity. It is commonly understood as the academic formation but also includes advanced vocational formation (EUROSTAT Glossary[19]). Overall migrants – non-EU and EU born – are more likely to have a tertiary education than UK born population, and notably if they live in Scotland.

In 2006, at country level, about one in every three UK, EU and non-EU28 born person had a tertiary education. The share of tertiary educated people steadily increased in the following years, so that in 2019 more than half of the migrant population (EU born 52%, non-EU28 54%) had a tertiary education, a percentage significantly higher than that of UK born (42%). In particular, a consistent increase of the share of migrants with tertiary education occurred between 2010 and 2011.

Figure 8. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



At regional scale, overall both regions show an increase between 2004 and 2019 of the share of UK born population with a tertiary education: from about 30% to 47%. In the Highlands and Islands EU and non-EU born migrants seem overall more likely to have a tertiary education than UK born. Their share varied significantly over time, at their highest share 67% of EU born had a tertiary education (2015) and 90% of non-EU born.

In South Western Scotland and then in Southern Scotland we could find the same changeability in the rate of tertiary education for the migrant groups. Overall non-EU born and EU born are more likely to have a tertiary education than the UK born population. In 2010 the share dropped for both groups – nevertheless the share of people with a tertiary education was equal or higher than that of UK born population. At their peak, 56% of non-EU (2011) and 62% of EU (2013) migrants had a tertiary education. Since 2013, the share of migrants (both non-EU and EU) with tertiary education decreased until 2017-2018 and is increasing in the very recent years: in 2019 59% of EU born and 52% of non-EU born population living in Southern Scotland has a tertiary education.

This fluctuating data seemed strongly impacted by the small number of migrants, in and out migration of UK nationals to/from our regions, the change in the definition of the NUTS2 area.

[19] International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 - Eurostat

Figure 9. Share of population 25-64 years with tertiary education. Source: Eurostat.



Overall, the UK attracted and/or allowed in a population with higher education than the UK-born, this can be related to the implementation of the Tiers-Point based system but it reflects overall a labour market which requires skills and education. The job market in the UK attracts more high-quality skills workers than other countries and it has a more homogeneous distribution of natives and migrants in the sectors with requests of higher levels of education and working skills (OECD 2020a).

Furthermore, in the last fifteen-year UK had a progressively more educated population this can be explained with an increased access of migrants with a tertiary education and/or that migrants access tertiary education while in the new country, in this sense we need to consider the country's university and higher educational system well known attractiveness for international students.

At regional level, the appeal of those areas for important proportions of migrants with tertiary education is coherent with the recent growth of sectors that require high skilled workers (Owen, 2012).

6. YOUNG PEOPLE NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The term "NEET" defines the young people neither in employment nor in education and training (EUROSTAT Glossary[20]). The data used define the NEET age range between 15 and 24 years old. Figure 10 represents the share of NEETs in the United Kingdom for UK born, EU born and non-EU28 born people. In 2006 about 12% of UK and EU born young person were neither in employment nor in education and 13% of non-EU28 born, such as more than 1 young person in every ten. The number of NEETs though overall diminished in the studied period 2004-2019 (ending at 10% for both groups in 2019).

[20] International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 - Eurostat

Figure 10 . Young persons neither in employment nor in education and training in the U.K. by broad category of country of birth. Source: Eurostat.



Regarding the UK born young people, the phenomenon is stable between 2004 and 2008 (about 12%). After this period, there is a rise between 2008 and 2014, in correspondence to the years of the economic crisis, with a peak of 14% in 2011. Then, a decline with the lowest figure in 2018 (10%).

EU born NEET young people similarly experienced a rise from 2010 and a peak in 2012 (13%), then a progressive decrease until the last available data in 2019 (8%)

Among the non-EU born young people, NEETs increase between 2006 (13%) and 2008 (15%) – where about one in every seven people was neither in employment nor in education – then decreased to the lowest figure in 2015 (8%). In the next years, the phenomenon had a rise with a peak in 2017 (11%) and then a stabilization around 10%.

The NEETs share represents a young population not in employment or in an educational meaning likely poor socio-economic conditions in the present or in the future. For both non-EU28 and UK born young people, despite the rising curve between 2008 and 2014 – probably caused by the Great Recession – the trend abates and lays around 10% than means a lower percentage compared to the pre-crisis period. This reduction can be explained with the programs that governments activated to contrast the phenomenon in young people (Maguire, 2013; 2015). For non EU28 born, statistics show a drastic reduction after the 2008 crisis meaning an entry in the educational system and/or job market. In any case, the trends line up after 2017 meaning similar conditions between the two groups.

7. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

As one of the most significant indicators on the migrants' participation in the labour market, comparing to that of British citizens, this indicator will be analysed here at UK level (7.1) and then at national (Scottish) level (7.2).

7.1 NATIONAL LEVEL

This rate represents the number of people aged 25 – 64 unemployed, which means that they do not have a job although they are able to work, they are available to take a new position in the next two weeks, and have sought employment during the previous four weeks (EUROSTAT Glossary[21]).

Figure 11. Unemployment rate in the U.K. by broad categories of citizenship (aged 25-64). Source: Eurostat.



Figure 11 compares the percentage of unemployed people among UK and non-EU28 citizens. In 2006, non-EU citizens where two times more likely to be unemployed than UK citizens 8% was unemployed while only 5% EU citizens. Between 2008 and 2013 – in the context of the Great recession 2008 – the share of unemployed people rapidly increased among all groups: at their peak 10% (2011) of non-EU28 citizens where unemployed and 6% of UK citizens (2011) and Europeans (2012).

The figure show in the following years a constant decrease with the lowest point in 2019. The returning to pre-crisis level occurred in 2016 for non-EU citizens when 7% of them were unemployed and in 2015 for EU and UK citizens when 4% of them were unemployed. After this point, the rate decreases for both group and in 2019 only about 6% of non-EU28 citizens aged 25 – 64 was unemployed and less of 3% of UK and EU citizens.

Overall, non-EU citizens are more likely than UK and EU citizens to be unemployed. This can be related to the obstacles to their access in the labour marked – among the more relevant the, regulations that do not allow them to work as in the case of asylum seekers, difficulties in having their former

[21] Please find the full description of the indicator at the EUROSTAT glossary page "Unemployment": https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Unemployment

education recognised, language proficiency issues, racism and xenophobia, lack of social capital (Calò et al. 2021, Federico and Baglioni 2021).

7.2 REGIONAL LEVEL

For the UK citizens, the Scottish trends is very similar to the national one, the share of unemployed was about 4% until 2008, then a growth occurred during the year of the economic crisis with the peak in 2010 (7%). For Scotland, the recovery from the economic crisis appears to be longer than for the all UK: only in 2017 the unemployment rate returned to pre-crisis level (4%) and then it continues to decrease until the most recent data (2019, 3%). Concerning EU migrants, they were overall significantly less likely to be unemployed than TCNs and less likely to be unemployed then UK nationals during the recession: only 5% of the Europeans was unemployed in 2011-2012, then in 2013 the rate rise to 7% and declined to 4% in 2019.Coherently with the country level, also in Scotland the economic crisis affected more intensely the non-EU population. In 2008, the 7% non-EU citizens were unemployed, they became 11% in 2011 and they doubled in 2015 (14%). It dropped to 7% in 2019.

Figure 12. Unemployment rate in Scotland by broad categories of citizenship (aged 20-64). Source: Eurostat.



Overall, the non-EU citizens in Scotland suffered more the consequences of the economic crisis and had more issues to re-enter the labour market compared to the UK citizens. Furthermore, TCNs seems to experience an important rise in the unemployment in 2015 – we cannot know if this is the same trend started during the economic crisis as there is gap in the data for 2014-2015 – and in 2018.

Comparing figures 11 and 12, firstly, we can notice that the unemployment rate before the economic crisis was lower in Scotland than in UK for both UK, EU nationals and TCNs. Secondly, the Scottish unemployment rate was slightly higher for both UK citizens and TCNs during and after the recession compared to the all country. Unemployment is currently (2019) higher in Scotland than in UK for all the studied groups.

8. RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP

"Different factors affect migrants' desire and ability to become citizens of the country they have moved to, ranging from the desire for recognition as a full member of society and the right to vote, to legal certainty about their residence rights and pragmatic advantages, such as easier travel overseas (…). Reasons for seeking citizenship are not necessarily 'positive' and can include migrants' fears of poor treatment or discrimination (Sumpton, Fernández-Reino 2021). In 2002 the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, in the context of the assimilationist turn of British policies, the test 'Life in the UK' was made a requirement for immigrants applying for UK citizenship to demonstrate they have sufficient knowledge of 'life in the UK' as well as competence in English. Furthermore, a 'citizenship ceremony' was introduced to reinforce new citizens' affective ties to British national identity (Bartram 2019).

Figure 13. Residents who acquired citizenship in the U.K. as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship. Source: Eurostat.



Non-EU28 former citizens are generally much more likely to acquire British citizenship than EU citizens. This can be understood in the contest of EU free movement and the access of EU citizens to welfare and rights. Furthermore, EU migration to the UK it is fairly recent, so the percentage of the EU migrants entitled to apply for British citizenship is likely to be small. It is relevant in this sense that a pick is registered in 2013, more than five years[22] after the beginning of the economic crises that saw many EU citizens out-migrating. After the Brexit vote, there has been a steady increase in EU28 citizens obtaining UK citizenship.

Among non-EU28 citizens the yearly rate of citizenship acquisition was mostly stable between 2009 and 2013 around 7.5% (average for this time period) and dropped after 2013 to 4.5% (average for the period 2014-2018). This seems to be related to the Nationality Act issued in 2006 and the ensuing Home Office hostile environment policy (Griffiths, Yeo 2021).

[22] Five years is the time in the country requested to apply for citizenship.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Social polarisation, understood as a situation in which the extremes of a distribution in terms of incomes, access to housing, etc. are growing and where there is a missing or shrinking 'middle' (Koch, Fransham, Cant, Ebrey, Glucksberg and Savage 2019), has been investigated in this report at UK level toward the three dimensions of poverty, wealth inequality and housing, and using the three indicators of relative poverty (at-risk-of-poverty), incomes inequality and overcrowding.

In the period between 2009 and 2019, the TCNs were overall considerably more likely to be at-risk-of-poverty than UK and EU citizens. In particularly we could notice how the Great Recession of 2008-2009 affected significantly more and for more time the TCNs to the point that in 2010 quite one in every three TCN was at-risk-of-poverty (the double of UK nationals). This has been linked to their limited access to welfare benefits than nationals such as to access a safety net in difficult times (see also Baglioni, Caputo 2021). After the recession effects mitigated, and the TCNs at-risk-of-poverty became one in every twenty (2017), we could appreciate that in the very recent years their condition deteriorated again and in 2019 more than one in every four TCNs were at risk of poverty. This very recent trend seems to be linked to both an increased inequality and the general worsening of the situation in the UK where in 2019 more than one UK citizen in every six in 2019 was at-risk-of-poverty, a share higher than during the recent recession years. However, we argued that the introduction of the Home Office 'hostile environment' policy too contributed worsening TCNs economic conditions by restraining legal opportunities for them to access decent employment.

Income inequality has been explored between 2009 and 2018 and it showed a gap between TCNs incomes and those of UK and EU nationals. In 2010, when the TCNs at-risk-of-poverty were quite one in every three, the difference between TNCs and UK and EU nationals' resources was of more than 4.500 euros. This gap tended then to reduce and in 2017 the distance between the two groups was reduced by 9 times (compared to 2010). Two factors have been underlined here: the post-recession recovery of the labour market and therefore more employment opportunities for TCNs but also the effects of the Tiers Point-Based System aimed at allowing entry to the country to skilled migrants to fill qualified jobs. As a result of this scheme, TCNs workers tended to be notably skilled workers and to be underrepresented in sectors that employ mostly routine or semi-routine workers. Comparing TCNs and EU citizens, we could appreciate how the gap between their incomes increases progressively over the years and has its peak in 2017 when EU citizens had about 3.700 euros available more than TCNs. EU migrants had overall similar incomes to UK citizens until 2017 when they started to have higher incomes than the local citizens. This can be understood as the effect of the Brexit impact on the type of EU migrants in the country and with the depart of many migrants working in routine and semi-routine occupations.

Furthermore, we investigated housing and notably the rate of EU and non-EU born population living in overcrowded households. The gap between the share of UK citizens and migrants living in overcrowded accommodations remained large and constant for most of the considered time span – the overcrowding rate among UK-born people was mostly constant around 4% while for non-UK born was on average 15%. We interpreted this difference by reflecting on the link between overcrowding and the type of accommodation. Overcrowding is more common in the private and social rented accommodations and non-EU and EU migrants are less likely to be owners (less than one in every two) compared to UK born people (about 70%). Furthermore, we highlighted how migrants' remittances could contribute to shape their housing conditions and choices.

In conclusion, we could find in the dimension investigated important evidences of social polarisation between the three groups, EU migrants seems comparable to UK citizens in term of monetary poverty and incomes, but they are as likely to live in overcrowded housing as TCNs. Overall, the indicators showed a significant gap between TCNs and UK and EU citizens, an issue that worsened during the recession period as well as in the most recent years.

Social inclusion and exclusion have been explored through the analysis of the education levels of UK born and non-EU28 born population and of the young population not in employment or in an education. Education is both a tool of the migrant agency and a mean for inclusion. We could see how overall the UK has attracted and/or allowed in a population with higher education than the UK-born, and how it did link to education the implementation of the Tiers-Point based system of immigration, as well as to an internal labour market which requires skills and education. We also pointed out how the country's university and higher educational system attract international students that participate in those figures. Differently, at regional level, two factors have been mentioned, the recent growth in sectors that require high skilled workers with tertiary education and the impact of in and out migration. Education policies like ESOL and the work-based learning system have been described as important enablers for the migrant participation in the education system in Scotland. At regional level, we could appreciate an even higher share of tertiary education among migrants, this was the case of both the Highlands and Islands and the Southern Scotland.

Finally, we explored the share of not in employment or in an education (NEETs) among EU, non-EU and UK young population in the United Kingdom and Scotland. The non-EU born have an initial higher rate of NEET (15%) but it decreased since 2008 and it is now equal to that of the UK born (about 10%). UK and EU born youngsters have a similar pattern with a rise during the crisis period and a consecutive decrease ('only' 8% of EU born were NEET in 2019). These similar relatively low rates among all groups in the recent years have been linked to the programs that Scottish government activated to contrast the phenomenon.

Social integration has been investigated through the indicator of the acquisition of the British citizenship or "naturalisation", a word that mirrors French assimilationist terminology, and we compared here non-EU28 (former) citizens with EU (former) citizens. The first group was generally much more likely to acquire British citizenship than EU citizens. This can be understood in the contest of EU free movement and the access of EU citizens to welfare and rights as the same trend occurs across EU countries. Furthermore, EU migration to the UK is fairly recent, so the percentage of the EU migrants entitled to apply for British citizenship is likely to be small. In this sense, we noticed a pick registered in 2013, more than five years after the beginning of the economic crises that saw many EU citizens out-migrating. After the Brexit vote, there has been a steady increase in EU28 citizens obtaining UK citizenship. Among non-EU28 citizens a drop of the rate of citizenship acquisition occurred after 2013 and we interpreted this change in the framework of the barrier posed by Nationality Act issued in 2006 and the ensuing Home Office hostile environment policy to migrants' integration.

Overall, the indicators show in the last quinquennial a worsening of the social polarisation between TCNs on the one side, and EU and UK citizens on the other and increased obstacles to social integration. TCNs are overall more educated but they have lower incomes than UK and EU citizens. The presence of a common educational framework resulted of the Process of Bologna could be a key element to understand why for EU migrants' education and skills mean higher income, as the portability of the skills from the country of origin to that of arrival is a key factor in shaping migrants' opportunities in the labour market. TCNs have an even higher share of tertiary education than EU migrants but those skills are less likely to be recognised in the receiving country so that they need to rebuild both education qualifications and working experiences to access the local labour market (Baglioni and Isaakyan 2020). This may help to understand why high share of tertiary education among TCNs corresponds to lower income and higher risk-of-poverty. Other aspects such as discrimination, racism, and legal hurdles, do also play a role, as pointed out by recent literature (Calò et al. 2021, Federico and Baglioni 2021).

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